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Abstract 
Technological alterations are ongoing in many areas, also in high-risk industries. 
The petroleum production industry in Norway is going through a technologically-
driven transition period named “Integrated Operations” (IO). The transition 
includes changes in sensor technology that increase the amount of data provided 
for important decisions, information and communication technology that enable the 
remote operation of offshore fields and distributed organizations, and possibilities 
for operations in marginal fields where oil and gas production was not previously 
possible. Transitions have been a part of petroleum operations for as long as the 
industry has existed in Norway – companies merge and new fields are developed. 
Whereas technological development has followed a continuous path, in other ways 
IO represents a change due to the dramatic impact it has on its dependence on the 
geographical location of the actors.  
Outside IO there is a quite a dramatic change in the industry as we move towards 
the end of the petroleum age. Changing public opinion following accidents such as 
that in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 as well as climate challenges represents a threat 
to expanding production.  
The dissertation explores 1) the establishing of risk images in an early phase of the 
development of IO and how risks are differently comprehended in different groups 
of people, 2) how system risk models can be used to understand how risks may 
emerge in complex systems as IO, and 3) how emergency handling can benefit 
from a resilience perspective with IO. The results indicate that altered risk images 
are formed at an early stage of a (technological) development. Participation in 
different communities of knowing determines the comprehension of risks. Risk 
comprehension is influenced by technology optimism as well as one’s position in 
groups such as being part of the management or being responsible for 
implementation of new concepts or technology.  I found that the industry still relied 
on traditional risk assessment, and that areas where the technological development 
will have great impact, such as in emergency management did not enter a 
significant transition period during the period of this study. 
I have argued that IO is representative of the time in which it exists – not only 
something restricted to the oil and gas industry. The trends are not unique. Neither 
are some of the challenges identified for IO, especially when it comes to the 
comprehension and handling of risks. By that I find that the results from my work 
matter for the world outside IO – in healthcare, transport, energy, transport 
infrastructure, finance and telecommunications.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Technology in organizational and safety research – an 
area that needs more attention 
In general, organizational research studies do not address technology as a premise 
for change or as an actor in alterations on the safety level. However, some 
researchers address this gap (see a good overview by Orlikowski & Barley, 2001) 
and claim that socio-technical system theorists have increasingly framed 
technology as a process that requires input and output. Hence, the technology has 
become more like a “black box.”  Principally, safety research regards technology 
both as a contributor to risk scenarios and as a mitigator working as a barrier, but 
still treats technology as a “black box,” an artifact that humans must comprehend 
and handle (Perrow, 1986; B. A. Turner, 1978; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997; Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2001, 2007).  
In this introduction I will argue that technology must be taken much more into 
account in safety studies. I claim that we have to give more attention to the 
technology that surrounds workers in high-risk environments and the 
understanding that technology works as an actor in the socio- technical system, 
realizing that technology may not only alter our individual and interactive 
behavior, but also our work processes. This is not only something we must handle; 
technology alters our perspectives and limits of comprehension. It can most 
certainly be claimed that our perception of risk is influenced by the introductiuon 
of new technology.  
Today it has become quite normal for technology to be introduced, and this implies 
reforms and changes in high-risk organizations and systems (the term “high-risk 
organizations” refers to the HRO concept first introduced in LaPorte & Consolini, 
1991). Technology that is introduced sometimes has a strong influence on how 
workers and experts in organizations communicate and relate to each other and on 
how work time is spent. The development of technology seems to be self-
preservative – a process that is faster, better and sometimes cheaper. Devices are 
sometimes introduced in the early phases of technology development, and updates 
and new models are introduced before the previous one has become a part of 
normal life. This may be particularly true for information and communication 
technology (ICT). It is a characteristic of our modern society that technology is 
tested in real life, sometimes also in working life, with positive as well as negative 
implications. Good or bad, this implies that the development of technology is 
inherently connected to social life and we can argue that technology developed 
today for use by society and work at large is part of a socio-technical system, in 
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which it may be difficult to see the technological and societal aspects as 
significantly distinct.  
Organizations that operate high-risk systems such as those involved in oil and gas 
production experience changes, just like other organizations. Normally, changes in 
high-risk organizations are evaluated in terms of how they impact safety issues. 
The goal should be that the changes will not result in the impairment of safety 
issues – the state of the HSE1 should remain the same or the safety level should be 
increased (R. Flin, Slaven, & Carnegie, 1996). However, occasionally we 
experience changes that are not recognized as being relevant to safety, or safety 
studies are performed in a very early phase when the changes are still not 
experienced and the changes are unpredictable. Hence, the descriptions of the 
changes are underspecified, and therefore different studies are required in order to 
obtain a valid picture of the changes to the risks. 
Modern technology differs from much of the earlier technology when it comes to 
how much latitude people have when interacting with it. Conventional technology 
such as a production line does not leave much room for variable action, whereas 
modern information ICT often demands interaction and adaptive behavior. Modern 
technology is also more like a “black box” for the user: we know that it works, but 
not how it works. Thus, it is difficult to understand how people and technology 
interact – the socio-technical system has become more complex and intractable. 
1.2 Different leeway for action – revitalization of the socio-
technical perspective 
Whereas different organizational models have been introduced as a means for 
obtaining behavioral patterns (workflow, information and communication lines, 
etc.), technology – especially communication and information technology as well 
as data-providing technology – may have a greater influence on the way people 
work and relate to each other. Tasks that are to be completed are always within an 
environment. However, technology and organization are two major elements in this 
environment, and these two constitute the room for action or leeway provided for 
people. The performance of tasks will be adjusted to technology and organization. 
Thus, the leeway for actors in changing environments varies depending on how 
systems are set up, i.e. regarding rules, sanctions, and choices of actions. Modern 
technology in organizations seems to open a large leeway for actors in the system 
and rules seem to be set up ad hoc (e.g. the use of social networks, rules for e-
mails, data access, etc.). 
 
                                                          
1 HSE means Health, Safety and Environment – in Norwegian Helse, Sikkerhet og miljø 
(HMS). 
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Technology has had an impact on work and practice since the early days. I will not 
focus on the early developments in technology, but on the development of modern 
ICT and technology for information processing and visualization that has 
influenced working life over the past three decades. Technology as a premise of 
change, and how the technology influences organizational changes, has been 
studied and presented in several interesting publications (e.g. Heath & Luff, 2000). 
However, risk and safety is not an issue in these studies. Most research on IT and 
organizational change has focused on adaptation and change within single 
organizations. Macro-social and cultural elements are assumed to be unproblematic 
constants (Yates & Maanen, 2001). However, this observation implies that there 
may be a need to develop a new risk perspective on technology and transitions in 
high-risk organizations.  
 
Since the start of the twentieth century, several perspectives on organizational 
safety have been presented – regarding how organizational aspects may influence 
safety and risk. Apparently, reference texts have been published since the mid to 
late part of the twentieth century (see, for example, Haddon, 1980; LaPorte & 
Consolini, 1991; Pidgeon & O’Leary, 2000; Rasmussen, 1997; Reason, 1990, 
1997; Vaughan, 1996; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, 2007). In reality, technological 
aspects and factors are sparingly addressed in these perspectives. However, 
technology will be an issue of concern as well as people’s use of the technology 
(usually referred to as competence and skills). Safety, technology and organization 
will depend on each other and the dependency and the coupling between safety, 
organization and technology will become especially important when alterations 
occur, in either component. Hence, I will claim that it is an imperative to revitalize 
the socio-technical perspective in safety studies, in order to introduce a more 
comprehensive and complete theoretical approach to safety studies. 
Risk images of technological alterations and social construction 
Risk perceptions of new technology and technology-related changes have been 
studied as individual risk perceptions (e.g. Jaafar et al., 2007; Sjøberg, 1999; Tichy, 
2004). In general, differences are found in risk perception, but as I see it, how this 
influences the forming of risk images in a society or in an organization has not 
been thoroughly dealt with. From my understanding of former studies of the 
introduction of new technology in high-risk surroundings, I argue that technology 
introduced in organizations or societies cannot be understood by itself, but only 
through our own understanding of how it is used and how it influences our reality. 
This means that the interpretation of technology and how this influences our reality 
in relation to possible changes in risks are constructs. Risk images of new 
technology are formed as social constructs as the individual risk perceptions of the 
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changed realty are negotiated in dialog with and in social interaction between 
stakeholders, appliers and consumers of the technology.   
 
1.3 Integrated operations – an interaction with considerable 
leeway for action 
As a general framework for my study on safety in relation to technological 
changes, I have focused on the introduction of new technology in the oil and gas 
industry that has introduced a “step change” in how oil and gas operations are/can 
be carried out. This is an area where the action span for the actors of high-risk 
operations is wide due to the fact that the technology influences large parts of their 
work while giving considerable leeway to making the most of it in an efficient and 
safe manner.  
 
The technological change Integrated Operations (IO) was initially introduced as a 
technological development that would improve existing production and expand the 
possibility of new fields of production of oil and gas on the Norwegian continental 
shelf (referred to as NCS), linked to the oil and gas companies’ desire for lower 
costs, more efficient reservoir management and fewer mistakes during well drilling 
that will eventually raise profits and make more oil fields economically viable. The 
change in operation made by new technology has had different names such as 
“Smart fields” (SHELL), “Smart wells” (Schlumberger), “eOperation” (Hydro), 
“Field of the future” (BP), “eField” (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate), “i-field” 
(Chevron), “Real-time operations” (Halliburton), “Digital oilfield of the 
future/DOFF” (CERA), and “Intelligent field optimization and remote 
management/INFORM” (Cap Gemini) (a description of the different concepts can 
be found in OLF, 2006a). Since 2005, the term Integrated Operations (IO) has been 
used, mainly influenced by OLF and the major petroleum operating company in 
Norway, Statoil.  
 
Integrated Operations (IO) was developed as a description of the development of 
new ways of operating in oil and gas drilling and production on the Norwegian 
continental shelf as the general trend is towards the development of smaller and a 
greater number of deep-water fields where incomes and expenditure, as well as 
practical obtainable solutions, demand remote and cost-efficient operations (“tail 
production”). From the viewpoint of most researchers, IO is a technologically 
driven development, or, from the viewpoint of representatives of companies, a 
business-driven development with a technological enabler. Hence, the main 
changes can be categorized by technology, distributed work, and business 
opportunities: 
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Technology: IO includes the use of integrated real-time data technology and 
increased use of automation and remotely controlled operations.  
Distributed work: Improved information and communication technology enables 
the comprehensive use of distributed work, across organization borders or 
geographically located at different sites. “Around the clock” or 24/7 (24 hours a 
day, 7 days a week) work onshore offers possibilities for global network 
organizations with “follow the sun” principles, where distributed work includes 
work across national and cultural borders.  
Business opportunities: IO is seen as an opportunity to expand the life expectancy 
of existing installations with more extensive use of onshore planning, support and 
operation, and correspondingly a reduction in offshore staff. Also, new fields (“tail 
production” or “brown fields”) that were not considered as good business cases can 
be developed due to more efficient operations and improved technology. 
The implementation of IO has been presented in the literature as a development 
that would be implemented in two stages, referred to as Generation 1 and 
Generation 2. Figure 1 below was originally developed for the 2005 OLF report on 
“Integrated work processes: Future work processes on the Norwegian continental 
shelf.” The description of the concept of two generations has attracted much 
attention and will therefore be thoroughly presented here.  
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Figure 1 “Integrated work processes will most likely be implemented in two 
steps.” 
From the report “Integrated work processes: Future work processes on the 
Norwegian continental shelf” (OLF, 2005) 
 
The development of IO as described in Figure 1 goes through two stages in 
addition to the so-called “traditional practices.” The traditional practice is 
described as operations with limited integration between on- and offshore units. 
Changes to traditional practices are already seen in 2005 within well planning and 
well execution, where processes are more integrated. Though limited by 
organizational borders, production optimization is executed by offshore operators 
with some support from onshore experts and maintenance management that has 
evolved from preventive maintenance to condition-based maintenance, along with 
some integrated work between disciplines. In the second stage, named “IO 
Generation 1,” decisions are jointly made by onshore and offshore teams, working 
in integrated on- and offshore centers and collaborating in real time. Personnel 
onshore monitor the operations, identify operational and safety-related problems, 
and discuss actions with and support offshore personnel in the implementation 
phase. Off-the-shelf technologies, like high-quality audio and video systems, are 
used extensively. In the third stage, “IO Generation 2,” installations and subsea 
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fields are operated from integrated onshore centers that are manned 24 hours a day, 
seven days a week. There can be several locations involved, and vendors can be 
given responsibility for handling processes that were previously managed by the 
operators themselves. There is extensive use of digital services and changes in 
responsibility within the offshore control rooms. Information overload should be 
limited by “automatic filtering” and the automation of processes and decisions. 
Parties cooperate over the Internet on a 24/7 basis, and tasks are carried out 
according to “follow the sun or around the clock” principles. The second 
generation of IO is expected to become evident in the period 2010–2015. In the 
report it is stated that development towards second-generation IO requires several 
adaptations. Some of them are technological: digital infrastructure, information 
security framework and data standards. The technologies for instrumentation, real-
time gathering of data and real-time optimization were, in 2005, still expensive and 
immature. Thus, further development of these technologies was required for the 
successful implementation of IO.  
1.3.1 Technological alterations within IO 
The foreseen development is illustrated by the S-curve shapes. The S-curve model 
in Figure 1 shows the development towards an alternative way of operating, as a 
process that will follow predetermined steps or phases. It indicates that it is 
possible to predict the stage of development in the close or more distant future. S-
curves are normally used to describe how technologies evolve. It is common belief 
that most new technologies follow a similar technology maturity life cycle 
describing the technological maturity of a product. The theory is that innovations 
spread through society in an S-curve (Rogers, 1962). S-curves have also been used 
in research and development strategy planning to evaluate the maturity of 
technology or products (Mann, 1999). The use of S-curves in the OLF figure is an 
indication that IO is seen as a technological development. The paradox is that the 
stages described in Figure 1 are mainly of an organizational nature. The model seen 
in relation to present observed reality is also interesting. Still by the end of 2013, 
parts of the oil and gas industry in Norway may be at stage 1; others are at, or on 
their way to, stage 2, whereas some fields may be characterized as having reached 
this level of offshore-onshore integration. Typically, more newly developed fields 
and subsea installations are operated closer to stage 2 of IO with more control and 
operation from onshore and integrated contracts with contractors that are more 
interwoven in what resembles distributed organizations. Older fields with more 
traditional installations, however, have adapted to IO by developing onshore 
support and leaner organizations offshore that rely on communication with onshore 
support and expertise in their operations. The industry as a whole exists in all 
stages, in parallel, at any time. Some new fields are planned for the full 
implementation of these kinds of technical and operational solutions, but even in 
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these instances there seem to be blurred boundaries between traditional and “new” 
ways of operating in both the technological and the organizational arenas. 
1.3.2 Stakeholders/actors in the development of IO 
There have been several stakeholders in the development of IO, and their risk 
images of the technological alterations were of interest to me at the beginning of 
my work with this thesis:  
The Norwegian Oil and Gas Association (Norsk olje og gass), formerly known as 
the Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF2), is a professional body and 
employers’ association for oil and supplier companies engaged in the field of 
exploration and production of oil and gas on the NCS. In 2004, the OLF 
established a “Steering Group for Digital Services,” later becoming OLF’s priority 
area in IO. The steering group represented the offshore industry. In a presentation 
from their first meeting, the steering group stated that they would work for the 
acquisition of real-time data, the availability of a digital infrastructure offshore, 
information security, a data integration platform to provide quality information, 
integrated work processes (drilling, reservoir/production and 
operation/maintenance), new products and services based on real-time data, and the 
establishment of forums for dialog about IO with all the stakeholders (N. O. I. A. 
OLF, 2004). The OLF’s work on IO lasted until 2010 and has resulted in many 
reports in the field, most of which are referred to in this thesis. 
The center for IO in the petroleum industry (IO Center) is hosted by the Norwegian 
University of Science and Technology, where research, innovation and education 
within the IO field to promote accelerated production, increased oil recovery, 
reduced operating costs and enhanced safety and environmental standards are 
carried out. It receives funding from the Norwegian Research Council as well as 
from partners (oil and gas operating companies and contractors). During the first 
five years the IO Center established four cornerstones or research fields (“drilling 
and well construction,” “reservoir management and production optimization,” 
“operation and maintenance” and “integration across disciplines”), hence, the IO 
Center includes research within all fields related to the operation of oil and gas 
production facilities. The IO Center conducts research, innovation and education 
within the field of IO, to promote increased oil recovery, accelerated production, 
reduced operating costs, and enhanced safety and environmental standards. In the 
first research period (2007–2011) these four topics were addressed through four 
different programs: (1) drilling and well construction, (2) reservoir management 
and production optimization, (3) operation and maintenance, and (4) new work 
                                                          
2 I will use the abbreviation OLF in this thesis as this was the name of the organization 
during my main work with this thesis. 
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processes and enabling technology. The IO Center is governed by representatives 
from both the industry and the center’s many research partners. 
The Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) is the regulatory authority for technical and 
operational safety, including emergency preparedness, and for the working 
environment. Their regulatory role covers all phases of the industry, from planning 
and design, through to construction and operation, to possible ultimate removal. 
The PSA has held its focus on IO from the beginning of 2005, by financing 
research within the field, and has arranged for workshops where HSE and ICT 
security aspects of IO have been debated. They have especially focused on HSE. 
On their web page they state that the PSA will help reduce the risk of introducing 
IO, partly by investigating the possible significance of ICT developments for HSE, 
and that the PSA will be a prime mover in ensuring that the new technology 
contributes to HSE improvements, not least by encouraging the use of IO when the 
industry further develops HSE management. 
Operators, contractors and smaller service companies: All operating companies as 
well as contractors and vendors that operate on the NCS are to some extent 
involved in the development of IO. Some are more prominent than others and 
different companies have played special roles in some areas of development. 
Drilling contractors have been the driving force in developing ICT solutions for 
well operations. The companies generally speak of life extension and the more 
efficient production of oil and gas fields due to IO. In relation to IO, HSE is 
addressed, although it is not as much a priority as the development of IO. 
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2 Existing research 
In order to illustrate the relevant research for the topic of this thesis, I have 
identified four areas of existing research; (1) Risk and safety within IO, (2) Risk 
images and risk construction in different groups, (3) Emergency handling in 
distributed surroundings, focusing on technology-supported emergency handling, 
and (4) Use of system-based models in risk assessments with a special focus on the 
Functional Risk Analysis Method (FRAM). 
2.1 Risk and safety within IO 
HSE in general and especially safety aspects related to the IO development have 
been a focus of research in Norway since the beginning of IO, and several reports 
and papers have been published, (e.g. Apneseth 2010; OLF, 2007; Apneseth, 2010; 
OLF, 2007; Ringstad & Andersen, 2006; Tveiten, Lunde-Hanssen, Grøtan, & 
Pehrsen, 2008; Tveiten, Albrechtsen, & Skjerve, 2009; Tveiten & Schiefloe, 2009). 
Internationally it is difficult to find publications on IO and safety, or related 
developments, though Norwegian researchers have published their work in 
international media. The empirical-based research is sparser, as most publications 
focus on potential risks or the necessity for new safety perspectives.  
The rationality for new safety perspectives has been based on IO as a complex 
system rather than a system that is possible to divide into defined parts. In two 
papers presented at the Working on Safety Conference in Crete in 2008, and in the 
proceedings from the European Safety and Reliability Conference in 2010, Grøtan 
et al. argue for diversity in perspective-taking when assessing risk in a system as 
complex as IO (Grøtan, Albrechtsen, Rosness, & Bjerkebæk, 2008; Grøtan, 
Størseth, & Albrechtsen, 2010). The Cynefin model (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003)3 is 
proposed as a promising framework for addressing risk in IO because it can 
...”capture the mixed ontological and epistemological dimensions of the sense 
making situation” (Grøtan et al., 2010, p. 440). The Cynefin framework is used to 
describe problems, situations and systems. The evolutionary nature of complex 
systems, including their inherent uncertainty, is emphasized. The Cynefin 
framework provides a typology of contexts that guides the user as to what sort of 
explanations and/or solutions may apply. The model distinguishes between the 
                                                          
3 Cynefin is a Welsh word chosen for the model by Dave Snowden. Cynefin is commonly 
translated into “habitat” or “place”, though a more complete translation of the word 
would be that it conveys the sense that we all have multiple pasts of which we can only be 
partly aware: Our experiences, both through the direct influence of personal experience, 
and through collective experience.  
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directed order of the knowable and known and the undirected order of complex and 
chaos, making it possible to maintain control by responding categorically, by 
responding to system analysis, by responding according to interference to the 
system (probing), and by making sense of the system’s reactions.  
A central theme in research on potential risk in IO has been the introduction of 
ICT-based collaboration and monitoring. The role of ICT and security aspects is 
elaborated in a chapter on reducing risk in oil and gas production operations, 
concentrating on ICT (Johnsen, Ask, & Roisli, 2007). It is concluded that a holistic 
approach that addresses technical ICT-based risks, organizational risks, and risks 
related to human factors should be introduced in the petroleum industry (Johnsen, 
Ask and Roisli, 2007, p. 94). 
Looking at IO from a broader angle, it is seen that the introduction of ICT-based 
collaboration and monitoring influence both work processes and crisis handling 
(Tveiten et al., 2009). Within empirical studies on the safety aspects of IO, a need 
has been identified for updating the defined scenarios for hazards and accidents 
(DSHAs) which are used for emergency management planning, training, risk 
analysis and investment in risk-reducing barriers. The three possible future 
operational scenarios “Well control and lean staff levels; Integrated operations 
support from the onshore operations center”, “Onshore CCR (central control 
room)” and “Integrated supplier of crucial safety equipment” were described and 
explored in a study among identified significant actors in IO development (C. 
Tveiten et al., 2008). It was found that all these scenarios introduced unknown or 
little-known hazard and accident scenarios. Later, the possible hazard and accident 
scenario of “lost communication through the ICT system” was singled out as a 
scenario that should gain attention with the introduction of IO. In a study involving 
a literature review as well as interviews of key individuals within risk assessment 
and emergency management in the offshore petroleum industry in Norway, the loss 
of functionality in ICT systems was identified as a possible IO-related DSHA 
(Skjerve, Albrechtsen, & Tveiten, 2008; Tveiten et al., 2009). In the report from 
the study it is further stated that  
“...this DSHA may include that expert evaluation/analysis for operation/well is not 
available in situation of deviance or in normal operation (that gets out of hand), 
and/or that there is limited contact between first and second line emergency team 
in an emergency situation (if first line emergency is still offshore) or that there is 
no local emergency expertise on installation if first line emergency has been moved 
onshore” (Skjerve et al., 2008, p. 30).  
In the empirical study where the three operational scenarios of “Well control and 
lean staff levels; “Integrated operations support from the onshore operations 
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center”, “Onshore CCR (central control room)” and “Integrated supplier of crucial 
safety equipment” were assessed, it was explicitly suggested that an IO-related 
DSHA should be related to failure in ICT systems:  
“It is perceived as a serious risk that ICT systems failure is not part of standard 
analyses of /defined situations for hazard and accidents (DSHA’s)/ (...) In 
integrated operations-situations involving loss of communication or other ICT-
related scenarios are relevant in relation to the definition of factors which can 
cause dangerous or emergency situations (...) They should be included in the 
definition in order to ensure that they become part of risk analyses, education, 
training and so on” (Tveiten et al., 2008, p. 18). 
2.2 Risk images and risk construction in different groups 
The research area on risk images is mostly covered in studies of risk perception. 
Such studies often involve looking at differences in risk perception between 
groups. Of special interest for this thesis are studies on the risk perception of new 
technology and technology-related changes in high-risk industries. In a study of 
technology-readiness among managers in a Malaysian construction company, 
Jaafar, Aziz, Ramayah and Saad (2007) used the Technology Readiness Index 
(TRI) to identify technology readiness differences between companies. The TRI 
measures optimism, innovativeness, discomfort, insecurity and a general 
measurement of all items. As a result of the study the authors stated that risk 
perception is dependent on an individual’s perception of his or her own knowledge 
about the risky matter. According to this view, those that claim themselves experts 
or have great knowledge on, for example, a technology, demonstrate a lower 
perception of risk associated to the implementation of that technology. The basic 
thought is that optimism, innovativeness, discomfort and insecurity vary within 
groups of people in terms of their attitudes (skeptic, pioneer, paranoid) towards 
technology (Jaafar et al., 2007). “Explorer” and “pioneer” were generally found 
characteristics between managers and technology experts in the companies studied, 
and respondents with high scores on these characteristics also have significantly 
higher scores on technology optimism. The differences between groups in terms of 
risk images of new technology are found to be similar in other studies. It is 
generally found that the differences between experts and lay people is related to the 
fact that the experts are normally attributed the highest degree of optimism when 
judging risks with new technology. A study of risk perception in different groups 
using a new questionnaire, called the Austrian Technology Delphi (Tichy, 2004) 
lists several reasons for this difference. He refers to the literature where it is 
suggested that unrealistic optimism may result from the overestimation of one’s 
own capabilities and the underestimation of risks inherent in one’s own work. 
Perceived controllability, commitment, and emotional investment may be seen as 
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typical constellations influencing an insider’s points of view. Also it must be taken 
into consideration that experts pushing ahead development in their specific field 
must believe in its significance and in its future. There is a strong influence by the 
desirability of the outcome. Insiders overestimate their knowledge and their 
competitiveness relative to their competitors (Tichy, 2004). In his study using the 
Austrian Technology Delphi inventory, Tichy (ibid) found that in both the Austrian 
and the equal questionnaire, – the German Technology Delphi – experts self-rated 
as more knowledgeable gave more positive answers than those experts who rated 
themselves as less knowledgeable. In different studies, Lennart Sjöberg (1999) 
found that experts and the public disagree in risk assessments, and that there is 
some sort of lack of trust among the public whereas the expert’s rate risk lower 
(Sjöberg, 1999). In later studies it has been found that the level of education does 
not have a significant effect on the perceived need for precaution (Sjöberg, 2009). 
A similar finding is common when studying risk perception among “managers”, 
though the occupational category “management” has been used ambiguously 
within many research studies, describing various levels of management from chief 
executive officer (CEO) to first-line supervisor. Apart from an earlier survey 
among offshore installation managers (OIM) in 1991 (Rhona Flin & Slaven, 1993, 
1994), which concentrated on the emergency command function of OIMs, the 
management group in the offshore petroleum industry has been largely ignored by 
researchers. Management as a feature to risk perception is however found in many 
safety climate questionnaires. Flin et al. (2000) examined 18 safety climate 
instruments used in industry and extracted the following dimensions: 
“Management/Supervision” (especially in relation to perceived commitment to 
safety), “Safety System” (procedures, practices, and equipment), “Risk” (attitudes 
to risk-taking), “Work Pressure” (work pace – production versus safety), and 
“Competence” (knowledge, skills, training). “Procedures/Rules” was also a factor 
found in a number of studies. Guldenmund (2000) identified similar factors from 
the 16 articles he reviewed. In both reviews, management appears as a dominant 
variable for lower risk perception. This includes first line supervisors, site 
managers and senior managers. The level of management is not however always 
well specified. Using a self-administered survey on 915 (the response rate was 
92%) offshore petroleum personnel, Rundmo (1994) analyzed the association 
between organizational factors and safety in the Norwegian offshore environment, 
and found that employee perceptions of greater management commitment to safety 
and a priority of safety over production goals were important predictors of 
employee satisfaction with regard to safety and contingency measures (Rundmo, 
1994). This finding was replicated in a subsequent survey in the UK sector using a 
similar set of measures (R. Flin et al., 1996)  
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Later research within the field of how risks are perceived and comprehended has 
focused on new perspectives of the duality in risk perception; risk as feelings and 
risk as analysis. The importance of affect and the lack of rationality in risk 
decision-making have long been known, based on the works of Kahneman and 
Tversky on heuristics and biases in judgments (Kahneman et al., 1982). Slovic et 
al. underline the importance of affect in decision-making (Slovic, Peters, Finucane, 
& MacGregor, 2005), but emphasize the importance of looking at the two aspects 
of risk comprehension as a “dance of affect and reason” (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, 
& MacGregor, 2004 (p. 4)). Partly based on findings from neuroscience (Damasio, 
1994) they claim that there is also a strong element of rationality in the affective or 
experimental mode of thinking. According to Slovic et al., “the rational system is a 
deliberative, analytical system that functions by way of established rules of logic 
and evidence, and the experimental system encodes reality in images, metaphors 
and narratives to which affective feelings have become attached” (Slovic et al., 
2004, page 6). They conclude that the experimental system with its affect heuristics 
enables people to be rational actors when our experience enables us to anticipate 
the future and the consequences precisely, but that it fails when the consequences 
turn out to be different than what was anticipated. Slovic et al. (2004) emphasize 
the need for understanding the affect heuristic and how it may benefit risk analysis.  
2.2.1 Construction of risk images 
A social arena is a metaphor to describe the symbolic (not geographical or 
organizational systems) location of political actions that influence collective 
decisions or policies (Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988; Kitschelt & Offe, 1980). The focus 
is the political issue at the meso level of society rather than the individual/micro 
level) or societal behavior as a whole (macro level). The arena idea only 
incorporates those actions by individuals or social groups that intend to influence 
collective decisions or policies. The center stage of an arena is occupied by the 
principal actors – that is those groups in society that seek to influence policies. 
Theories on social arenas focus on influencing in decision-making (Renn, 1992). 
In association with theories and research on communities of practice that originate 
from the work of Wenger (Wenger, 2004), knowledge-creating groups have been 
named communities of knowing, described as inter-organizational or inter-
institutional communities of specialized knowledge workers where dynamic 
interactions facilitate the emergence of new meaning and knowledge (Boland & 
Tenkasi, 1995). The term “perspective making” is explained as a process whereby 
a community of knowing develops and strengthens its own knowledge domains 
and practices, whereas “perspective-taking” denotes the process of taking account 
of the knowledge and expertise of others. Boland and Tenkasi claim that 
communities of knowledge workers who deal with parts of an overall 
organizational problem through perspective making and taking will interact to 
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“create the patterns of sense making and behavior displayed by the organization as 
a whole” (ibid, p. 351). One can also say that such communities “develop unique 
social and cognitive repertoires which guide their interpretations of the world” 
(ibid, p. 351). Another important point made by Boland and Tenkasi (1995) is that 
communities of knowing can operate within specific forums, which serve as a kind 
of “container” for dialogue on certain topics, issues, concerns or tasks. Different 
kinds of forum reflect the way work on knowledge is being focused, as well as 
pointing to the kinds of knowledge structures that are emerging. Boland and 
Tenkasi are especially preoccupied with forums based on electronic 
communication media, but the reasoning may also be relevant for knowledge work 
and sense making processes taking place in other kinds of communication setting. 
Five classifications of forums are presented: task narrative forums where stories 
and other oral communication including videos enables information for all that 
attend; knowledge representation forums where communication is not only 
narrative in an auditory or visual way, but involves written material that is 
discussed and reformulated; interpretive reading forums that involve an intended 
criticism or search for tacit information about the knowledge; theory building 
forums where communication on the theories that underlie the decisions is the 
focus; and finally intelligent agent forums where agents outside the organization or 
system are involved, such as libraries, databases or other information sources. 
The forming of risk images among people in general and groups like mass media 
and authorities in particular have been studied in social settings by researchers like 
Paul Slovic, Ortwin Renn, and Roger E. Kasperson. Social amplification theory 
(Renn, 1991; Slovic, Pidgeon, & Kasperson, 2003) and arena theories Renn (1992) 
recognize political issues in the formation of risk images, as well as the fact that 
risk images are the result of negotiations and other processes between groups and 
individuals. In theories of risk approach and assessment where political aspects of 
the actors involved are important, the actors are seen as involved in role playing, in 
games and negotiations. Social amplification theory (Kasperson, 1992; Kasperson 
et al., 1988; Renn, 1991) focuses on social interactions during events or 
perceptions of risk. Social interactions can heighten or attenuate perceptions of 
risk. By thus shaping perceptions of risk, risk behaviors are also shaped. 
Behavioral patterns, in turn, generate secondary consequences that extend far 
beyond direct harm to humans or the environment. According to Kasperson (1992), 
liability, insurance loss, loss of trust in institutions, and alienation from community 
affairs, are a few such examples. Field studies using the social amplification theory 
as a basis show that the forming of risk images in society is rather complex and 
depends on a number of attributes, and the role of e.g. mass media is important but 
not the same in all cases (Kasperson, 1992, p. 173).  
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Risk and safety within IO, Risk images and risk construction in different groups and 
cConstruction of risk images are further explored in the studies presented in paper 
1 on risk images and 2 on safety comprehension among different groups.  
2.3 Emergency handling in distributed (technologically-
supported) surroundings 
In their study of recent crisis managements in the UK, French and Niculae (2005) 
found that science (or scientific models) formed the basis for coping with crises 
(French & Niculae, 2005). In their study, they intended to explore a more balanced 
perspective on the role of scientific input in emergency management, and to reflect 
on the use of models in the context of decision support systems. Reflecting that 
socio-economic and cultural issues are left out in studies of emergency 
management they argue that authorities need to take a socio-technical, rather than 
purely technical i.e. “science-based”, approach at the outset when planning their 
response to an emergency. The reason for this approach is partly due to the 
uncertainty that will arise from information in emergency management that does 
not fit the scientific model. They argue that most emergency management models 
are based on a belief that the system is known or knowable, i.e. that cause and 
effect are understood and predictable or can be determined with sufficient data. 
They further conclude that this may be due to overconfidence in emergency 
preparedness modeling. They claim that most models are poorly calibrated for 
major accidents since these are by nature infrequent, thus insufficient historic data 
exist to test the models.  
In a later article within the same area of research from the same authors it is argued 
that serious accidents arise because they are unanticipated, and management teams 
must think through alternative strategies from the start (Simon French, Carter, & 
Niculae, 2007). The people involved are drawn from other “day jobs” and have 
little experience of working in a crisis situation (with and assessing the import of 
the advice from their experts) (S French & Niculae, 2005), p. 10). 
Investigation reports on the successful handling of major accident scenarios often 
include a description of how people at the sharp end apply a combination of layers 
of defense that is not only relying on a detailed or more generic predefined 
handling of the situation. This has been reported in studies on the emergency 
management of the Snorre A gas blow out incident in 2004. The pre-described 
models of events (defined scenarios for hazards and accidents) did not fit the 
Snorre A case, and the crew needed to improvise and apply uncertain procedures in 
order to bring the well back to a safe state (Brattbakk, Østvold, Zwaag, & Hiim, 
2004; Schiefloe et al., 2005). 
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When introducing (new) technology in emergency management it seems quite 
common to conclude that information and communication technology (ICT) must 
be carefully introduced into emergency preparedness training. This is shown by a 
study of emergency management of breakdown of the Swedish power grid by 
Woltjer, Lindgren and Smith (2006), and in a study of the introduction of an 
information management system for the incident management systems in homeland 
crisis management in Australia (Iannella & Henricksen, 2007). Woltjer et al. 
(2006) observed a real-time simulation of the emergency management of a 
devastating storm. The exercise was initially meant to train the crisis 
communication skills of radio correspondents. As a storm occurred, resulting in a 
breakdown of telephone and electrical grids in large parts of the country, the 
training session was therefore of larger interest than the initial purpose. The 
emergency management team was to collaborate in a new way for this exercise; the 
team would normally stay at home and collaborate through telephone conferences, 
but for this training session they used a meeting room where they could collaborate 
face to face. The team functions and use of artifacts (whiteboard, e-mail, phone, 
maps radio, face to face, etc.) was studied. The whiteboard and the face to face 
communication were the most used media for all team functions. Woltjer et al. 
concluded that the remaining artifacts lacked important characteristics for use in 
team communication. They further claimed that there should not be a mismatch 
between the ICT tools used in training and those used in the actual work 
environment, as this may lead to domain-specific skills not being transferred to real 
situations. They go on to say that the skills may transfer but that they are 
inappropriate and a source of confusion and ineffectiveness (Rogier Woltjer et al., 
2006) p. 336). Emergency management systems that are not used on a regular basis 
are unlikely to be of use in actual emergencies.  
Ianella and Henricksen (2007) participated in a training session on the emergency 
management of a simulated cyclone heading towards a large regional city. They 
observed the training session and identified areas where ICT could play a larger 
role to improve the effectiveness of communication and information management. 
Incident information and resource messaging were identified as two areas where 
ICT may play such a role. They conclude that crisis information management 
systems help support the information-rich needs for emergency management teams 
(Iannella & Henricksen, 2007). A key challenge for such systems is the 
heterogeneous ICT systems in different organizations which for a crisis 
information management system are required to provide a seamless service across 
organizational borders. They also identified challenges for sharing information and 
terminology between cultures in different organizations (ibid, p. 589). Emergency 
handling in distributed surroundings is further explored in the paper on Building 
resilience into emergency management (paper 4) 
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2.4 Use of system-based models in risk assessment 
In a project memo for the “Interdisciplinary risk assessment of integrated 
operations addressing human and organizational factors (RIO)” project, it is argued 
that none of the perspectives within organizational safety that had been identified 
in a report by Rosness (2004) and in a revised version of the report by Rosness, 
Forseth et al. (2010) are sufficient to meet the needs for assessing risk in the RIO 
project (that is to assess risk in IO) (Hollnagel & Besnard, 2009). The five initially 
identified perspectives in the 2004 report were the energy and barrier perspective 
(Haddon, 1980), the normal accident perspective (Perrow, 1984, 1999), the HRO 
perspective (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; Roberts, 1993; G. I. Rochlin, 1993), the 
information processing perspective (B. A. Turner, 1978) and the as a framework 
for the risk assessment of IO. The authors refer to the argument that socio-technical 
systems have become so complex that they defy linear and causal descriptions. 
This is an argument that can be traced back to Perrow’s theory of normal accidents 
(1984) and that is further elaborated on in descriptions of the development of safety 
management methods (Hollnagel & Speziali, 2008). It is concluded in the memo 
that the traditional approaches to risk assessment should be completed by 
approaches that are capable of addressing complex socio-technical systems that 
defy traditional linear descriptions. They assume that IO in the petroleum industry 
in Norway falls within such a category. They also argue that safety management of 
such systems should be obtained by principles and methods that address the 
carrying out of the system without distinctions made between safety and 
productivity (Hollnagel & Besnard, 2009). 
In a paper for the 2009 EUROCONTROL Safety research and development 
seminar and additionally in his PhD thesis, Luigi Macchi applied a RE approach to 
risk assessment using FRAM (Luigi Macchi, 2010; L. Macchi et al., 2009). The 
FRAM method was first presented in the book Barriers and accident prevention 
(Hollnagel, 2004) and has been related to the RE perspective, together with the 
system theoretic accident model and processes model and method (STAMP) 
(Leveson, 2004a, 2004b). Macchi applied FRAM to look for risks due to the 
combination of variability of normal performance rather than system failures in a 
minimum safety altitude warning system (MSAW) for air traffic management 
(ATM). Macchi proposed that performance variability in a risk perspective could 
be assessed by the use of the precision aspects “precise”, “acceptable” and 
“imprecise”, and the temporal characteristics “too early”, “on-time” and “too late” 
in a three-by-three matrix that results in an overall performance variability for each 
function in a system model. The analysis showed that an inappropriate enabling of 
the alert transmission in combination with a “trivial” anticipation of a clearance 
could result in a degraded performance of the monitoring function (Macchi et al., 
2009, p. 10) 
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There are few publications on the use of socio-technical and systemic models for 
risk assessment. The use of such models is also explored in accident investigation. 
As a result of a comparison between FRAM and the multi-linear model STEP 
(Hendrick & Benner, 1987) when investigating an accident, Herrera and Woltjer 
found that FRAM is well suited for system accidents and that it brings forward a 
better understanding than traditional methods such as STEP (Herrera & Woltjer, 
2009). The use of system based models in risk assessment is further explored in my 
paper on Resilient planning of modification projects in high-risk systems by use of 
the FRAM methodology (paper 3). 
2.5 Relevance of existing research for the research 
questions of this thesis 
Existing research on risk images and risk comprehension showed that there risk 
awareness about IO existed in the studied groups of informants. Still, little was 
known on how the risk images and comprehension was formed and how groups of 
people potentially differed in their risk images. I found it important to study these 
issues to elaborate on the images of risks related to technological changes. I also 
found it relevant to look for communities of knowledge within the offshore 
petroleum industry, as little was known about inter-organizational groups of 
stakeholders’ influence on risk image forming. 
I found no existing research on risk assessments of complex planning processes, 
though promising results were shown with system-based models on complex work 
operations. As incident investigations had shown that social factors are important 
contributors to hazardous situations and the handling of crises in the offshore 
petroleum industry as they are elsewhere, I found it relevant to apply system-based 
risk assessment models to high-risk work processes in the petroleum industry. 
As research had shown that emergency handling may be influenced by the 
introduction of advanced ICT, I found that empirical studies of emergency 
situations, followed by interviews and workshops, could bring light to whether 
emergency handling could benefit from IO or if there were any challenges that 
could be introduced for emergency management.  
2.6 Findings from existing research and implications for my 
research 
The presented existing research address the fact that IO introduces a change in 
risks and that risk perception is influenced by participation in groups. Also it seems 
evident from the existing research that social arenas are important in decision 
making processes about risks and that new technology influence emergency 
handling in different situations.  
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The existing research does not address how risk images are formed on 
technological alterations in general in high risk systems or managed in crisis 
handling. Nor is it demonstrated how new risk assessment methodology can 
intercept changed risks in technology - altered systems. By addressing these issues 
I hope to contribute to bridging of different research perspectives and provide 
better insight on risk comprehension and management in a high risk industry 
undergoing technological alterations.   
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3 Theory 
In general, theories and perspectives on organizational changes give little account 
of how technology changes alter ways of work in organization. There are theories 
and perspectives on how organizational issues influence risk and safety, though 
neither of these perspectives address how operating in a safe manner is influenced 
by technological changes. In this chapter, I present the essential theories and 
perspectives on technology in high-risk organizations, and how safety in social 
technical/material systems is addressed. Though these perspectives give valuable 
insight to organizational issues in technological and high-risk systems, I end this 
chapter by arguing for an integrated theoretical perspective on technology and 
transitions in high-risk organizations. 
3.1 Technology in high-risk organizational research 
An organization may be defined as... “systematically arranged frameworks relating 
people, things, knowledge and technologies, in a design intended to achieve 
specific goals” (from (Clegg, Kornberger, & Pitsis, 2008) p. 8). Based on this 
definition, technology and people (and knowledge and things) are seen as separate 
units or elements in the organization. They relate to each other, but do not 
necessarily co-act.  
Most theories on organizational changes focus on the implementation of 
modifications that through phases of change result in a new situation – a changed 
organization (e.g. the business re-engineering perspective first presented by 
Hammer and Champy in 1993). Researchers have also argued that organizational 
changes are dynamic and that changes are more the normal situation for 
organizations than any stable state (Senge, 1992, 1994, 1999). Still, technology is 
often seen as a premise for organizational change – change in an organization is 
related to adopting the technology; the introduction of (new) technology produces 
changes in work processes, performance and routines.  
Karl Weick has argued from the sense-making perspective and points out that 
people make sense of situations and continuously change the organization through 
micro actions that imply a change in macro systems (Weick, 1995, 2001). He has 
argued that organizations are like a football match but without rules and full of 
conflicting goals. In this view, organizational change is not the result of planned 
actions with clear consequences and implications. Weick takes a constructional 
perspective in which organizational designs are emergent and where organizational 
changes are ongoing improvisations, with actors trying to make sense of the 
situation. These ongoing processes are labeled double interacts; where an act is 
followed by a response that leads to reaction change in the initial act followed by a 
response, in an ongoing loop (Weick, 1979). Weick (2001) claims that previous 
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technology in the industrial era has been described as deterministic, with clear 
cause-effect relationships, whereas modern technology is described as more 
unpredictable and abstract. In Weick’s terminology, technology is seen as 
something (an equivoque) that admits several plausible interpretations and is 
therefore “... subject to misunderstandings, uncertain, complex and recondite” 
(Weick, 2001) p. 148). Weick argues for that the equivocal processes in 
organizations can better be understood by talking about structuration rather than 
structure, affect rather than analysis, dynamic interactive complexity rather than 
static interactive complexity and premise control rather than behavioral control 
(ibid, p. 149). Structuration is used to describe the two sides of a structure; 
structures are both the medium and the outcome of interaction. Technology 
constrains people, but is also constrained by people. Structuring is an ongoing 
process that shapes meaning through interaction; tradition, writing and structure are 
themselves shaped by those meanings (ibid, p. 162). Dynamic interactive 
complexity is an extension of the concept of interactive complexity (Perrow, 1984). 
By thinking of how organizations that function as tightly-coupled complex vs. e.g. 
loosely-coupled systems, linear functioning organizations are able to cope with 
tighter and more complex situations, Weick argues that organizations disintegrate 
at different speeds depending on their former experiences with interactive 
complexity. Less experience means faster deterioration, whereas organizations that 
have experienced complex interaction deteriorate at a slower pace. That is: 
experienced, complex interactive functioning organizations may be argued to be 
highly-reliable organizations (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; Roberts, 1993). In high-
risk environments with modern technology, when a process begins to fail stressful 
situations occur and decisions are made in affect rather than based on analysis. 
New technology demands more abstract mental work and there is an increase in the 
demand on the mental system; the worker cannot rely on skills and rules alone, but 
needs to apply knowledge-based behavior (Reason, 1990). Weick (2001) argues 
that behavioral control is more difficult with new technologies because modern 
technology is controlled by cognitive variables and not so much by orders, rules 
and regulations. Behavioral control requires visible behavior. Premise controls are 
important when work is non-routine (Weick, 2001 p. 170).  
 
3.1.1 The role of technology 
Lars Groth argues that even though computers run sophisticated programs they 
cannot be viewed as actors in the same way that humans are actors. He calls live 
action living patterns of action, and computer “action” programmed patterns of 
action (Groth, 1999). In systems where these patterns of action are tightly 
integrated and intertwined it is difficult to perceive them as separate. The 
conclusion for Groth is then that organizations are a system of living patterns of 
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action and programmed patterns of action that constitute what we call 
organizations (ibid, p. 353). Groth argues that technology in organizations has 
developed from tools for carrying out single tasks, through computer-based 
coordinating mechanisms that run larger groups of tasks or whole processes, to an 
emergence of a third level of computer use; where computer-based systems are 
clear-cut representations of conceptual models of organizations (ibid, p. 355). In 
this third level, computer-based systems become active and the living patters of 
action and the programmed patterns of action will be inherently intertwined. These 
organizations are (active) model-driven organizations. The airline booking systems 
is an example of a model-based organization according to Groth.  
 
With the introduction of model-based organizations that rely highly on computers, 
Groth proposes new organizational forms such as meta-organizations and the 
organized cloud. In meta-organizations, the participating organizations are bound 
closely together by comprehensive systems. The common systems for partners in a 
meta-organization will coordinate the total or a large part of the activities in the 
member’s organization. Each member of the organization may be a member of 
several meta-organizations. Meta-organizations resemble virtual organizations or 
network organizations in that they are constituted of actors working together by 
information and communication technology, but it is argued that meta-
organizations are not virtual, but real, and not just networks that one can connect 
and disconnect to, but the results of long time commitments and efforts in 
establishing the relationship. In this way a meta-organization is a good description 
of organizations that operate in an IO perspective and that are involved in the 
research presented in this thesis. One example of a meta-organization (to be) is the 
operating company–contractor company relationship described in “Generation 2” 
in IO and addressed in Paper 3, “Resilient planning of modification projects in 
high-risk systems The organizational cloud is another new organizational form 
proposed by Groth. The organizational cloud is an image used to describe actors in 
different organizations held together by common database such as (ticket-, flight-, 
hotel-) booking systems or trading systems for stocks, commodities and currencies 
(ibid, p. 408). These organized clouds normally coordinate a few of the member’s 
activities in their organization as opposed to meta-organizations that involve the 
majority of activities in the member organization. Groth studied service trade 
companies, and in particular information management in these companies.  
 
The value of transferring Groth’s research to the area of IO is significant, as the 
work performed in the service trade is similar to that of the process industry, but it 
can hardly be argued that IO is a purely model-driven organization. For the topic of 
this dissertation, it is difficult to see where technology ends and where the 
organization or work processes start. Therefore, in the following, I present theories 
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that argue for a different view of organizations where systems are not purely social, 
material or technical, but where technology, things and people are intrinsically 
interwoven. 
3.2 From socio-technical systems to socio-materiality 
The concept “socio-technical” (systems) originates from the work and publications 
of the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations (founded in 1946) in London, where 
scholars such as Eric Trist, Fred Emery and Kurt Lewin studied people in 
organizations. A study on implications on productivity following mechanization of 
the work concluded that new technological equipment by itself was not sufficient 
to create an efficient production system. The conclusion was that the key to an 
efficient production system lies in good interaction between the technology and 
organization (Trist & Bamforth, 1951). The Tavistock Institute developed the 
socio-technical perspective in which it was argued that social life cannot be 
understood without insight into the material framework condition. Any social 
system was looked at as a socio-technical system even though the degree of 
technological influence would vary (F.E. Emery, 1959).  
 
The relationship between technology and people in socio-technical systems has 
been described as “... so close is their relationship that the social and the 
psychological can be understood only in terms of the detailed engineering facts 
and of the way the technological system as a whole behaves in the environment of 
the underground situation” (Trist & Bamforth, 1951) cited in Emery and Trist, 
(1960). Still, technology was treated as something that sets “certain requirements 
of its social system...” (F. E. Emery & Trist, 1960, p. 328) and thus the technology 
is itself not changed or in transition. In hindsight, the understanding is that socio-
technical system theorists increasingly framed technology as a process that requires 
input and output, and thus the technology became more like “black boxes” 
(Orlikowski & Barley, 2001). Also, it seems that the socio-technology system 
theorist mainly looked at work practice developments that would make the use of 
technology more efficient and raise productivity as well as improving the working 
conditions for the workers. Variance in performance is by this attributed to social 
interaction and not to the interaction between technology and social life. 
 
The reciprocity between material and social matters forms the basis for 
understanding human work and activity. The joint optimization of social and 
technical systems was the main focus for all socio-technical analyses (F.E. Emery, 
1959; F. E. Emery & Trist, 1960; Thorsrud & Emery, 1969). The research at the 
Tavistock Institute influenced the development of action research – a branch within 
sociological research that influenced Norwegian organizational studies through 
contact between the Tavistock Institute and the Norwegian psychologist Einar 
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Thorsrud. This Norwegian branch within studies of socio-technical systems led to 
the development of psychological requirements for work, that later became part of 
the Norwegian Health and Safety at Work Act, and the use autonomous work 
teams or groups in industry (Fred E. Emery, Thorsrud, & Trist, 1969; Thorsrud & 
Emery, 1969). The thinking also influenced development within Europe, the USA 
and Japan (Levin, 2008).  
3.3 Socio-materiality as a perspective on technology in 
organizations 
Wanda Orlikowski argues for a situated change perspective for technology-based 
organization transformations. Organizational change is not a process with 
predetermined steps, but rather an organizing discourse (Orlikowski, 2001). With 
the use of the label “socio-materiality”, researchers such as Wanda Orlikowski, 
Susan W. Scott, Lucy Suchman and Stephen R. Barley build a new perspective on 
organizations upon a rationale in which current (late 1990s) research on 
organizations and technology has either treated technology as absent present 
(technology is essentially unacknowledged (in organizational studies), an 
exogenous force (technology having an impact on organizational life) or as an 
emerging process (technology is a product of ongoing human interpretations and 
interactions) (Orlikowski, 2010; Orlikowski & Barley, 2001; Orlikowski & Scott, 
2008). It is more evident in some of the writings than in others that socio-
materiality is looked upon as a new or alternative perspective on technology in 
organizations (Orlikowski, 2010; Orlikowski & Barley, 2001). A thorough 
rationale for the new perspective on socio-materiality is outlined in a chapter in the 
2008 Academy of Management Annals (Orlikowski & Scott, 2008). Orlikowski 
and Scott refer to two research themes that involve technology within 
organizational studies; one that treats organizations and technology as discrete 
entities that have some inherent and stable characteristics and a second research 
stream where actors and technology are seen to be related through and an emergent 
process of interaction – leading to interdependent systems. The authors point to 
existing difficulties in treating technology as causing organizational effects, and 
that treating technology as a cause of organizational change is only relevant if there 
is a specific technological event. The research on the use of technology in 
organizations within the two research streams have shed light on the impacts, 
implications and unanticipated consequences of technology, but have not 
questioned the logic that technology and organizations are separate in the first 
place (ibid, p. 455).  
The socio-materiality heading is referred to as an umbrella for several research 
areas all focusing on technology as an inherent part of human social life, where 
neither technology nor action can be separated into entities (Orlikowski, 2001). 
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The research area that Orlikowski considers most prominent under the socio-
materiality umbrella is Actor Network Theory (ANT) (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987, 
2005). Also, the perspective of high reliability organizations (HRO) (LaPorte & 
Consolini, 1991; Roberts, 1993; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, 2007; Weick, Sutcliffe, 
& Obstfeld, 1999) is seen as a research area that has shed light on the inseparability 
between technology and society. The research stream within socio-materiality also 
consists of contributions from research areas such as human-machine 
reconfigurations (L. Suchman, 1996; L. A. Suchman, 2007) and information 
technology (Sassen & Latham, 2005). Common to all contributions is the ontology 
that dissolves analytical boundaries between technology and humans (Orlikowski 
& Scott, 2008). As expressed by Orlikowski and Scott: 
 
“...entities (whether humans or technologies) have no inherent properties, but 
acquire form, attributes, and capabilities through their interpretation. This is a 
rational ontology that presumes the social and the material as inherently 
inseparable.” (Orlikowski and Scott, 2008, p. 456). 
 
From the socio-materiality perspective the relationships between technology and 
social life are not fixed but are brought forward in acting out practices. It is noted 
that practice studies are not new in sociology, but emphasis should be on studying 
practices, not the communities behind them, and comprise technology in the 
practice studies (Orlikowski and Scott, 2008, p. 462). Every day work practices 
should be studied. The relationship between technology and organizations in a 
socio-technical or socio-material view may be easier to visualize when studying 
normal operations and everyday practice. To obtain a better grasp of normal work 
is also the focus of resilience engineering, a promising perspective within the area 
of safe operations (Hollnagel, Nemeth, & Dekker, 2008a, 2008b; Hollnagel, 
Woods, & Leveson, 2006; Nemeth, Hollnagel, & Dekker, 2009) (see also the 
section on resilience engineering, this chapter). 
 
Though the more general theory on organizations and technology indirectly 
addresses safety by descriptions of human interaction with sometimes high-risk 
technology, a special branch of research has focused on organizational perspectives 
on safety in high-risk organizations, which will be treated in the following section. 
3.4 Addressing safety in social technical/material systems 
3.4.1 The information perspective on accidents – Turner’s theory of 
man-made disasters 
Though originating in a linear model on major accidents (the model of man-made 
disasters (Turner, 1978)), the information perspective on accidents bring to light 
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interesting views on how accident scenarios evolve over time and where root 
causes can be found in the interaction between the human and organizational 
arrangements of the socio-technical systems. This may be important in a modern 
informational technology perspective. Thus, the information perspective is treated 
in this thesis because it may shed light on accident scenarios where information 
breakdown play a role.  
 
The essence of Turner’s information processing framework is that a disaster is 
almost always associated with the recognition of a disruption or collapse of the 
existing cultural beliefs and norms about hazards (Rosness, Grøtan, et al., 2010). 
Turner’s theory of disaster is concerned with a large system, which not only 
includes physical events but also the perception of these events by individuals 
(Pidgeon & O'Leary, 2000; B. Turner & Pidgeon, 1997; B. A. Turner, 1978).  
In developing his theory, Turner studied the reports of 84 accidents. The theory 
thus reflects recurring findings in the material he studied. He studied three serious 
accidents in depth in order to elaborate the theory (B. Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). 
These accidents were: a landslide in Aberfan in 1966, a collision where a large 
road transporter was hit by a train at a railway crossing in Hixon in 1968, and a fire 
in a holiday leisure complex on the Isle of Man in 1973. A common feature of 
these three accidents was that a large and complex safety problem was dealt with 
by a number of groups operating in separate organizations, and in separate 
divisions within organizations. They could thus be considered organizational 
accidents. 
 
The Man-made Disaster model proposes that accidents or disasters develop through 
a long chain of events, leading back to root causes such as lack of information flow 
and misperception among individuals and groups. Chains of discrepant events 
develop and accumulate unnoticed. This, Turner argues, is a result of a culture 
where information and interpretations of hazard signals fail. Erroneous assumption 
about the hazards can lead to the acceptance of informal norms that do not comply 
with existing regulations, and thus to violations of these regulations. Disaster 
development should be viewed as a process, often over years, developing from an 
interaction between the human and organizational arrangements of the socio-
technical systems (my own emphasis). 
 
Turner emphasizes the breakdown in the flow and interpretation of information, 
which is linked to the energy of physical events. The critical assumptions in his 
theory concern the process leading up to disasters. However, the Man-made 
Disaster model also includes stages after the actual disaster, including rescue and a 
final stage of full cultural readjustment to the surprise associated with the event. 
The whole model comprises six stages (Figure 2): 
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Notionally normal 
starting point
Incubation period with 
misperceptions and lack 
of information flow
Precipitating event
Rescue, dealing with 
immediate problems
Full cultural 
readjustment
Onset
 
Figure 2: Main stages in the Man-made Disaster (Turner, 1978; Turner and 
Pidgeon, 1997). 
 
The starting point of the model is a situation where matters are reasonably 
“normal”. This implies that the set of culturally held beliefs about the world and its 
hazards are sufficiently accurate to enable individuals and groups to survive 
successfully. Individuals and groups adhere to a set of normative prescriptions, 
ranging from informal norms to laws and regulations, which are culturally accepted 
as being advisable and necessary precautions to keep risks at an acceptable level.  
 
The second stage, the incubation period, is characterized by the accumulation of an 
unnoticed set of events that are at odds with the accepted beliefs about the hazards, 
and the norms for their avoidance. The incubation period starts with rigidities of 
belief and misperception of danger signals; events happen unnoticed or are 
misunderstood. Events may also go unnoticed or be misunderstood because of a 
reluctance to fear the worst outcome. An important factor in this stage is the 
structure of communication networks, in particular the boundaries where 
knowledge is not shared or where it is distorted or simplified. If someone takes 
action to the signals, it often results in what Turner labels “the decoy 
phenomenon”. This is action taken to deal with a perceived problem which, in 
hindsight, is found to distract the attention from the problems that actually cause 
the trouble. In many cases the company disregards complaints from outsiders and 
fails to disseminate and analyze pertinent information. At the same time, the 
situation is not getting better when individuals often become insecure due to “out 
of date” regulations and procedures. This makes the situation even more 
ambiguous, and may cause violations of formal rules and regulations to be 
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accepted as normal. In cases of an actual incident or accident, the incubation period 
is brought to conclusion by a precipitating event which in a compelling manner 
reveals the inadequacy of the beliefs about the risks that developed during the 
incubation period. A dramatic event, such as an explosion or a burning building, 
creates a large-scale disruption of cultural expectations. The precipitating event is 
by definition unpredictable for those sharing the culturally-accepted beliefs about 
the system.  
 
The precipitating event is followed by the onset, the stage in which the direct and 
unanticipated consequences of the failure occur. The onset is followed by the 
rescue and salvage stage. This is also the first stage of cultural readjustment to the 
precipitating event. Involved persons and onlookers make rapid and ad hoc 
redefinitions of the situation. However, the circumstances during the rescue and 
salvage stage do not allow for prolonged analyses or comprehensive revision of 
beliefs. A full cultural readjustment takes place in the last phase of the model. An 
inquiry or assessment is carried out, and precautionary norms are adjusted to fit the 
newly-gained understanding of the world. The inquiry may reveal errors and 
breaches of good practice that did not contribute to the particular accident, but 
which might contribute to future accidents. The outcome of the final stage is thus 
the establishment of a new level of precautions and expectations. 
Prevention of disasters through providing information to those who need 
it 
Turner stresses the significance of information flow when discussing risk control. 
The question asked is: “What stops people acquiring and using appropriate 
advance warning information, so that large-scale accidents and disasters are 
prevented?” (B. Turner & Pidgeon, 1997), p. 162). The answer in general is that 
relevant information is not available to the right people at the appropriate time in a 
form that is possible for them to use:  
x Completely unknown prior information: Where the information which 
foretells disaster is completely unknown, it is clear that there is little that 
can be done, except for searching for better procedures for information 
flow in the relevant arena. This is not a common situation; there is usually 
someone who knows something relevant.  
x Prior information noted but not fully appreciated: Where information is 
potentially available, but not fully appreciated. The situation indicates that 
the information may not have been understood completely because 
individuals have a false sense of security when faced with danger signals. 
Often this emerges from distractions or pressure of work, which can give 
the subject an impression that the information is irrelevant.  
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x Prior information not correctly assembled: When information about 
danger signals is carried in the minds of individuals others cannot reach it. 
A key to preventing disaster is therefore to place information in places 
where everybody can reach it.  
x Information available, but which could not be appreciated because of 
conflict with prevailed understanding: In cases of disaster, Turner saw that 
relevant information was available, but when it was in conflict with prior 
information, rules or values, it was neglected and not considered. 
The category prior information not correctly assembled is again elaborated and 
divided into (i) information buried amongst other material, (ii) information 
distributed among several organizations, (iii) limited information available to two 
parties, and (iv) prior information willfully withheld. In subgroup (ii), Turner 
points to regulations and routines between organizations that establish boundaries 
and barriers for information flow. This is a point to be emphasized for the growing 
number of organizations that are undergoing change in terms of out-sourcing and 
entering into meta-organizations such as those described by Groth (1999). 
 
To control risk, “irrational” events have to be continuously evaluated by the 
organization. A key factor is to make intensive efforts to collect and analyze 
information about hazards and find out what we do not know. Experiences from 
man-made disasters have shown that someone somewhere does actually know 
something. The outcome of risk control therefore depends on the quality of 
monitoring risk. Westrum (1993) discusses what can be done to develop 
organizations with requisite imagination. The organization should provide 
incentives for thought. The only valid incentive for thinking is to use people’s ideas 
– and to make sure they know that their ideas are being used. The organization also 
needs to cultivate and reward efforts to bridge the boundaries between 
organizational layers, departments, subcultures and different sites.  
3.4.2 High Reliability Organization (HRO)  
In addition to being attributed to the socio-materiality perspective, HRO 
theory/perspective serves as one of the main perspectives of organizational safety, 
or theories that address the role of organizations in accident and safety 
management. The HRO perspective was developed by a group of researchers at the 
University of California, Berkeley, commencing in 1984 (Roberts, 1993). The 
focus for the researchers was to, from an interdisciplinary point of view, study how 
organizations with a high degree of complexity could maintain an unusually-high 
level of safety despite the high-risks and hazards they faced in their operations. 
Through several publications, the Berkeley researchers established a view of what 
characterizes HRO organizations (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; Roberts, 1993). The 
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HRO perspective states a socio-technical perspective in their research on safety 
management in stating that: 
“It is impossible to separate physical-technical, social-organizational, and social-
external aspects; the technology, the organization, and the social setting are woven 
together inseparably” (La Porte, 1975; Perrow, 1986). 
It is also argued that: 
“What distinguishes reliability-enhancing organizations is not their absolute error 
or accident rate, but their effective management of innately risky technologies 
through organizational control of both hazard and probability....” (Rochlin, 1993, 
p. 17). 
The earlier publications on the HRO perspective focus on describing the HROs 
studied (e.g. (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; Roberts, 1993) and definitions of a HRO. 
In his definition of HROs, Gene Rochlin points to the following characteristics (G. 
I. Rochlin, 1993): 
x The organization is required to maintain high levels of operational 
reliability and/or safety if it is to be allowed to continue to carry out its 
tasks (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991). 
x The organization is also required to maintain high levels of capability 
performance and service to meet public and/or economic expectations and 
requirements. 
x As a result, the organization is reluctant to allow primary-task related 
learning to precede by the usual modalities of trial-and-error for fear that 
the last error will be the last trial (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991). 
x Because of the consequentiality of error or failure, the organization cannot 
easily make tradeoffs between capability and safety (Schulman, in Roberts, 
1993) 
x The organization will be judged to have “failed” – either operationally or 
socially – if it does not perform at high levels. 
The HRO perspective was further developed by researchers outside the Berkeley 
group. Whereas the earlier research based all finding on the studies of the three 
organizations that participated in the Berkeley study – the Federal Aviation 
Administration’s Air Traffic Control system, Pacific Gas and Electric Company’s 
nuclear power plant at Diablo Canyon, California, and the U.S. Navy’s nuclear 
powered aircraft carriers – later publications include other high-risk organizations 
such as hostage negotiation teams, emergency medical teams and wildlife fire-
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fighting crews (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, 2007). The focus is on thinking, practices 
and actions in what are labeled HROs.  
Mindfulness and the principles of anticipation and containment 
One concept that has influenced recent HRO theory is the concept of mindfulness 
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, 2007). Mindfulness is defined as “a rich awareness of 
discriminatory detail” (ibid, p. 42/32). Acting mindfully means being aware of the 
context of how details differ. Mindful people have an overview of the momentary 
situation, sometimes referred to as situation awareness (Endsely, 1995a; 1995b; 
1997). Mindfulness involves the detailed comprehension of emerging threats and 
of factors that interfere with such comprehensions. Whereas situation awareness as 
a concept relates to individual cognition, mindfulness may be present in an 
organization which is subject to certain principles:  
Principles of anticipation: The principle of being preoccupied with failure, noticing 
small failures as well as larger ones; the principle of reluctance to simplify, 
noticing the distinctiveness in observations of failure rather than hiding them in 
categories; and the principle of sensitivity to operations, remaining aware of 
ongoing operations. 
Principles of containment: The principle of commitment to resilience, locating 
pathways to recovery rather than only “abandoning ship”; and the principle of 
deference to expertise, knowledge of how to implement the pathways to recovery 
by trusting expertise rather than experts. 
The reluctance to rely on pre-established control systems and risk assessments in 
complex, high-risk industry is clearly illustrated by the following quote from the 
publications on managing the unexpected in HRO’s: 
“ ...it is impossible to manage any organization solely by means of mindless control 
systems that depend on rules, plans, routines stable categories and fixed criteria 
for correct performance” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 49; 2007, p. 39).  
This reluctance to rely solely on pre-established control systems are shared by a 
later perspective on organizational safety; resilience engineering. 
3.4.3 Resilience Engineering 
Resilience engineering (RE) (Hollnagel et al., 2008a, 2008b; Hollnagel et al., 2006; 
Nemeth et al., 2009) partly builds upon HRO theory and Perrow’s theory of normal 
accidents (NAT) (Perrow, 1984, 1986, 1999), as well as relying on other elements 
of perspectives on system/organizational accidents, such as the energy-barrier 
perspective (Haddon, 1980), the decision-making perspective involving goal 
conflicts (Rasmussen, 1997) and the information processing perspective (B. Turner 
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& Pidgeon, 1997; B. A. Turner, 1978). RE introduces a way of thinking for socio-
technical systems where flexibility and adaptation are as important as control and 
constraint. According to the RE web site, 
 
“Resilience Engineering looks for ways to enhance the ability of organizations to 
create processes that are robust yet flexible, to monitor and revise risk models, and 
to use resources proactively in the face of disruptions or ongoing production and 
economic pressures. In Resilience Engineering failures do not stand for a 
breakdown or malfunctioning of normal system functions, but rather represent the 
converse of the adaptations necessary to cope with the real world complexity. 
Individuals and organizations must always adjust their performance to the current 
conditions; and because resources and time are finite it is inevitable that such 
adjustments are approximate” (http://www.resilience-engineering.org). 
Definition and the four cornerstones of resilience engineering 
A general description of resilient organizations and systems is normally presented 
as: 
x A resilient system tries to understand how it functions, not only how it 
fails. Resilience is the ability to sustain normal functioning, not just to 
prevent failures. 
x A resilient system does not limit descriptions of events to their causes. RE 
looks for dependencies among functions and for representative variability 
in functions. 
x In a resilient system, learning should be continuous rather than discrete, 
and driven by planning rather than events. Lessons learned should be 
treated as interpretation rather than as facts, and should be revised and 
revised. 
There is no formal definition of resilience and RE in the central publications within 
the RE field, though working definitions do exist. One of these is presented in 
Volume II of the Ashgate studies on RE:  
“A resilient system is able effectively to adjust to functioning prior to, during, or 
following changes and disturbances, so that it can continue to perform as required 
after a disruption or major mishap, and in the presence of continuous stresses” 
(Hollnagel, 2009a, p. 117) 
The terms “system” and “organization” are interchangeably used in RE 
publications and this is also underlined in this specific chapter. This working 
definition is followed by an outline of what is called the four cornerstones of RE; 
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x The ability to address the actual by knowing what to do, or being able to 
respond to regular and irregular disruptions and disturbances by adjusting 
normal functioning.  
x The ability to address the critical by knowing what to look for, or being 
able to monitor that which is or could become a threat in the near term. 
Monitoring must cover the system’s own performance as well as changes 
in the environment.  
x The ability to address the potential by knowing what to expect, or being 
able to anticipate developments and threats further into the future, such as 
potential disruptions or changing operating conditions.  
x The ability to address the factual by knowing what has happened, or being 
able to learn from experience, in particular to learn the right lessons from 
the right experience. 
 
In order to respond (address the actual) organization must be able to detect that 
something has happened, to identify the event and to recognize the event as being 
serious, the organization must know how to respond and be capable of responding. 
The ability to respond to the actual has been the focus of risk assessment and 
management, through being prepared to handle identified threats or events by 
accepting all risks that are lower than a set limit, e.g. by the use of the ALARP (As-
Low–As-Reasonably-Practicable) principle, and planning for management of risks 
that involve regular threats and cost effective risk management. 
Irregular threats and events must be managed by monitoring what may become 
critical and remaining ready to respond if a crisis or disturbance is probable. This 
sort of monitoring requires the use of leading indicators that indicate what may 
happen before it happens. Because leading indicators rely on a good description of 
a system, they are difficult to find in intractable systems with complex interactivity, 
systems that are hard to describe.  
Looking for the potential – what may go wrong in the future – requires requisite 
imagination (Westrum, 1993) or the ability to imagine important aspects of the 
future. In addressing the difficulty of addressing the potential, Hollnagel (2009a) p. 
127)  refers to the fact that human thinking has been shown to make use of 
simplified heuristics such as representativeness, recency, and anchoring 
(Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982) – handy in everyday situations, but restricts 
the open-minded thinking that is needed in order to look for the possible. Truly 
resilient organizations, it is argued, realize that there is a need to think about the 
possible, even though the cost benefits of such thinking are uncertain.  
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To learn from experience is the fourth cornerstone. Learning from experience is 
described as the basis for the other cornerstones, though all cornerstones are 
equally important. If learning from experience is an essential part of resilient 
systems, it is crucial to form a good basis for learning to know which events or 
experiences to take into account, have a plan for how to analyze and understand 
these events, and know who, where and how often learning should take place. 
Counting incidents and accidents are common in order to show some learning from 
experience, but learning implies perceiving lessons that are meaningful, small or 
major.  
The four cornerstones are later used in developing the resilience engineering grid 
(RAG), which is presented in the epilogue of the third volume of the Ashgate 
studies on RE (Hollnagel, Paries, Woods, & Wreathall, 2011). RAG is intended to 
assess the organization’s resilience via measuring the organization’s ability to 
respond, monitor, learn and anticipate. RAG provides scores for each capability as 
well as for the combined capabilities. It is strongly emphasized that 
interdependencies are required between the four capabilities in order to be a 
resilient organization (Hollnagel, 2011). 
Variability and the “functional resonance” metaphor 
Both successes and failures result from the adaptations that organizations, groups 
and individuals perform in order to cope with complexity. Success depends on their 
ability to anticipate, recognize, and manage risk. Failure is due to the absence of 
that ability (temporarily or permanently), rather than the inability of a system’s 
component (human or technical) to function normally. Complex socio-technical 
systems are by necessity underspecified and only partly predictable. Procedures 
and tools are adapted to the situation, to meet multiple, possibly conflicting, goals, 
and hence performance variability is both normal and necessary.  
The variability of one function in a system is seldom large enough to result in an 
accident. However, the variability of multiple functions may combine in 
unexpected ways, leading to disproportionately large consequences. Normal 
performance and failure are therefore emergent phenomena that cannot be 
explained by solely looking at the performance of system components.  
The performance within a function may be variable, e.g. because time is too short 
or too long, because resources are missing or controls are inadequate, etc. If the 
performance of a function is variable, it may be carried out even if e.g. an input is 
missing or a precondition is not fulfilled. Performance conditions can affect 
functions. Functions can set and interrogate states. 
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The term “functional resonance” refers to the possibility that the variability in 
individual functions may combine and escalate in an unwanted and unexpected 
way. This is the result of functional couplings in the system. Any part of the system 
variability can be a “signal”, and the “noise” is determined by the variability of the 
functions in the system. Thus the variations of a number of functions may resonate, 
i.e. reinforce each other, and thereby cause the variability of one function to exceed 
its normal limits. This principle captures emergent system properties that only are 
understandable if the system is not decomposed into isolated components (L. 
Macchi, Hollnagel, & Leonhard, 2009; Roger Woltjer & Hollnagel, 2007). 
Systems with functional resonance may not be captured by the binary logic of 
many reliability and risk analysis models. A fault tree, for instance, is based on the 
preconditions that we can define in advance as to what constitutes a failure for each 
of the components in the fault tree, and that the occurrence of a failure of the 
system as a whole is determined by the state of the components. The “functional 
resonance” metaphor suggests that both these preconditions may be invalid for 
many systems (Rosness, Grøtan, et al., 2010). 
Underspecification and intractability 
Complex systems or organizations can only be incompletely described 
(intractability) and are thus underspecified. Within RE it is argued that effective 
performance can therefore not be prescribed. Since effective performance requires 
variability, safety must be achieved by controlling variability rather than by 
constraining it (Hollnagel et al., 2006). 
In everyday language, the word “intractable” is used to characterize phenomena, 
objects, persons or situations that are difficult to deal with or solve, or diseases for 
which we lack an adequate treatment. In this use of the word “intractable”, most 
socio-technical systems are complex, intractable, interdependent and constantly 
changing.  
Tractable organizations are characterized by simple descriptions with few details. 
The principles of functioning are known and the system does not change while 
being described. Intractable systems or organizations are interdependent, 
descriptions of the system are elaborate with many details, the principles of 
functioning are partly unknown and the system changes while being described. The 
notion of an intractable system strongly resembles Perrow’s (1999) description of 
systems with high interactive complexity. Charles Perrow stated that,  
“On the whole, we have complex systems because we don’t know how to produce 
the output through linear systems” (Perrow, 1999, p. 89).  
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Complex systems with catastrophic potential in Perrow’s writings were judged to 
be abandoned or demounted. Within RE, as well as within HRO, complexity is 
seen as manageable, though not through traditional control and linear cause – 
effect-based thinking. In order to manage a complex system, one must realize that 
it is intractable and that despite all efforts to describe the system or organization it 
will remain underspecified, as it is continuously in transition. 
Intractability is thus related to events that are the consequence of some 
unanticipated combination of the normal variability in socio-technical 
performance. Hence, adverse events and accidents are not necessarily related to 
collapse of the normal system components and functions, they may also result from 
intractable combinations of adaptive behavior – such as optimizing system 
performance or trying to meet requirements of the management or one’s self. 
Intractable events are thus also the flip side of the necessary adaptations to 
variability. Failures and successes alike are results of adjustments to cope with 
complexity.  
Barrier systems to control and dampen unwanted variability 
Within the writings on RE, barriers and barrier systems are greatly emphasized. 
The barrier conception within the RE perspective includes: 
x Physical barrier systems that block the movement or transportation of 
mass, energy or information. Examples include fuel tanks, safety belts and 
filters.  
x Functional barrier systems that set up pre-conditions that need to be met 
before an action (by human and/or machine) can be undertaken. Examples 
include locks, passwords and sprinklers.  
x Symbolic barrier systems are indications of constraints on action that are 
physically present. Examples include signs, checklists, alarms and 
clearances. Potential functions encompass preventing, regulating, and 
authorizing actions. 
x Incorporeal barrier systems are indications of constraints on action that are 
not physically present. Examples include ethical norms, group pressure, 
rules and laws.  
Barriers are important for resilient organizations as they may hinder unwanted 
variability or escalation of events in operations. Barriers can help prevent accidents 
by stopping failures from developing into hazardous situations. Reason 
hypothesizes that most accidents can be traced to one or more of four levels of 
failure: organizational influences, unsafe supervision, preconditions for unsafe acts, 
and the unsafe acts themselves. In the Swiss cheese model, an organization's 
defenses against failure are modeled as a series of barriers, represented as slices of 
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a Swiss cheese. The holes in the cheese slices represent individual weaknesses in 
individual parts of the system, and are continually varying in size and position in 
all slices. The system as a whole produces failures when all of the holes in each of 
the slices momentarily align, permitting “a trajectory of accident opportunity”, so 
that a hazard passes through all of the holes in all of the defenses, leading to a 
failure (Reason, 1997). 
3.5 Social construction of reality 
The introduction of IO in the petroleum industry brings about many elements of 
change in the reality for operators as well as for management and authorities. These 
elements appear as partly-known elements or modes of operating, but more than 
that it appears as something that resembles former ways of operating or totally new 
elements or ways of operating. This is something that individuals and groups must 
make sense of in order to plan for, or operate in a safe way. The sensemaking is 
expressed in concepts, descriptions, ways of working, and formal and informal 
rules, all developed between individuals in social settings. The situation, as well as 
all other similar settings in social life is what has been known as the social 
construction of reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1966), also known as the general 
constructivist perspective. The term “social” refers to the fact that construction 
processes are inherently social, i.e. they take place in social settings, where people 
interact, communicate, discuss and influence each other. Social constructionism as 
a paradigm claims that the reality for individuals and groups is formed by 
interpersonal relationships and agreements. 
3.6 Integrating theoretical perspectives - Technology and 
transitions in high-risk organizations  
Focusing on technological alterations in high-risk industries make socio-technical 
theories and system-oriented safety perspectives appropriate for studying 
transitions in risk images, as well as risk assessments and handling. These theories 
and perspectives make it possible to view technology and social processes as equal 
entities in an integrated system. The constructivist perspective makes it essential to 
study risk perception as something that emerges and is constructed between agents 
in social settings, which are visible in arenas where risks are discussed and in 
carrying out of work operations The theories and perspectives presented do not 
directly address technological transitions, though technology is present in the 
empirical basis for the models or theories presented. For one perspective in 
particular, the maintenance of balance in systems and resilience is essential for risk 
management. The following points of relevance from the presented theories and 
perspectives can be extracted for the study of technological alterations and 
transitions in high-risk organizations: 
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1. Risk images are constructed in the interaction between actors in social 
settings such as arenas for discussions or in workshops or gatherings. Risk 
images may be possible to extract from observations and participating field 
studies in such social settings as well as from interviews and surveys. 
2. Major accident scenarios may emerge from interactions of actions by 
humans and technology which by themselves are not necessarily high-risk. 
Unbalance in systems may stem from failures that are not detected at the 
time of their occurrence or at the introduction of the technology. Risk 
influencing elements may be found by studying normal operations and 
practical work, not necessarily in high-risk situations.  
3. Parts of a system may develop informal norms about a transition, or 
transitions in an element are unattended. Thus systems and organizations 
may enter an incubation period where danger signals are not detected or 
are misunderstood. An occurring event may then be unpredictable for the 
organization. It is essential to look to all parts of a system that undergoes 
transitions, as well as those that are not directly affected by the changes. 
These relevant points are further explored and analyzed in the papers of this thesis. 
A central point in all the perspectives and theories presented is that changes in risk 
level of complex socio-technical systems or people’s perception of risks cannot be 
determined through linear, quantitative risk analysis. They must be assessed from a 
broader angle. In order to assess the overall question on how technological 
alterations influence risk comprehension and management in a high risk industry 
such as the offshore petroleum industry I have to look on my research questions 
through interdisciplinary lenses. The relationship between the theoretical 
approaches presented in this chapter, the research questions presented in section 0 
and the different studies presented in the papers in this thesis is shown in Figure 3 
Relationship between theoretical approaches, research questions and papers of 
this thesis 
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Figure 3 Relationship between theoretical approaches, research questions and 
papers of this thesis 
 
The theoretical approaches social construction of reality, social - materiality, high 
reliability organizations, resilience engineering and the issue of mindfulness within 
HRO are the most central theoretical approaches in relation to this thesis. Turner’s 
information perspective on accidents is mostly addressed in the paper on building 
resilience into emergency management. Before addressing the theoretical 
approaches in relation to the research question, I will present existing research in 
the field of the research questions presented in the general problem formulation 
(section 4). 
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4 General problem formulation  
Changing the ways of working in IO introduces a possible change in many of the 
risks in terms of operations, technology and emergency handling. Changes are 
mainly due to tighter coupling between technological and human systems, 
increased complexity in organizations and operations, and possible reduced 
manning on installations where incidents and accidents may occur. It might well be 
that IO becomes a successful way of operating in the petroleum industry, and it 
may be that IO will reduce the risks and improve safety in the industry. It may be 
stated that the risk images in the offshore petroleum industry prior to IO were 
characterized by technology optimism. The improvements in safety in the offshore 
oil and gas production in Norway have mainly been based on technology 
development such as sensors, emergency shutdown systems, safety valves, etc. 
Unfortunately, elements that come along with changes in IO can also be a threat to 
safety, especially when technology and humans, as individuals and as teams within 
and between organizations (such as between contractors and operators), are seen as 
separate units in terms of development and learning. Only skilled operators and 
teams can make good decisions based on the complex information presented in 
abstract forms with ambiguous information about their uncertainties from remote 
systems. It is therefore crucial that we have knowledge about what brings out the 
best from people in strategic, normal and crisis situations – that is, we must 
understand how people can contribute to their maximum potential in IO. It is also 
crucial to know how stakeholders in the development of IO (authorities, managers, 
researchers, etc.) perceive hazards and risks in relation to such a complex change.  
Research within this field will enhance information about safety requirements, and 
about the development of regulations and standards. Viewed against this 
background, the formulation of my general problem reads: 
How do technological alterations influence risk comprehension and management 
in a high-risk industry? 
Technology cannot be understood by itself, but only through our understanding of 
technology. The diversity of elements that constitute IO requires a constructionist 
approach, both because the reality of IO is a construct but also because risk images, 
perception and management of risk will be socially constructively formed, affirmed 
and reaffirmed. The comprehension of IO and what it means in terms of risks may 
be viewed as an example of secondary socialization for those who are involved. 
This makes it relevant to study social relationships and arenas where people meet 
in order to plan management and the operation of systems that contain elements of 
IO. For this thesis I look into social construction at two levels – the social 
construction of IO itself, what it is all about, and the social construction of risks 
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related to IO. The social construction of IO influences the social construction of 
risks. The individual risk image influences, and is influenced by, the socially 
constructed risk image, which is a representation of the agreement between 
participants in a social setting. 
 
I have found three areas of interest for studying safety in tasks related to 
technological alterations by the introduction of IO in the offshore petroleum 
production industry in Norway. These are as follows: 
1. The forming of risk images of the technological and organizational 
alterations among IO stakeholders in the petroleum industry.  
2. The planning process of minor modifications in established installations in 
order to prepare these for new technology. Maintenance and modification 
were one of the areas where it was argued by the offshore petroleum 
industry that IO would have a major impact on work practices (OLF, 
2003). 
3. Emergency management in organizations that have introduced IO 
technology and work processes. Emergency management was never 
mentioned in the early phases of IO as an area where IO would have any 
impact, but still emergency management faces challenges due to changes in 
other parts of the organizations. 
Technology is introduced and altered without special focus on the consequences 
regarding organizational issues, both in area of interest two and three above. In 
area of interest one, the stakeholders are aware of the technological development 
and possible organizational changes. I argue that research within these areas of 
interest requires a broad theoretical perspective due to the diversity of research 
objects. An interdisciplinary angle will help to ensure that the total socio-
material/technological system is taken into consideration. 
 I have focused on the following research questions: 
1. From a socio-technical and socio-material point of view,4 what risks are 
people aware of in early phases of IO development? 
a. What risk images exist among stakeholders of IO at the blunt end 
(far from where the operation takes place)? 
b. Relying on existing data from questionnaires, is risk 
comprehension equally distributed in different groups of offshore 
                                                          
4 Socio-technical and socio-material points of view refer to viewing social and material 
issues as being interwoven and impossible to separate in the interpretation of the world. 
The socio-technical and socio-material perspectives are presented in sections 3.2 and 3.3 
of this thesis. 
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petroleum workers at the sharp end (close to where the operation 
takes place)? 
2. From a system perspective5 and considering a specific work process, how 
may risk be managed in an increasingly complex system such as IO? 
3. Furthermore, what about emergency handling, which was not an identified 
area for IO development, but is still an essential part of risk management; 
how may IO influence the way of working in crisis management? 
These research questions were chosen in order to study IO from different 
perspectives, both in areas that were in focus for the introduction of new 
technology and work processes, and in areas that existed in the shadows of the 
introduction of IO. Questions 1a and b were studied in two settings: the forming of 
risk images among stakeholders of IO and the comprehended risk level among 
offshore personnel as expressed in the Norwegian Offshore Risk and Safety 
Climate Inventory (NORSCI, in Norwegian known as the RNNP) in the early 
phase of IO in 2007. Questions 2 and 3 reflect the two sides of risk management: 
the prevention of risk scenarios by risk analyses and the handling of risk scenarios 
as they occur through crisis management to avoid further escalation of hazardous 
situations and harmful consequences. The second question was studied based on a 
planning phase of modifications for a mature installation, with an integrated service 
contract between the operating company and the contractor. The third question was 
examined through a study of the management of emergency handling in offshore 
oil and gas production and with a focus on development within IO.  
I have addressed how the formed images of risks are manifested in risk perception 
and the carrying out of new work processes in real life of offshore oil and gas 
production in an attempt to answer the question on how technological alterations 
influence risk comprehension and management in a high-risk industry. A 
constructionist perspective is taken in addressing the forming of risk images in 
order to start the research process with a wide perspective on what risks in IO are 
about and what issues to address in the later research. 
  
                                                          
5 System perspective here refers to the systemic approach to understanding accidents in 
complex human-machine systems, e.g. the resilience engineering perspective presented in 
3.4.3 of this thesis. 
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5 Research design and methodology 
In the following chapter I will give a description of the three cases or areas where I 
have studied the different research questions outlined in the “General problem 
formulation” chapter of this thesis. The chapter also includes an outline of the 
methodology used and limitations of the methods and underlying data. 
5.1 Case description: technological alterations in the 
Norwegian offshore petroleum industry (IO) 
In the publications from the OLF, four parts of offshore oil and gas production are 
presented as areas where technology in IO will be implemented. The description 
from the report that is presented in this text refers to the (then) future description of 
“Generation 1” and “Generation 2” of IO (between approximately 2010 and 2015 
according to the report (OLF, 2005)). 
Generation 1 is characterized by the use of onshore centers that facilitate and 
support offshore operations. The onshore personnel have access to the same 
information as the personnel offshore. For some areas, like drilling, onshore 
competence is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, but for other operations 
onshore personnel are only available within normal (onshore) working hours. 
Vendors and contractors are more involved in the planning of well operations, but 
also in the planning of maintenance and modifications. The technology will be less 
mature and not integrated into all work processes. For Generation 2 it is generally 
claimed that the processes implemented in Generation 1 will lead to closer 
integration between vendors, contractors, and operating companies due to more 
mature technology. A typical oil and gas field will be operated by personnel 
located in operation centers and belonging to both the contractor and operator 
companies. Contractors will have taken over some of the daily work and decision-
making processes. All centers will be operational 24/7. The operation centers will 
be located across different geographical sites and time zones instead of requiring 
the personnel to work through the night.  
Well planning and execution: In Generation 1, onshore drilling centers will be 
actively used in planning processes, and geologists, geophysicists, reservoir 
engineers and drillers will develop drilling and completion plans using virtual-
reality models. Vendors will be more involved in well planning, and drilling 
optimization will be more automated and performed onshore. There will be a 
demand for multifunctional drill teams that can assist in the activity but not the 
function. Measurements and decisions are to be automated to a greater extent. In 
Generation 2, drilling contractors and drilling service providers will carry out most 
of the development of well programs with the operator as a quality assurer. Seismic 
instruments and sensors will be used while drilling; these provide data for real-time 
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updates on the reservoir – and geological models. Specialists from around the 
world will participate virtually. Data will flow through the system without manual 
editing and the data system will provide scenarios, options and estimates for the 
teams to decide upon. Decision-making processes will be automated. Tools and 
equipment will be managed in an automated logistics system where all parts are 
automatically identified, tracked and managed. 
Well completion: In Generation 1, virtual-reality models will be used when 
planning and executing work-overs and interventions. Downhole surveillance will 
develop into measurements based on distributed sensing systems that continuously 
monitor well performance. The wells will become more advanced in terms of being 
multilateral, and the limits for what sort of wells can be drilled will be stretched. In 
Generation 2, well completion will become an integrated part of virtual-reality 
reservoir models. Wireless intervention tools will be available for interventions in 
subsea wells without the use of rigs or vessels. 
Production optimization: In Generation 1, reservoir engineers and topside-oriented 
engineers will be more integrated by the requirements of closer interdisciplinary 
interaction and shared reservoir and process system information. The primary 
control of the production process will remain offshore. The onshore support centers 
will provide advice and support in decision-making. Due to limitations in 
technological development they will still be required to perform measurements in 
the field manually, but the readings may be registered in real time. In Generation 2, 
production optimization will become a fully automated process. The availability of 
downhole measurements such as temperature, pressure and flow will improve the 
understanding and lead to even more optimized production. Process surveillance 
and control will be performed onshore. 
Maintenance management: In Generation 1, all planning and preparatory work is 
carried out onshore and the preventive maintenance processes will be integrated 
with other onshore processes. The use of external specialists will increase. It is 
claimed that decision cycles will be shorter and that time spent on shutdowns of the 
production system for maintenance work will decrease. In Generation 2, the 
onshore planning will be supported by offshore teams through the use of portable 
video conferencing equipment and updated 3D models. Experts from around the 
world will participate when necessary. Condition-based maintenance will fully 
replace traditional maintenance, as more instrumentation is available that will 
replace manual data gathering. Smart decision support software will ensure that 
only the necessary data are sent onshore. 
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5.2 Case description of modifications in offshore oil and gas 
production installations 
Traditionally, work carried out on installed equipment or systems has been divided 
into maintenance and modifications. Maintenance comprises actions carried out to 
maintain or bring back the functionality of the equipment or to the system. The 
purpose is not to change functionality or appearance. Nowadays, maintenance is 
normally divided into the subcategories corrective and preventive. Preventive 
maintenance is carried out according to decided intervals or criteria. The goal for 
preventive maintenance is to reduce the probability of failure or degradation of 
equipment (Schjølberg, 2002). Preventive maintenance may be condition-based 
(monitoring and inspection are important) or periodical. Condition-based 
maintenance may lead to corrective maintenance in the case of function failure 
before any action is taken on the identified condition. Corrective maintenance is 
carried out after a failure in the equipment or system and the goal is to bring the 
functionality of the equipment or system back to what it was before the failure. 
Corrective maintenance may be possible to postpone, or it may be sudden and 
action must be taken immediately. In most organizations, maintenance includes 
inspection, corrective and preventive maintenance, and the maintenance philosophy 
will provide information on what sort of maintenance program an equipment or 
system will need in order to optimize cost and production.  
Modifications imply changing the functionality of the equipment or system, by 
changing it or replacing parts so that the appearance of the equipment or system 
changes, as well as the functionality. Drawings and manuals will need updating. 
The goal is normally to improve the system or to adjust the system to new 
requirements, etc. The modifications are normally either minor or major. The 
definitions of minor and major modifications differ, but are normally stated in 
terms of cost or the impact on operation, production or safety. Minor modifications 
will usually be carried out by own and/or contracted workers, but will follow a 
normal project work process. The decisions are local as long as the budget is 
followed. Major modifications involve larger parts of the organization and may 
imply project organization.  
The difference between maintenance and modification will be an equal 
replacement of parts for maintenance and a non-equal replacement for 
modification. Modifications will typically be equipment or system changes that 
require a subscription service, and a design change in relation to documentation, 
instructions, competence, equipment or systems. Border projects (not purely 
maintenance or modifications) will be company-dependent and act on the value or 
size of the project. In the IO context, modifications usually take place on producing 
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platforms and follow the approximate project work process. Maintenance will have 
a suitable process that includes inspection, preventive and corrective work.  
Five years after the introduction of IO-related technology, maintenance and 
modification work is not greatly influenced, either in relation to technology or 
organizations. In a report from 2008, the authors stated that contractor companies 
have not met the expectations from the introduction of IO that were set, even 
though the volume of maintenance work is the same (though offshore work is 
somewhat reduced due to greater onshore planning and administration work) (Øien 
& Schjølberg, 2008). 
As IO brings forward new technology that enables prolonged life for older 
installations, many installations will face challenges related to old equipment and 
constructions. Also, new modules may need to be installed in order to enable, for 
example, drilling, and/or subsea extensions if needed. When the petroleum 
authority issues consent for the operation of a field/installation, it is typically valid 
for 15 or 20 years (design life). At this point, when IO is introduced many 
installations have reached the end of the consent (design life) and need to apply for 
new consent. This has triggered ongoing activity on regulations and requirements 
for giving extended consent to older installations, as well as research on safety, 
reliability, maintenance and modifications on older installations. The following is a 
quote from the petroleum safety authority’s (PSA) website in 2009: 
... A number of installations on the NCS are aging, but remain commercially 
attractive.... a petroleum installation is designed to last for a specific time, and a 
growing number of facilities on the NCS (the Norwegian continental shelf) are 
approaching the end of their original production life...but a number of 
considerations may have changed since they first became operational, making it 
desirable to keep them working beyond this period. That could involve methods 
which improve and extend recovery from the field, the tie-back of subsea 
production facilities, or conversion of the installation to new uses. The PSA has 
been concerned for a number of years about the challenges posed by such 
extensions, and has formed a picture of where its commitment needs to be 
strengthened. (PSA, 2009)  
In my work I studied the planning of minor modifications for a mature installation 
with reduced oil production. The field has reached its initial life expectancy, but 
has received further expectancies in production due to new technology and 
prospects in the oil and gas market. The need for modifications is thus increasing. 
The acting resources within modifications are managed by an integrated service 
contract with a large offshore construction company. Integrated service contracts 
are long-lasting and include a broader service concept that may include the 
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contractor providing all planning, administration, cost estimates, etc. The 
integrated service contract between the two parties involved in modification work 
for this specific installation had been in operation since 2005. A project for 
modifications follows manuals from the operating company and from the 
construction contractor. It has been attempted to combine the two manuals in a 
figure that shows how the different phases in a modification project for the two 
companies relate to each other (Figure 4). The planning phase consists of 
identifying a problem or an opportunity, finding possible solutions, as well as 
defining a concept for carrying out the modification with cost estimates and risk 
assessment before executing pre-engineering activities.  
 
Figure 4 Interface between operator and contractor project execution models. 
5.3 Case description of emergency management 
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emergency preparedness analysis (NTC, 2001, p. 6), which focuses on emergency 
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planned to be implemented under the management of the emergency organization 
in case hazardous or accidental situations occur, in order to protect human and 
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management, e.g. “the process of coordinating an emergency or its aftermath by 
communication with participants and organizing the deployment and use of 
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execution of the risk, and emergency preparedness analysis. The emergency 
preparedness plan is established in an installation’s design and building phase and 
is executed, for example, for training and manning purposes throughout operation. 
Oil and gas companies rely on the NORSOK standard and the work carried out 
based on this standard for establishing their emergency management and for 
training.  
An emergency management organization for offshore operation is typically set up 
with three emergency-handling groups within an organization: local or first line, 
second line and third line. The local, first-line team is located on site offshore and 
handles evacuation, firefighting, problem-solving, prevention of escalation of the 
event, and treatment of acute injuries. They also manage communication with 
nearby vessels and installations. The first-line emergency management team 
consists of the platform manager, who is normally the emergency team manager or 
action leader, and other managers of personnel offshore. The nurse is also normally 
a member of the emergency team, though the nurse carries out his or her work in 
the sick ward. There will normally also be a firefighting team and a lifeboat team, 
in addition to other possible specialized teams or specialists within the installation 
organization.  
The onshore, second-line emergency team is led by an emergency team leader and 
further consists of an emergency coordinator, a next-of-kin contact, a person in 
charge of media and press and other identified functions specific to the 
organization. In addition, the safety authorities may require a seat in the emergency 
management room. There are also seats available for oil spill and pollution experts 
or other external functions relevant for the emergency scenario.  
Third-line emergency management consists of top management and contact with 
external media. The top management team normally holds the main responsibility 
for emergency operations. 
Several other actors, depending on the accident scenario, participate in emergency 
handling. A contractor company may have a similar organization to the one 
described above if they are working on larger projects or programs (e.g. 
construction or drilling). Experts on the scenario at hand may be called upon and 
participate in emergency handling. The role of different actors is part of the study 
of emergency management in an IO context, presented in Paper 4: Building 
resilience into emergency management. 
5.4 Methodology 
The theoretical approaches presented in chapter 3 call for qualitative methodology 
such as the use of observations, interviews and field studies. Data from socio-
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material systems can only be retrieved from observations and field studies as 
interactions between humans and technology are present in real life and less in 
descriptions or even in explicit knowledge. The importance of observing real-life 
carrying out of work, rather than work as planned to be carried out, is stressed in 
the resilience engineering literature as well as in HRO and mindfulness literature.  
I have mainly applied qualitative methodology for exploring risks related to the 
introduction of IO. This has been an explorative study and I have found it 
important to be able to follow up on the issues that have emerged. The methods 
applied have been literature reviews, observations, workshops and qualitative 
interviews for the study on risk images, on the use of FRAM for risk analysis and 
the study of resilience in emergency handling. In the paper on safety 
comprehension among offshore workers, my co-writer relied on quantitative data 
from a survey, whereas I, in my analysis of the findings from the quantitative 
analysis, applied theoretical and empirical knowledge. The use of quantitative data 
for the article on risk perception at the sharp end (offshore workers) was mainly 
due to the lack of access to qualitative data from this area.  
Document study has been applied for the study on resilience in emergency 
handling, as well as in the study of risk images. An overview of the distribution of 
interviews, observations, workshops, literature reviews and use of quantitative data 
is presented in table 1. 
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Table 1 Overview of methodology used in empirical studies 
 
 
Article/study 
Interview
s 
W
orkshops 
 
 
 
Observations and field studies 
Literature review
 
Q
uantitative data 
Risk images in a 
changing high-risk 
industry 
10 1 2 (observed seminars) yes - 
Safety perception 
among different 
groups 
- - - yes yes 
Resilient planning of 
modification projects 
4 - 5 (3 days of visits over a period 
of 18 months) 
yes - 
Building resilience 
into emergency 
management 
5 1 2 (crisis management training 
sessions) 
yes - 
 
5.4.1 Review of documents and texts 
Gale Miller (1997) points to the importance of reading documents in social 
research. Miller argues that texts are aspects of the sense-making activities through 
which we construct and maintain our sense of reality, and thus provide important 
information about the sense-making of reality within a certain time frame. He 
points to the fact that texts and documents are especially interesting when 
conducting observation studies in institutions and organizations, as texts are often 
constructed in the context of the setting being studied. The context in which the 
text has been constructed is of great importance, as the text itself seldom provides 
information about the circumstances, possible conflicting arguments and other 
social processes that surround the text construction. Hammersley and Atkinson 
(2007, p. 121) state that texts are documentary constructions of reality and that 
collective social activities involve the creation, use and circulation of material 
artifacts. 
I have used text and document reviews for most of my studies. Some of these have 
been traditional literature reviews; that is, the academic review of theories, models 
and research within a subject. Others have been readings of company documents, 
statements, manuals, procedures and web pages. The context in which these texts 
are constructed is not always clear and thus I have little information about how 
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these texts have been constructed. Rather than treating the texts as artifacts, they 
have been sources of knowledge and information about the author’s/s’ construct of 
reality. The document reviews have in all studies been conducted in addition to 
other methodological assessments such as observations and interviews. In this 
sense, the documents have provided images of constructs of reality, e.g. in the 
study of risk images of IO, where the studying of websites, reports and memos 
from the industry gave an insight into how the construction of IO may be expressed 
in the industry. 
5.4.2 Observations and interviews 
During observations of meetings between actors during planning of modification 
projects, of workshop discussions and of emergency-handling training situations I 
took field notes, either by hand or directly chronicled on a computer. Where I was 
allowed by the persons present, I recorded conversations and statements. The data 
in the different studies were partly obtained using open-ended or semi-structured 
interviews with individuals and through group discussions. The topic was planned 
and exemplified with questions that could be applied, but emphasis was placed on 
the interviewees being able to talk about the subject from their own viewpoint. The 
conversations were digitally recorded for later analysis. Otherwise, notes were 
taken by the interviewers and used in the analysis. 
The recordings, either auditory or written, were analyzed using coding schemas, 
mainly in a process resembling what is described within grounded theory (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967).  
5.4.3 Use of workshops as a source of data 
Farner (2008) describes workshops as an efficient tool for collecting data and 
getting opinions from several stakeholders as well as an arena for coordination and 
interdisciplinary problem-solving. The workshop is seen as an arena for 
communication within interactive cooperation where the content is created by the 
participants within an organized process that is partly controlled, but that may be 
adapted to the development of the communication. Workshops are seen as good 
arenas for making tacit knowledge available and as good forums where experts and 
lay people can meet. Within a research setting, workshops are seen as providers of 
richer information than, for example, questionnaires and surveys (Farner, 2008, pp. 
19–20). 
Data collection from the workshops for the work presented in this thesis was partly 
from observations where I as a researcher had the role of an observer or facilitator, 
and partly from group interview settings where I asked the participants questions to 
start group discussions. The observations of group dynamics in discussions of, for 
example, risk images were seen as a good source of information about how 
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authority and role-specific attributes influence the construction of risk images. The 
observed dynamics in the group conversations were later checked with the audio 
recordings in order to validate what was observed. 
5.4.4 Questionnaires and surveys 
The Norwegian Offshore Risk and Safety Climate Inventory (NORSCI) is part of 
the study of trends in risk levels on the NCS (in Norwegian known as the RNNP). 
The NORSCI survey was developed by health and safety researchers, and used 
experts from occupational health and safety in the industry and representatives 
from the unions to review, test and examine it. The survey is limited to factors of 
relevance to safety and the working environment, excluding the external 
environment. The aim of the survey is to measure employees’ perceptions of HSE 
in the Norwegian offshore industry. The survey consists of a total of 124 questions 
divided into six main parts relevant to health and safety.  
5.5 Data gathering 
Data were collected from different sources for the different topics: 
5.5.1 Data for the study of construction of risk images 
In the study on constructions of risk images I used qualitative techniques to analyze 
the data. I first listened to all audio recordings and read all notes from the 
workshop and interview settings. I identified central issues and topics related to 
safety, risk, change, technology and IO work practices. Then I aggregated these to 
arrive at a set of common or recurring themes. Preliminary findings were shared 
with informants and colleagues and this provided helpful comments for further 
interpretation of the data/understanding of the results. I used the following 
procedure to analyze the data from the interviews and workshops: 
1. Coding based on a process of establishing first preliminary categories. The 
preliminary categories were as many as necessary to distinguish the 
different statements from each other. Later, the categories were modified 
so that preliminary categories that were similar in nature were combined. 
2. Formation of themes. Themes were formed by defining a description that 
represented the interpretation in the coded statements. 
3. Alignment of themes with groups of informants. A group would consist of 
people with the same education/background (human factor researcher or 
consultant, petroleum engineer, etc.) or type of employment in an 
organization (managers, project managers, developers, trade union 
representative, etc.). 
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Data for the study of risk comprehension in different groups 
The NORSCI was performed among personnel in the Norwegian offshore industry 
in the period January 7th to February 15th 2007. In addition to demographic and 
other background data, the survey included 35 statements about daily HSE 
prioritization and risk communication, own and others’ safety skills and behavior 
connected to role clarity, safety training, competence and workplace conditions 
influencing health and safety such as management and prioritization, in addition to 
individual motivation and follow-up systems and procedures. The results for the 35 
statements were analyzed. In the analysis all items were graded from “1” (“totally 
agree”), which is the lowest, to “5” (“totally disagree”), the highest. The mean 
score on each individual statement was calculated for the three variables: (a) OIMs; 
(b) safety representatives; and (c) the rest of the offshore organization. 
The estimated response rate for the 2007 NORSCI was about as low as 30. 
Nevertheless, the number of responses, N=6850, is sufficiently large to perform 
statistical analysis and to split the data material into different categories. The 
distribution of responses among different groups corresponds reasonably well on 
the whole with the distribution in previous years’ studies and with the reported 
number of hours for different groups. The number of installation managers 
responding was N=105 and the safety representatives constitute a larger group 
(N=226). 
5.5.2 Data for the study of risk assessment of the planning phase for 
minor modifications 
The planning process was studied through a literature review of manuals and 
procedures provided by the operating company and the contracting company. 
Functions relevant for carrying out the planning process were identified in the 
texts. Validation of the work procedure was conducted through observation of how 
work was carried out in meetings where I participated as well as through 
conversations with the participants. The question I asked in the process of 
validating the functions in the work process was “How is work really carried out?” 
Information about potential variability in how these functions were carried out was 
gathered in observations and interviews. I was not able to make audio recordings of 
the meetings and conversations. The observations and conversations were recorded 
in notes and later analyzed. 
5.5.3 Data for the study of emergency management in IO 
The study of emergency management was conducted in two parts. The first part 
had the purpose of describing requirements and contents of DSHAs currently 
applied by the industry, and to explore the demand for new or changed DSHAs 
related to IO. Opportunities and challenges for the use of DSHAs in an IO context 
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were also explored. A literature review was conducted on existing literature on IO 
and safety issues. In addition, an interview study was performed. Five interviews 
with central stakeholders in the Norwegian petroleum industry were conducted to 
study DSHAs currently applied by the companies and how the current DSHAs 
were used, communicated, produced and updated. 
In the second part of the study, I participated in a research team that observed two 
emergency management training scenarios. The two emergency-handling training 
sessions were observed in two different companies. The first training session 
included two DSHAs: loss of control of a well and a subsequent oil spill. We 
observed the identification of the event in a morning meeting between the onshore 
operation support center and the offshore installation, the establishment of the 
second-line emergency organization, and the following actions in the emergency-
handling center and in the well support center. Third-line emergency handling was 
also partly present in the areas that we observed. The second session included 
training in handling the loss of control of a well with a subsequent oil spill and 
injuries to personnel. We observed second-line emergency handling onshore (the 
emergency-handling room/center) and third-line handling at the company’s head 
office. The participants in the workshop were representatives from three operating 
companies, a contractor and consultants within the emergency-handling field. The 
meeting lasted for six hours with informal discussions. The group of 19 
participants was divided into two smaller groups during the day to make it easier 
for everyone to contribute to the discussions. The results were recorded by 
researchers taking notes during both discussions and presentations following 
guidelines to sort the data into the following categories: emergency preparedness 
exercise and training, transition from normal to emergency situation, interfaces, 
ICT, information flow and visualization, and finally a miscellaneous category.  
The results from the observations were recorded in field notes during the sessions. 
The field notes followed an observation guide that included the role of the actors 
and groups, interfaces between actors, communication between co-located actors, 
formal and informal information sharing, use of ICT, and observations made on the 
transition from normal to emergency situation. 
Following the observations, a workshop was held where the overall question asked 
to the group at the beginning of the workshop was “Which opportunities and 
challenges do you foresee related to emergency handling in 2015?” The 
participants in the workshop were representatives from three operating companies, 
a contractor and consultants within the emergenc-handling field. 
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For the observation study we also conducted document studies of organizations’ 
charts, emergency procedures, work process descriptions, etc. in the organizations 
that we observed. 
5.5.4 Important aspects when interpreting qualitative data 
In qualitative interviews and in observations where the researcher participates, e.g. 
as a facilitator, the data are extracted from an interaction in dialogue between the 
interviewer and the interviewee. The interviewer influences what is said by the way 
questions are formulated, what she or he focuses on when following up with new 
questions, etc. The value in this is that it is possible to explore and get a richer 
description of a topic than through other methodological approaches. This is 
essential when exploring new and unknown fields like IO. It is not necessarily seen 
as a good measure of reliability if two interviewers get the same answers when 
conducting a qualitative interview; this may be a result of using leading questions 
or because the interviewee may have stuck to the “official version” of the topic 
(Rosness et al., 2010). 
It is not possible, nor desirable, to generalize the data from my studies. The objects 
of my research have been case studies. In order to obtain a broad picture of the 
topics I have tried to involve several companies and many informants as case 
studies, but the goal for this has never been to generalize the findings so that they 
are valid for all other companies that introduce IO. The findings may, however, be 
transferable. Companies within and outside the petroleum industry may find that 
the results fit them as well. This way of thinking about naturalistic rather than 
rational generalization is well described in the works of Lincoln and Guba (Lincoln 
& Guba, 1985).  
5.5.5 Research ethics 
All data for the studies presented in this thesis have been made anonymous. The 
data files are all stored in secured servers. Audio recordings have been stored for 
analytical purposes only. They are not labeled with anything that can identify the 
interviewee or participants. Coding schemas for categorizing participants etc. have 
been kept separately from the recorded and transcribed material.  
The companies that have admitted me for my research are partners in the IO 
Center, and thus they may be identified as a group. When particular companies 
have participated in my research, or provided documentation or information, they 
have been made anonymous. This is also the reason why company-specific 
manuals and procedures are not referred to in this thesis.  
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5.5.6 A constructivist approach to interpretation 
Faced with these different data sets all based on case studies, interviews, 
observations or survey data that I had not collected myself, I applied an inductive 
data analysis and made an effort to interpret the findings within their context. I 
have thus followed what is described as the constructivist program (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985). The constructivist strategies face problems of a theory and value-
laden nature and ambiguities (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008). 
5.5.7 Reliability and validity – trustworthiness of and possible 
weaknesses in my research 
As described by Lincoln and Guba (1985), trustworthiness relates to the credibility, 
validity, reliability and objectivity of the research.  
Response bias and socially desirable responding 
There is always a chance that informants in interviews or participants in workshops 
tell the interviewer or other participants what they think the other(s) wants to hear. 
The reason for this behavior differs, but the behavior itself is generally termed 
“response bias.” A response bias is a systematic tendency to respond to a range of 
survey items or questions on the basis that it is different to the content of the item 
or question. In research on risks and safety issues, this may be a significant 
problem. In high-risk organizations such as in the petroleum industry, there are 
clear expectations of safe behavior and attitudes. As participants in the petroleum 
industry, the informants and participants in my interviews, workshops and seminars 
may have experience of different situations where “the right way of viewing risks 
and safety” has been emphasized, or they may have experienced that their own or 
others’ attitudes toward safety have influenced their work possibilities and 
reputation. Sometimes a person’s response style develops into a pattern (e.g. 
always choosing the extreme part of the scale). Psychologists have identified a 
phenomenon called socially desirable responding. Socially desirable responding is 
a tendency to answer in a way that makes the respondent look good (Palhus, 1991). 
What is socially desirable depends on the situation and the individual’s perception 
of what is desirable in their situation. In my research, I find socially desirable 
responding a threat to the reliability of data from workshops and seminars where 
representatives from the safety authorities as well as safety managers in petroleum 
companies are present as participants or as speakers. Former experience, in 
addition to the presence of significant others in the workshops and seminars, may 
have contributed to response biases that threaten the reliability of my findings. I 
have made the issue of bias part of the focus in my research in the paper on risk 
images (Paper 1), and on safety perception and comprehension among OIMs and 
safety managers (Paper 2).  
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Reliability and validity in my analysis 
I have read and listened to all the notes and voice recordings from the interviews 
and observations myself, thus avoiding different patterns in the extraction of 
findings, but at the same time missing the opportunity for inter-reliability checks. I 
have, as far as possible, tried to make available information about the settings and 
questions asked when describing my approach to gathering data in the papers. 
Though trying to follow a strict line when selecting and coding data, all analyses 
are influenced by my interpretation. In the studies within emergency management, 
there were several researchers, myself included and all participated in selecting and 
coding data for the analyses. The data collection and the quantitative assessment 
for the NORSCI data for the paper on differences in risk comprehension were 
conducted by other researchers and I have only checked the consistency in the 
output of the analyses, based on the raw data that have been presented to me.  
I have tried to obtain external validation through read-throughs and checks by 
colleagues and the informants themselves. It is still possible that the interpretations 
made are influenced by my values, thoughts and ambitions. It is my view that 
research is never unbiased. I have very possibly influenced the answers and 
utterances in interviews and workshops by being present and asking questions. It is 
also quite possible that other researchers would come to conclusions that differ 
from mine, due to both different extractions of findings from available information 
and to different interpretation of the findings.  
Difficult access to data 
It is always difficult to acquire data from organizations that are busy and in 
operation. The partners in the IO Center participate in many research studies and 
they have been reluctant to admit all those who want access to their employees and 
office premises. I would have preferred to spend more time within the 
organizations that I have studied, however this has not been possible due to 
distance and priorities. This would have also probably led to a more limited scope.  
When studying the modification project process I visited the company for shorter 
stays both onshore and offshore on a petroleum production installation where 
modification projects took place. I value the opportunity to conduct interviews with 
workers on their own premises as I believe that more valid information is acquired. 
Being present on the informant’s home ground, I have also had the opportunity to 
observe situations myself, thus collecting richer information on issues than is 
possible through interviews alone. 
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6 Summary of papers 
The research questions presented in section 5 of this thesis called for a study of risk 
images among stakeholders of the technological development in IO, a study of a 
work process where IO was introduced and of emergency-handling situations 
where IO had not yet been formally introduced. My research has followed a path of 
curiosity over how to deal with risks in a transition in the way a high-risk industry 
is operated. The path starts with research of what IO means and what sorts of risk 
image stakeholders hold at the beginning of the transition period. This is dealt with 
in the paper on risk images in a changing high-risk society. The paper presents risk 
images from the stakeholders at the blunt end: authorities, managers, researchers 
and experts in different areas. Risk images at the sharp end were approached 
individually through union representatives who participated in the study of risk 
images presented in this first paper. In 2007 and 2008, when conducting the study 
of risk images, IO had reached the sharp end in only a limited sense. Video 
conferences existed and there had been some smaller organizational adaptations, 
although the broader picture was that work was carried out as usual and bore little 
resemblance to what was pictured in Generations 1 and 2 in OLF’s description. I 
still felt a need to know more about how risks were perceived offshore. The study 
presented in Paper 2, on safety comprehension among installation managers and 
safety managers, provided information about the perceived risk level offshore in 
2007, but without addressing particular IO-related issues. The studies of an IO-
influenced work process and a work process where IO had not been introduced 
resulted in the study of emergency management presented in Paper 4 and the study 
of how a systemic model could be applied for risk assessment of the planning 
phase for offshore modifications presented in Paper 3. The planning of 
modifications was found to be interesting because maintenance and modifications 
was singled out as one of the main areas where IO would have an impact. Risk 
handling in an emergency management setting was not identified as an area where 
IO would have an impact; however, for me it was clear that the ongoing transitions 
in the industry would influence risk management and thus I found it valuable to 
study. The study of emergency handling was valuable due to the reluctance to 
apply new technology in the crisis-handling situation, despite still having to deal 
with the technological alterations in the environment of the crisis. 
The papers are presented in the same order as the related research questions have 
been presented in the previous text.  
6.1 Risk images in a changing high-risk industry 
Risk images held by actors involved in the planning and execution of operations 
with a high-risk potential are critical components of risk governance. The principal 
concern in this paper was to investigate the forming and development of risk 
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images in a high-risk industry when introducing new advanced operational 
technologies. The case studied was the planning and implementation of IO in 
offshore oil and gas production.  
The importance of risk images in a high-risk setting is twofold. The first argument 
is that an adequate risk image is a precondition for the sufficient understanding of 
the actual technology, operational procedures and organizational arrangements 
necessary to identify possible hazards of different kinds. These kinds of 
understanding strongly influence risk analyses and the forming of accident 
scenarios. A relevant and comprehensive risk image is, therefore, a precondition 
for developing necessary surveillance systems and barriers to prevent possible 
accidents. The second argument concerns risk perception, which relates to the 
ability to interpret signals and warnings and react to these in adequate ways, so that 
potential incidents and accidents can be avoided. These arguments are strongly 
supported in the theory of man-made disasters (B. A. Turner, 1978; B. Turner & 
Pidgeon, 1997) where among other things it is stressed that a reluctance to perceive 
changes or incidents as relating to a change or a new paradigm may lead to an 
incubation period where information about possible increased risk is not interpreted 
as valid and thus creates the basis for an accident. 
The informants in the study were representatives from different groups involved in 
the development of IO on the NCS, groups that participated in making decisions, 
gave consent and permission for operation in an IO setting or were involved in 
protecting HSE. They performed work such as R&D, inquiries, reports and 
statements in the mass media. They also participated in workshops, discussions, 
seminars and other kinds of arenas where IO was discussed. 
Information about risk images was gathered in various settings such as interviews, 
workshops, seminars and informal talks. Visual and written representations of risk 
images were gathered from presentations and reports in meetings, and on the 
Internet. Open-ended interviews and workshops with stricter agendas but with open 
discussions in planned groups were the dominant sources of data collection. 
In the interviews, seminars and the workshop, the informants could express their 
risk images in comments and as answers to questions from the interviewer or from 
other participants in the group. Expressed images of IO in general varied from 
opportunities based on technology to changes in organizations and competences. 
The definition of IO, and what kinds of technological and organizational changes 
this development comprises, was not clear in any of the statements from companies 
or in official reports. Images of IO, therefore, were related to the informants’ 
experiences with IO in their own environments and from what they had read or 
heard outside their own organizations or positions at work. 
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The analysis showed that the informants’ statements revealed such consistent 
patterns of reasoning on risk images that it became empirically feasible to group 
them into distinct categories that could describe the features of the risk images: 
x Technological optimism;  
x Traditional risk images; and 
x Reconfigured risk images. 
 
The dominant point of view in the technology optimism risk image is that things 
seem to be in good shape and that there is no specific reason why this should not be 
the same, or better, as progress is made towards more advanced IO. According to 
the traditional risk image, IO means business as usual. The development of IO is 
not seen as significantly introducing new kinds of risks and the view is that risks in 
IO can be handled with traditional measures. The development and implementation 
of IO does not call for any specific increase or change in risks compared with 
traditional operations. The reconfigured risk image is characterized by 
acknowledging that IO is something that moves the operation of petroleum 
production from a more closed to a more open system, and that this may be 
considered a significant change in perspective. It may be that making this 
acknowledgement is essential for constructing risk images related to IO.  
The second finding from the analysis was that the distribution of the three types of 
risk images among different categories of informants was inconsistent. There seem 
to be no clear differences between groups when it comes to risk images, nor do 
those who may be labeled “experts” show a different risk image to the others. This 
finding supported the writing about the perspective-making process presented by 
Boland and Tenkasi (1995). The social arenas that the informants attend seem to 
contribute to the formation of what looks to resemble a kind of community of 
knowing where specialized knowledge workers interact in perspective making and 
perspective taking, facilitating the emergence of new meaning and knowledge. 
The results from the study imply that we need further research on risk images 
among those that take part in risk appraisal, and that social science models such as 
social constructionism, arena models and knowledge about communities of 
knowing should be included to enable understanding of how risk images are 
constructed and formed in the process of risk appraisal. 
6.2 Safety perception and comprehension within different 
groups 
The background for the study was for the corresponding author related to studying 
safety culture and impacts on possibilities for accidents. In his work with data from 
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the 2007 NORSCI, he came across significant differences in measured safety 
comprehension between the different groups; in particular, the fact that the OIM 
and the safety representatives showed a significantly more positive comprehension 
of the risk level and their ability to cope with risks when compared to the rest of 
the respondents. The OIMs also showed an overall significantly more positive 
comprehension compared to the safety representatives. Though differences in risk 
comprehension between different groups and the more positive attitudes among 
managers are not unfamiliar in the research literature, the finding still attracted my 
interest. The NORSCI questionnaire of 2007 had been administered in the early 
days of the introduction of IO to offshore installations and I found it interesting to 
investigate the risk images of the offshore workers during this period, albeit only 
through their scorings on a questionnaire. I also found it interesting in relation to 
my previous study on risk images at the blunt end, where I had found that group 
belonging and organizational role had little impact on the forming of risk images. 
This made it interesting to look into what influences an individual’s comprehension 
of risk and how this influenced a group of people, such as the OIMs. 
The OIM is responsible for all matters of health and safety on board an offshore 
installation. The OIM also supervises the day-to-day aspects of the oil and gas 
production operation, generally including budgets, personnel, production, 
maintenance, and logistics (helicopters/supply boats/dive vessels, etc.). The OIM 
represents a key link between the onshore and offshore facets of the organization, 
and as such the OIM plays an important role in communicating the safety message 
from senior levels within the onshore organization to the workforce at the sharp 
end. OIMs have a critical role to play in developing and maintaining the safety 
culture in the offshore environment.  
Safety representatives play an important role in occupational health and safety 
management on offshore platforms. All installations have a safety representative. 
The safety representative can have different titles such as Offshore Safety & 
Environment Coordinator, Safety Leader and Safety Manager. At some 
installations the function is shared with the role of being a trained nurse. The safety 
representative is usually a part of the OIM’s leadership team and emergency 
management team. The safety representative is usually the contact person with the 
government and has responsibilities related to tracking and reporting safety, health 
and environment issues.  
Reasons for differences in responses between groups may be related to socially 
desirable responding, cognitive biases and power and conflict issues. Socially 
desirable responding is related to the respondent’s role in society or in an 
organization as well as a number of other attributes of the person. A response bias 
is a systematic tendency to respond to a range of survey items on a basis that is 
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different from the content of the item. Socially desirable responding has been 
identified as a tendency to answer in a way that makes the respondent look good 
(Paulhus, 1991). What is socially desirable depends on the situation and the 
individual’s perception of what is desirable in their situation. For a group to answer 
homogenously in a socially desirable way, the group must be uniform to a large 
extent, and the surroundings must be comparable for the different individuals of the 
group. There is no indication that socially desirable responding is controlled for in 
the NORSCI survey. There is still little evidence of systematic differences between 
groups in their tendency to answer in a socially desirable way. Cognitive biases 
may lead individuals to perceive less risk. Cognitive biases are common types of 
mental shortcuts used to make judgments. Overconfidence refers to the failure to 
know the limits of one’s knowledge. The illusion of control occurs when 
individuals overemphasize the extent to which their skill can increase performance 
in situations where chance plays a large part and skill is not necessarily the 
deciding factor. Because the individuals believe that they can control largely 
uncontrollable events, they also think they can accurately predict the outcome of 
the events. Issues of power and conflict are rarely addressed in safety 
comprehension research. Safety issues, like other organizational issues, are subject 
to discussion and disagreement. Although most organizations in the oil and gas 
production sector in Norway are normally nonhierarchical in nature, power issues 
of course exist. Hierarchy and authority discussions arise in safety- and efficiency-
related issues as well as in emergency handling, where it is natural that the 
emergency organization has clear leadership and strict procedures for handling 
resources and information.  
Our findings echo the fact that the managers of organizations who are closer to the 
planning and strategy of the operation generally express a more positive view of 
the safety level. The findings thus correspond to previous research, although the 
OIMs and the safety representative have not been isolated as groups in such 
studies. In later studies, it will become important to address the role of groups that 
show a different risk comprehension than others in the construction of risk images. 
6.3 Resilient planning of modification projects in high-risk 
systems 
Following the study of risk images of operations within the offshore petroleum 
industry and the introduction of IO, the plan was to look at how to assess risks in 
such a system. The background consists of the argument that traditional risk 
assessment methods may be insufficient when assessing risks in a complex socio-
technical system with a great deal of uncertainty about what may or may not be 
risky. The chosen case was one of the areas where IO had been described as 
something that would have an impact on how it was handled: the modifications and 
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maintenance work for offshore installations. The aim of the study was to 
investigate how risks may be identified in a complex system with interactions 
between persons, technology, organizations and parallel processes. It was the 
planning phase of modifications on a mature installation that has earned the right 
for a prolonged life partly because of new technological development that was 
chosen as the case for studying how a systemic risk model and method like the 
Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) may be applied in risk 
assessment. FRAM has previously been used to identify emergent risks due to the 
variability of normal performance in the minimum safety altitude warning system 
(MSAW) within air traffic control (L. Macchi et al., 2009).  
The planning phase of a modification project is typically described in procedures. 
The procedure is a detailed description of all aspects to consider and attend to in a 
planning phase. The described procedure is very detailed and thorough in order to 
account for any installation in the company. As with most procedures like this, the 
way work is conducted relates to the procedure, but a more manageable 
“procedure” is used in daily work. This daily “procedure” is not described in 
manuals or the like, but is shown through the tasks, meetings and documentation 
that are carried out when planning for modifications. In line with the FRAM 
analysis, the functions identified for the analysis are the ones observed in work as 
done, not in work as planned in the guidelines.  
The identification of risk in FRAM is based on the evaluation of the variability of 
normal performance. How to evaluate variability is under discussion within the 
development of the method, and some different attempts had been presented 
elsewhere. My application of FRAM was on an operation at the organizational 
level and I found that the variability may be evaluated slightly differently than in a 
previous study where FRAM had been used for risk assessment. I found that 
organizational functions are not stable for the system I assessed; in fact, 
organizational functions (providing resources, allocating budget, etc.) may vary 
over the time span for the planning phase, which may last several months (e.g. time 
of year for budgets and seasonal variations for staffing and personnel). Also, I 
found that technological functions are not necessarily stable, though they may be 
designed for stability. It could be argued that they may vary (in performance, due 
to power supply and network access, access to information in protected data 
catalogues, etc.) and have the possibility of dampening variability by providing 
warnings and alarms. I found it important to evaluate variability in the interwoven 
socio-technical system, not treating technological functions as different from 
human or organizational functions.  
The evaluation of performance variability revealed several interesting results that 
shed light on possible risks in the planning phase. Hidden or not easily accessible 
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information about the system where the modification takes place causes unwanted 
variability. Growing organizations with an introduction of new employees that do 
not know the history of the installation also causes variability. In combination, this 
constitutes variability that may lead to unwanted outcomes from the planning 
phase. It probably leads to more delays than necessary and thus jeopardizes the 
precision in the decision to execute for pre-engineering. It was also found, though 
not properly shown in the analysis, that more complexity is introduced as there are 
parallel modification projects going on in different phases of planning and 
execution.  
It may also be a source of unwanted variability that the procedure for modification 
projects is detailed and to a large extent far away from the daily carrying out of the 
planning phase. As any “normal way of doing it” then becomes a habit that has 
little reference to any general description that is accessible to all, different mental 
models of “how it is done” and “how thorough this needs to be” may develop in the 
organization.  
Safety and efficiency in modification planning may be improved by showing 
“work as is” more than “work as planned.” The FRAM model may be a helpful 
tool in the way it stresses that each function has an origin, this being that all aspects 
can be related to other aspects of other functions.  
It may also dampen variability and thus functional resonance to make information 
about the system and installation (models, drawings, historic data, etc.) visible and 
accessible to all and to work as a team and not as two separate organizations in the 
work of planning and carrying out the modification. Modification planning will 
benefit from the sharing of updated and real-time information of the installation 
and the systems. In order to dampen variability that may stem from other 
modification projects as more proposals are made and more modification projects 
are carried out in parallel, it may be useful to develop a FRAM model for the 
system of parallel modification projects and identify variability that should be 
dampened.  
The study revealed that further development of FRAM as a risk assessment tool is 
needed in order to make FRAM a manageable and practical tool for use in the 
industry. This especially applies to the evaluation of possible variability and how 
this should be presented.  
6.4 Building resilience into emergency management 
Emergency management faces a changed reality in terms of possibilities and 
threats with the introduction of new technology and related changes in work forms 
as well as organizational forms. In the study we attempted to look at how new 
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technology and new work processes influence emergency management in the oil 
and gas industry, with the introduction of IO. Emergency management had not 
been singled out as an area where IO would have influence. In fact, it was the 
general opinion in the industry that emergency management should be left alone. 
This view was expressed in many settings when we first started our study on 
defined situations for hazards and accidents.  
Emergency management may be defined as the total amount of activities (both 
administrative routines and informal processes) conducted in a more or less 
coordinated way to control emergencies before, during and after an event. This 
includes planning, training handling, learning, anticipation and monitoring. This 
definition is broader than most definitions of emergency management, as they 
mainly focus on emergency handling during an event.  
The theoretical basis of the study was taken from the field of RE and HRO. Both 
perspectives are relevant for handling emergencies as well as representing a 
proactive approach to emergency management. RE looks for ways to enhance the 
ability of systems to succeed under varying conditions (Hollnagel, 2009b). This 
includes the ability to respond effectively to both expected and unexpected 
conditions; to monitor both threats and opportunities; to anticipate future 
developments that may affect the system’s ability to achieve its goals; and to learn 
from past events in order to correctly understand both what happened and why. The 
HRO literature provides input on how organizations develop a capacity to handle 
unexpected events and detect risk. The theory is grounded in studies of 
organizations that have demonstrated an outstanding capacity to handle fairly 
complex technologies without generating major accidents (LaPorte & Consolini, 
1991; G. Rochlin, 1997). Important aspects from this research tradition are 
organizational redundancy and the capacity of organizations to adapt to peak 
demands and crises (Weick, 2001; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, 2007). In HRO theory, 
mindfulness points to a constant awareness and an ability in an organization to 
search for evolving practices and mechanisms to handle the unexpected through the 
principles of anticipation and containment.  
The interest in studying emergency handling from a resilience point of view also 
came from the literature study. From a total of 16 reports from accident 
investigations conducted by the safety petroleum authority during the period 2007–
2009, we found deficiencies in risk anticipation and assessment in 11 of the reports 
(eight out of eight occupational accidents and three out of eight major accidents). 
Deficiencies in learning were found in four of the reports (all major accidents), and 
deficiencies in monitoring were found in three of the reports (all major accidents). 
Nevertheless, the emergency response (evacuation of personnel, rescue, etc.) was 
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described as sufficient in seven of the 16 reports (four occupational accidents and 
three major accidents).  
We carried out two observation studies of training sessions and arranged a 
workshop with participants from the industry where the future of emergency 
management was debated. The overall question asked to the group at the beginning 
of the workshop was “Which opportunities and challenges do you foresee related to 
emergency handling in 2015?” 
Results indicate that there are possibilities for more efficient and earlier handling of 
possible hazardous deviations in the transition stage between normal operation and 
emergency handling. This acknowledgement is supported by the introduction of 
new technology and work processes and more integrated information. The main 
results are related to early risk anticipation, interaction between different actors, 
and communication during distributed emergency handling. The results are 
relevant for opportunities that should be incorporated into the future of emergency 
management, as well as representing challenges that follow the introduction of IO. 
Both the observation studies and the workshop revealed that there was a need for 
more focus on detecting and responding to deviant situations at an earlier stage. 
The role of the recently established operation centers that (continuously) support 
the operations offshore and how these could be involved at an early stage was an 
issue. Early anticipation of events was generally described as non-existing or 
hidden, outside the emergency management teams.  
The challenges regarding interaction between actors were related to the increased 
number and complex map of actors involved in emergency handling in the industry 
due to changes brought on by IO. These actors are different in terms of 
responsibilities, interests, proximity to hazard and resources, and thereby there is a 
need to focus on new forms of cooperation, coordination and awareness when 
planning and handling emergencies. Furthermore, it was identified that 
involvement of some of these actors at an earlier stage in normal operation and in 
developing new ways of including these actors in emergency management could be 
a step in the right direction in detecting deficiencies or a drift from normal 
operation to incidents or accident situations.  
Communication challenges in existing emergency management were related to the 
increased number of actors and the large amount of available information. Sharing 
of information in real time plays an even more crucial part than before in the 
coordination of activities at different vertical and horizontal levels in emergency 
handling. It was found that both poorer and richer forms of communication should 
be used, but that these have both strengths and weaknesses in emergency handling 
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that need to be considered further. Additionally, the reliability and integrity of the 
information shared and received in an emergency situation should be seen as 
important factors when reviewing the data, channels and tools used.  
There may be different approaches to designing resilience into a system. An 
organization should aim to identify potential contingencies in order to ensure an 
effective, customized response to such situations (first layer of defense), but it is 
not possible to accomplish this for all contingencies. A second layer of response 
should be to identify contingencies at a less complete level of detail and to develop 
generic responses to these. A third level of defense is needed for complex systems, 
one that makes it possible to detect and respond to novel and yet unanticipated 
scenarios. One of the main key factors for achieving this may be the onshore teams 
being introduced with IO. These teams monitor and work with real-time data, 
which means that more people see the same things within the operation. Expert 
knowledge is often used in onshore teams. Their knowledge and expertise may 
imply a reluctance to simplify and more sensitivity to the operations. This may 
move the focus of handling crises from handling top events. The implications of 
the changes will be changed scenarios for, and roles within, emergency 
management training sessions. In order to prevent distrust in new tools and 
unfamiliarity with new work forms and new actors, the use of collaboration tools 
and technology for information sharing must be expressly considered in training 
sessions. 
6.5 Essence of articles 
The articles outlined above may be summarized as follows based on the research 
questions outlined in the general problem formulation in section 1.5:  
What risks are people aware of in the early phases of IO development?  
Risk images at the starting point of IO were characterized by technology optimism 
and traditional risk images, though reconfigured risk images exist, mainly among 
researchers and others who are further away from the implementation of IO. At the 
starting point of IO development, offshore workers were generally satisfied with 
the handling of risks though differences existed between OIMs that perceive a 
lower risk level than the remaining population. The results also suggest that risk 
images are influenced by which group stakeholders belong to or which arenas they 
have attended. There may be possible bias among stakeholders of risk management 
and technology development. 
How may risk be managed in an increasingly complex system such as IO? 
The results from the FRAM analysis of the planning process of modifications 
suggest that risks stemming from root causes such as information breakdown may 
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be captured by systemic risk models. Such models may help the management of the 
risks in the reconfigured risk image found in Paper 1. 
How may IO influence the way of working in crisis management? 
Emergency handling will benefit from adapting to the technological changes with 
IO and may become more proactive in the management of risks if new technology 
is used wisely. Nevertheless, relying solely on modern information communication 
technology in crisis handling is risky. 
The general finding from the articles is that one cannot be too sure that the risk 
level remains the same as technological alterations introduce new risks or changed 
ways of handling risk, though some risks are reduced due to the new technology.  
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7 Discussion and concluding remarks 
The question asked at the start of this thesis was: How do technological alterations 
influence risk comprehension and management in a high-risk industry? I chose the 
technology-driven development called “Integrated Operations” (IO) as an arena to 
study this question. Through my work I have tried to understand what IO within 
the Norwegian offshore petroleum industry means, especially in relation to what 
the risks are within this development. I have tried to uncover the risk images that 
existed in the early days of the transition from traditional operations to IO, and how 
to assess and manage these risks. IO in the offshore petroleum production industry 
is many things. IO includes technology, work processes, organizational 
developments and changes, and importantly the general information technology 
development in the society. In order to grasp this broad picture I have taken a 
constructivist perspective. The constructivist perspective enabled me to study risk 
images of inexperienced situations based on the perception and comprehension of 
descriptions and early IO initiatives within the industry. The constructivist 
perspective also enabled my perspective on risk image forming as processes in 
arenas with various participants rather than as processes in hierarchical structures.  
The existing research had not revealed specific knowledge on how the altered 
technology in IO influenced risks, nor how possible altered risk images were 
formed. In general, there was a lack of research on the implications of altered 
technology on work processes in high-risk environment.  
I have tried to capture a broad image of risk, risk assessment and risk handling 
through the socio-technical perspective of safety. The socio-technical perspective 
treats technology and human beings as equal entities, and presumes that social 
processes and technological entities are inherently inseparable. The socio-technical 
perspective forced me not only to study the technological development, nor only 
the organizational changes, but also to look at all entities of IO development as 
inseparable agents that influence each other. This also directed my research to 
everyday practices where the material and the social actors interact.  
I have focused on three research questions: From a socio-technical and socio-
material point of view, what risks are people aware of in early phases of IO 
development? From a system perspective and considering a specific work process, 
how may risk be managed in an increasingly complex system such as IO? And 
finally, not all work practices were in focus for the IO development, leading to the 
final question: How may IO influence the way of working in crisis management? 
The theoretical perspectives were chosen because they all involve technology as an 
element that humans and the organization must manage, though the technology in 
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these theoretical perspectives is static elements that do not change. The general 
constructivist perspective, as an open-minded approach to the forming of risk 
images, was chosen due to my belief that risk images involve technology, either in 
a static or dynamic phase, as well as human actions and organizational aspects. 
7.1 Risk images in early phases of IO 
I asked the following question related to this field of interest at the beginning of my 
thesis: From a socio-technical and socio-material point of view, what risks are 
people aware of in early phases of IO development? Also: What risk images exist 
between stakeholders of IO at the blunt end (far from where the operation takes 
place)? Is risk comprehension equally distributed in different groups of offshore 
petroleum workers at the sharp end (close to where the operation takes place)? 
The study of risk images among stakeholders at the blunt end and OIMs and safety 
leaders at the sharp end shows that different risk images exist in the industry. Risk 
images may be within what can be called a traditional area where people think that 
the industry knows how to handle the risks of any matters, including IO. Others 
rely on the technology reducing the risk as it removes unreliable humans from 
dangerous operations. Some face IO with a reconstructed risk image, where they 
regard IO as significantly different from traditional operations and thus they see 
that new risks may come along with such a transition. Are risk images individual or 
do groups also differ in how they perceive risks? Not necessarily. Findings from 
one of the studies (covered in Paper 2) indicate that managers perceive risks in a 
different way than others such as the sharp end workers do on the NCS, whereas 
these findings are not confirmed within the study of risk images among 
stakeholders of IO where some sharp-enders were included (treated in Paper 1). 
Such findings are supported in studies of risk perception, but the underlying 
reasons for this difference and how the different risk images are formed are rarely 
addressed in risk perception studies. Different methodical assessments may 
influence the findings, as may the forming of groups that may be different in other 
studies. Also, the OIMs and other sharp-enders were asked about the present state 
of risk in 2007, whereas the stakeholders in the risk image study answered 
questions about future risks. At the sharp end in 2007–2008 IO was new, and few 
had experienced risks with it or felt “that was close...” when operating in an IO 
setting. They may not have been exposed to risks related to IO. The stakeholders at 
the blunt end had neither been exposed to any risks or hazards related to IO, though 
some of them were presented with possible future accident scenarios.  
Based on the study of risk images among stakeholders it seems that the reasons for 
differences in risk images are not related to background or experience in traditional 
terms of education or role in organizations, but rely more on the areas of how 
people attend to and are exposed to risk and safety utterances from others and 
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discussions about safety and risks. Risk images may differ among the informants 
due to social issues and personal factors, but there seems to be little support for 
such explanations in the data other than the possible loyalty issues among the 
managers. However, this is a hypothesis and not a finding, as loyalty or other social 
issues were not measured in the survey where the data set comes from. The 
offshore petroleum production industry in Norway is normally described as having 
a very flat hierarchy when it comes to authority and power, though power and 
authority issues do of course exist. The description of the Norwegian offshore 
petroleum industry as a flat structure with open arenas for all who like to attend at 
least holds when talking about arenas where people, safety and risks are discussed. 
These arenas are relatively open. People also tend to move between roles and 
positions in the industry and are thus exposed to several groups throughout their 
working life. Findings in this thesis related to risk images, perception and 
comprehension suggest that groups, either one’s role in an organization or one’s 
academic background, and arenas of discussion and debate such as conferences, 
seminars and workshops, matter in terms of the forming of risk images of 
technological alterations. Risk images both at the blunt and the sharp end differ 
between groups, meaning that risk management in general and in each organization 
may differ depending on representativeness in risk management groups and 
departments.  It can be argued that the use of a constructivist approach to the 
forming of risk images has given new insight into how risk images are formed.  
7.1.1 The belief in technological development 
Technology optimism is found in this industry as well as in others. The 
improvements in safety in the offshore oil and gas production in Norway are partly 
based on technology development such as sensors, emergency shutdown systems, 
safety valves, etc., and this explains much of the technology optimism risk image 
in the industry. Limitations in the technology are barely addressed in accident 
investigations. Deviations from procedures, lack of risk analysis of operations, lack 
of competence etc. are addressed in the investigation and normally attributed to 
deficiencies in the organization. The belief that development in industries “saves 
the day” and decreases risks on a general level is also partly the basis of Turner’s 
Man-made Disaster Theory (B. A. Turner, 1978; B. Turner & Pidgeon, 1997), 
where new elements are not necessarily seen as a threat that may lead to narrowed 
interpretation. It is generally argued that technological development has formed the 
basis for growth in the Norwegian petroleum industry as well as having a strong 
impact on safety issues. There is a strong belief in the use of physical and 
organizational barriers for accident prevention. The energy-barrier perspective 
(Haddon, 1980) as a risk mitigation perspective is found in most regulations and 
manuals in the industry, and measures taken based on the energy-barrier 
perspective have traditionally proved to be effective. Based on the history of 
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technology development as being successful for the industry with respect to safety 
issues, I argue that technology optimism is also a traditional risk image. 
Technology and automation of human operations (e.g. on the drill floor) have been 
seen as improvements rather than threats.  
7.2 Risk management in an increasingly complex system  
My second research question was: From a system perspective and considering a 
specific work process, how may risk be managed in an increasingly complex 
system such as IO? 
According to some authors, maintenance errors (including what is described as 
minor modifications in this thesis) have been among the principal causes of several 
major accidents in a wide range of technologies (Reason & Hobbs, 2003). Within 
the oil and gas sector, the Piper Alpha accident (1988) is the best known. In their 
book of 2003, Reason and Hobbs focus on the human errors related to human 
interactions with equipment and systems and on the error-provoking conditions that 
one must try to avoid in high-risk technology environments. On the organizational 
level, it is argued that maintenance personnel come in contact with the largest 
number of failures at an earlier stage of development. In the HRO tradition, 
maintenance work is described in relation to “being preoccupied with failure” as a 
process of mindful organizing (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Maintenance 
departments in HRO may become central locations for organizational learning 
(Weick et al., 1999). As maintenance and modification work processes were 
identified in early publications on IO as areas in which IO would have a strong 
impact, I chose the planning phase of minor modification projects as a case for the 
assessment of risks. The study showed that there are many possibilities for 
variability in performance of the planning process. The variability in performance 
may interact in such a way that hazardous situations emerge. The variability is 
mainly due to a lack of proper information and communication between 
organizations, which may lead to the right information about the history and state 
of an installation not being present or found. If the future image of IO in which the 
seamless integration between operator and vendor companies comes true, some of 
these issues may be addressed, but problems will still be present for mature 
installations where critical safety information and history may be impaired or lost. I 
propose that socio-technical, systemic models of, for example, modification 
projects, where risk is assessed continuously and through the evaluation of the 
possible emergence of hazards due to unwanted variability, is a promising 
approach to deal with such a challenge. It is important that risk assessment is 
conducted in an arena where all have access, including contractor personnel, sharp-
end workers, planners, etc. The FRAM model may offer the opportunity to include 
all necessary evaluations, and to continuously reassess risks. This is important in 
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order to ensure that all parts of a resilient organization are present: monitoring, 
learning, anticipation and response. Efforts should be made not only to dampen 
unwanted variability, but also to support wanted variability in performance. Within 
the planning phase of minor modifications on a mature installation that is operating 
within an IO context, this may be things like making information about the history 
of the aging installation available to all and making it easier to exchange real-time 
information between the operator and the contractor organization. Organizational 
borders should be torn down in order to support integration between employees 
that share the same goals for their work: safe and efficient modifications.  
7.3 IO influence on crisis management  
The third research question asked was: How may IO influence the way of working 
in crisis management? 
The need for more proactive safety management was emphasized in the study of 
emergency management. It was found that emergency management traditionally 
starts too late, losing the opportunity to handle deviances in system performance at 
an early stage where the escalation of events into an accident may be hindered. 
Accident investigation reports indeed show that this opportunity is missed and may 
even contribute to the accident. A read-through of 16 reports from the period 2007–
2009 revealed that attention is drawn to matters that indicate insufficient risk 
anticipation and evaluation. The investigations revealed inadequate learning in 
organizations by pointing to insufficient learning from earlier similar incidents or 
accidents, since they have not changed any procedures, behaviors or attitudes 
towards safety in similar operations. 
In IO, the use of onshore support teams in normal operation has enabled a 
conversion into a dynamic problem-solving work process rather than an “expert-
on-call in case of problems” way of working. The handling of crises still seems to 
be either “on” or “off”; the emergency-handling organization is established by a 
call in case of emergency, usually late in the problem-solving process. In order to 
become more adaptive and resilient in the handling of operational problems, 
emergency management needs to include the transition period from normal 
operation to the actual emergency handling by use of available resources, such as 
the different support centers, in a more coordinated manner. The claim that most 
emergency management models are based on a belief that the system is known or 
knowable, i.e. that the cause and effect are understood and predictable or can be 
determined with sufficient data (S. French & Niculae, 2005), makes the concern 
that traditional emergency management may not be able to handle emergencies in 
the IO context even more considerable. In various phases of the transition from 
traditional operations, the “IO system,” with all its new or altered technology, is 
probably less known or not known at all. Crises in such systems may be difficult to 
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handle based on pre-established scenarios and procedures. Handling of major 
accident events is mainly characterized by systems or situations that are either 
complex (i.e. cause and effect may be explained after the event) or chaotic (i.e. 
cause and effect are not discernible).  
It was suggested that new operational teams onshore, as well as other actors that 
may anticipate risks in operations at an early stage, should be more integrated in 
the emergency management organization, meaning making use of the technology 
introduced with IO rather than avoiding it. The ICT that accomplishes IO, as well 
as technology specially adapted for the emergency-handling area, may help this 
integration and move emergency management into proactive rather than reactive 
management if the technology is properly introduced without disturbing the trust in 
the tools, technology and people within emergency handling. The results from the 
study of emergency management in offshore petroleum operations in an IO context 
may have relevance for emergency management outside the oil and gas industry, as 
other sectors such as energy supply, the financial system and transport systems also 
face challenges with new technology and distributed organizations. The challenges 
with emergency management in other industries, and especially at the societal 
level, have been exposed to disasters and accidents in the last few years, and seem 
to resemble the challenges that were seen in our study.  
7.4 Socio-technical systems with considerable leeway for 
action 
It was argued in the introduction of this thesis that IO and the technology that 
supports the transition can be interpreted in different ways. People, through project 
groups in the organizations, must find out how to use the technology themselves, 
whether it is ICT in meeting rooms or in the offices and workplaces, sensor 
technology that provides data from the wells or automated production-optimizing 
tools. As use of the technology is uncertain and changes depending on who uses 
the technology and who operates the installation, it is a socio-technical system that 
is difficult, if not impossible, to describe in detail. It is a system that can be 
described as complex and intractable. Such a system will always be underspecified; 
work procedures may help some situations, but they will be insufficient for many 
operations.  
7.5 Will the industry enter an incubation period? 
At present it seems that the offshore oil and gas production industry in Norway has 
left the concept of IO as something that needs special focus. IO as a concept has 
been removed from websites and other focus areas have taken its place. This does 
not mean that the development and the transition period have ended. The process 
still goes on, but with less attention from top management and probably also from 
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researchers. The status is that the oil and gas industry is entering a tail end period, 
with lower production and fewer discoveries of large fields of gas or oil, though 
some exceptions exist. In order to maintain the market goals, the oil companies will 
have to move north, into harsher environments and drilling for and production of 
petroleum in deeper and less accessible fields. The IO images have been the new 
fields that are used for promotion – the reality is that many older fields that should 
have been closed down for production by now still operate and receive prolonged 
life expectancies because of technological development and changes in the market 
situation. These installations must be modified to meet standards and requirements, 
a topic that I have assessed in the study of modifications of a mature installation 
(Paper 3). 
I have shown that the industry has a strong belief that strict procedures are effective 
means of meeting hazards and challenges. The procedures are only valid to the 
extent that they fit the surroundings in which they are used. Modifications 
influence the construction and functioning of the installations and it is often found 
that procedures and drawings are not updated to match the modified system. It may 
then be that parts of the industry imagine that they have the barriers to handle 
hazards, but it is very possible that they do not. It follows that it may be argued 
that, not only because of IO but because of IO in combination with aging 
installations that have undergone many modifications, the industry may face a 
process similar to that described by Turner and Pidgeon in their Theory of Man-
made Disasters (B. A. Turner, 1978; B. Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). The strong belief 
in technology and that IO “saves the day” may lead to narrow-minded risk 
comprehension and to deviances and incidents being left unnoticed or 
misunderstood. The chance is that this becomes an incubation period, with chances 
of “decoys” that distract attention from real problems. Drilling for and the 
production of oil and gas are never risk-free and safety barriers are vulnerable, as 
has been shown in the recent Deepwater Horizon accident in the Gulf of Mexico.  
7.6 Technological alterations’ influence on risk 
comprehension and management in a high-risk industry 
– concluding remarks 
Overall, though the development of IO has followed its planned path, little 
attention has been paid to the risk assessment of the whole socio-technical system 
and how other parts of the system are influenced by changes in the system parts 
that are in focus. 
I find evidence from my study that altered risk images are formed at an early stage 
of a technological development, and that risk comprehension is influenced by the 
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technology involved in the development as well as one’s position in groups such as 
being part of the management. The strong belief in barriers as efficient risk- or 
consequence-reducing factors is based on experience and will also influence the 
individual’s perception of risk in future IO work processes. 
Changes in risk management related to the development of IO were not evident in 
my study. The industry still relied on traditional risk assessment, and emergency 
management did not enter a significant transition period during the period of this 
study. This was the case, even though IO generates changes in different elements 
of the operation system and the interaction between these elements that may lead 
both to accident scenarios and changes in how accident scenarios may be handled.  
Among those who regarded new technology as more than just “black boxes,” but 
rather as a known manner of operation but with uncertain influence on work in the 
industry, it was possible to see how the technology will work in a socio-technical 
or system perspective. In their view, the technologies were “actors,” though the 
phrase was not used by the informants. 
Accident investigations of most major accidents reveal unbalance in the human-
organization-technological system, often referred to as the MTO model, and in the 
interaction between the different items of this model. My argument is that there is 
no need to wait for a major accident associated with IO before the industry should 
plan for managing the altered risk image that accompanies it. It will be difficult to 
establish probabilistic risk analyses, but it is possible to identify possible accident 
scenarios. The risks should be treated as accident scenarios that have not yet 
happened. These possible accident scenarios can be included in training for 
emergency management and in plans for competence and roles in the teams that 
operate the IO-based operations. It is possible to establish arenas where stories 
about the changed way of working in the industry could be communicated and 
discussed across organizational borders. The industry, including the authorities and 
the unions, has a good history of cross-group cooperation regarding health, 
environment and safety issues. The stories on how IO has improved safety are 
important in these arenas, but stories about the concerns and intuitions of 
uncertainty are crucial for maintaining a resilient, highly reliable industry that is 
able to anticipate and respond to risks before they combine and emerge as major 
accidents. 
This calls for a revitalization of the social-technological perspective and new 
research on this perspective within the organizational-safety research area. 
Theoretical perspectives presented in this thesis are promising but need to be 
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reviewed in the light of safety, especially related to risk assessment and 
management. 
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Summary 
We present the study of the forming and development of risk images in a high risk 
industry when introducing advanced new operational technologies. The case 
studied is the planning and implementation of integrated operations (IO) in 
offshore oil and gas production. We define a risk image as a combination of hazard 
identification and risk perception. The informants were representatives from 
different groups involved in the evaluation or development of IO on the Norwegian 
continental shelf. Data were collected through interviews and observations in 
workshops and of text representations. The analysis of the data revealed three 
groups of risk images: Technological optimism; Traditional risk images; and 
Reconfigured risk images. The individual risk images seem to be primarily 
connected to participation in distributed communities of knowing, operating on 
different arenas. These constructed risk images at the same time may act both to 
allocate attention to some hazards and to divert attention from others. We conclude 
2 
 
that we need further research on risk images among those that take part in risk 
appraisal. 
1 Introduction 
 
Risk images which are constructed by actors involved in the planning and 
execution of operations with a high risk potential are critical components of risk 
governance. Our principal concern in this paper is to investigate the forming and 
development of risk images in a high risk industry when introducing advanced new 
operational technologies. The case studied is the planning and implementation of 
integrated operations (IO) in offshore oil and gas production. 
 
2 Theory and framework 
 
2.1 Risk images 
In this paper we will define a risk image as a combination of hazard identification 
and risk perception. In other words, a risk image is a combined result of the 
identification of a specific risk and an evaluation of the perceived probability and 
possible negative consequences of this. 
There are two main arguments for focusing on the status and development of risk 
images in a high risk industrial setting. The first argument is that an adequate risk 
image is a precondition for the sufficient understanding of the actual technology, 
operational procedures and organizational arrangements necessary to identify 
possible hazards. These kinds of understandings strongly influence risk analyses 
and the forming of accident scenarios. A relevant and comprehensive risk image is, 
therefore, a precondition for developing organizational procedures, surveillance 
systems and barriers to prevent possible accidents. The second argument concerns 
risk perception, which relates to the ability to interpret signals and warnings and 
react to these in adequate ways, so that potential incidents and accidents can be 
avoided. The Deepwater Horizon catastrophe in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 
illustrates the importance of this factor. Analysis of the accident shows that the 
blowout and following explosion was caused partly by insufficient understanding 
of the situation in the well and by misinterpretation of the signals indicating that a 
blowout was emerging (US Congress, 2010). 
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2.2 Risk perception 
Risk perception can be described as a subjective judgment about the characteristics 
and severity of a risk. The phrase is most commonly used in reference to natural 
hazards and threats to the environment or health, and risk perception is claimed to 
be a part of individual judgments and decisions about risk. Risk perception as a 
term is mainly applied within psychological research. Within this tradition, the 
approach in early research was on understanding how people process information 
(Kahneman et al., 1982). These early works maintain that people use cognitive 
heuristics to sort and simplify information, which leads to biases in comprehension. 
Later work built on this foundation and developed into the psychometric paradigm. 
This approach identifies numerous factors responsible for influencing individual 
perceptions of risk, including dread, newness, stigma and other factors (Kahneman 
et al., 1982). Findings from studies within the psychometric paradigm generally 
state that an individual risk image is formed by the individual’s knowledge about 
the phenomenon or related phenomena or technologies, and the facts associated to 
it, and his or her perceived uncertainty and fear about the phenomenon or related 
phenomena. Jaafar et al. (2007) state that risk perception is dependent on an 
individual’s perception of his or her own knowledge about the risky matter. 
According to this view, those that claim themselves experts or have high 
knowledge about, for example, a technology demonstrate a lower perception of risk 
associated to the implementation of that technology (ibid.). In general, in the 
literature on risk perception a correlation can be found between lower perceived 
risk and higher knowledge about the issues involved (Sjöberg, 1999). 
Most of this research focuses on risks that may hit an individual personally, such as 
illness, poisoning or damage to his or her local community. Research on how 
people perceive a risk that is more distant to them, but where they may be directly 
or indirectly responsible for risk mitigation, has not been so much in focus. 
2.3 Sensemaking and communities of knowing 
The general constructivist perspective in sociology takes as its starting point that 
when it comes to action, people develop interpretations of the situations they are 
facing and make decisions on the basis of their ‘social construction of reality’ 
(Berger & Luckmann,1967). This means that “reality” is a subjective phenomenon, 
which may take on different forms for different persons. The processes whereby 
reality is “constructed” are, however, "social", which means that they take place in 
social settings, where people interact, communicate, discuss and influence each 
other. This also goes for how actors in a certain setting perceive and act towards 
specific risks. Situations and occurrences which may be considered dangerous by 
some actors or in some situations may be overlooked and ignored in other 
situations or by other actors. Feldman (1989: 19), referring to works by Weick 
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(1979) and March & Olsen (1976) argues that in most situations organizational 
members engage in interpreting both events and contexts, and that “This 
interpretive process is necessary for organizational members to understand and 
share understandings about such features of the organization as what it is about, 
what it does well and poorly, what the problems it faces are, and how it should 
resolve them.” 
Sackmann (1991:33), referring to the cognitive (or interpretative) perspective on 
culture in organizations, underlines the importance of sensemaking in construction 
processes, describing this as “those mechanisms that organizational members use 
to attribute meanings to events…which include standards and rules for perceiving, 
interpreting, believing and acting that are typically used in a given cultural setting.” 
Weick (1995:17) says that sensemaking is a process which implies seven 
distinguishing characteristics: “(1) grounded in identity construction, (2) 
retrospective, (3) enactive of sensible environments, (4) social, (5) ongoing, (6) 
focused on and by extracted cues, and (7) driven by plausibility rather than 
accuracy.” Among these factors, Weick points to the focus on retrospect as perhaps 
the most distinguishing characteristic of the sensemaking process. Clegg, 
Kornberger & Pitsis (2008:19) elaborates this by stating that one always makes 
sense of something as it is elapsing, and that even when they are forecasting, 
people will examine the future as if it had already been accomplished. They also 
point to the importance of images: “We often work with representations of things – 
models, plans and mental maps – as we navigate our way around unfamiliar 
territory.” 
 
From the above follows that risk images, which again influence attention, policy 
development, surveillance, safety culture and work practices can be understood as 
products of collective sensemaking and construction processes. 
 
A general trend in knowledge-intensive organizations and industries is that they are 
composed of communities of highly educated professionals representing 
specialised technologies and knowledge domains. Related to theories and research 
on communities of practice that originate from the work of Wenger (2004), these 
kinds of knowledge-creating groups have been named communities of knowing, 
described as inter-organizational or inter-institutional communities of specialised 
knowledge workers where dynamic interactions make possible the emergence of 
new meaning and knowledge (Boland & Tenkasi, 1995). The term “perspective 
making” is explained as a process whereby a community of knowing develops and 
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strengthens its own knowledge domains and practices, whereas “perspective 
taking” denotes the process of taking account of the knowledge and expertise of 
others. Boland and Tenkasi claim that communities of knowledge workers who 
deal with parts of an overall organizational problem through perspective making 
and taking will interact to 'create the patterns of sense making and behaviour 
displayed by the organization as a whole' (1995:351). One can also say that such 
communities 'develop unique social and cognitive repertoires which guide their 
interpretations of the world' (1995:351). Or, in other words: They construct their 
images by collective sensemaking processes.  
Another important point in Boland and Tenkasi’s (1995) paper is that communities 
of knowing can operate within specific forums, which serve as a kind of 
“container” for dialogue on certain topics, issues, concerns or tasks. Different kinds 
of forums reflect the way knowledge work is being focused, as well as pointing to 
the kinds of knowledge structures that are emerging. Boland and Tenkasi are 
especially preoccupied with forums based on electronic communication media, but 
the reasoning may also be relevant for knowledge work and construction processes 
taking place in other kinds of communication settings. Five classifications of 
forums are presented: task narrative forums where stories and other oral 
communication including videos enables information for all that attend; knowledge 
representation forums where the communication is not only narrative in an auditory 
or visual way, but involves written material that is discussed and reformulated; 
interpretive reading forums that involve an intended criticism or search for tacit 
information about the knowledge; theory building forums where communication on 
the theories that underlie the decisions is the matter; and finally the intelligent 
agent forums where agents outside the organization or system are involved, such as 
libraries, databases or other information sources. 
 
3 IO in the petroleum industry 
Within the offshore petroleum industry, development is towards smaller and more 
deepwater fields where incomes and expenditure, as well as practical obtainable 
solutions, demand remote and cost-efficient operations. This trend has been named 
differently in various companies (e.g. Smartfield, i-field, e-drilling, e-operation); 
however, the dominant solution, which also includes changes in work processes 
and organizations, is termed IO. IO includes the use of integrated real time data 
technology and the increased use of automation and remotely controlled 
operations. For mature fields, IO is also seen as an opportunity to expand the life 
expectancy with the more extensive use of onshore planning, support and 
operation, and correspondingly reduction of staff offshore. 
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Improved information and communication technology enables the comprehensive 
use of distributed work across organizational borders or among workers located at 
geographically different sites. "Around the clock" or 24/7 (24 hours a day, 7 days a 
week) onshore work gives possibilities for global network organizations with 
"follow the sun" principles, where distributed work may include work across 
nations as well as cultural borders. Vendors play a more prominent role and 
operational responsibilities may be distributed in a global network of cooperating 
organizations (OLF, 2005). 
The implication of these changes is an increased complexity in organizations and 
systems that may make them more vulnerable in terms of both safety and security. 
Fibre optic cables carry all real time data and are thereby central elements in the 
operations. The use of remote control implies more distance between the operators 
and the operation. The operators on the Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico 
were present and could perceive the situation in the well directly and use data they 
could control and validate with the real situation, whereas workers within IO can 
only evaluate representative data on computer screens and make use of sensor data 
and remote operations. 
We argue that these changes in combination imply a new paradigm in the operation 
of offshore petroleum fields. This new paradigm includes changed work processes 
and partly also new organization models. Modern information technology 
particularly developed for the offshore petroleum industry makes distant control 
and communication just as everyday as traditional face to face communication and 
human – technology interfaces. Large production fields may be controlled and 
operated from distance. Real time data from production fields prepare for future 
decision making by using semantic webs or automated decision making processes. 
Organization models evolve into distributed organizations with experts and 
operating staff working from where they are in the world. Also, these changes 
impose new models of organizing in companies that are established in the later 
years; they tend to build up small operating organizations with very essential staff 
and use national and international contractors even for what used to be in-house 
activities such as emergency management, risk management, human relations and 
working environment management.  
Norway is one of the world’s largest offshore oil and gas producers. The industry 
comprises most major international oil and gas companies either as operators or as 
license partners. The development of IO has come far on the Norwegian shelf. The 
solutions that have been developed are to a growing extent also put into use in 
other countries which are producing oil and gas from offshore fields. This makes 
Norwegian offshore oil and gas production a good object to study if these new 
technologies influence the forming of risk images.  
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4 Methodology 
The informants in this study were representatives from different groups involved in 
the technological development of IO on the Norwegian continental shelf, groups 
that participated in making decisions, gave consent and permission for operation in 
an IO setting or were involved in protecting Health, Safety and the Environment 
(HSE). They performed work such as R&D, inquiries, reports and statements in 
mass media. They also participated in workshops, discussions, seminars and other 
kinds of arenas where IO were discussed.  The informants were all representatives 
from groups of people involved in planning, developing, supporting, operating or 
regulating IO. In this study, they were placed in a category based primarily on their 
formal work positions or roles at the time of the study. Individuals’ placements 
were, in some cases, ambiguous because many of the informants had held different 
positions in the past or were involved in several roles at the time of the study. 
When selecting informants as in this study, one can of course not generalize the 
findings statistically. The selected procedure was preferred, however, because the 
study is of a clearly exploratory nature. 
Information about risk images was gathered in various settings such as interviews, 
workshops, seminars and informal talks and supplemented by visual and written 
representations of risk images gathered from presentations and reports in meetings 
and on the Internet. Open-ended interviews and workshops with stricter agendas 
but with open discussions in planned groups were the dominant sources for data 
collection. The groups of informants and how their risk images were assessed using 
interviews, workshops or other methods are listed in Table 2 
Table 2: Groups of informants  
 
Role Number Methodology 
Trade union 
representatives 
Four Workshop 
Technological 
researchers6 
Six Interviews 
Technological 
professionals in 
operating and 
contractor companies 
10 Interviews and 
workshops 
Managers with 
economical 
responsibilities 
Four Interviews and 
workshop 
Human factor 
professionals7 
20 Participation study 
and interview 
                                                          
6 They all belong to a centre for research on IO where they work on the innovation and 
development of new technological solutions for the petroleum industry.  
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In the interviews participants were first asked to describe their on-going IO 
activities and future plans and strategies. Questions focused on safety in terms of 
system accidents, HSE and risks related to the development and implementation of 
IO. Questions were formulated in general as well as more specifically and 
concerned factors such as technological hardware, software, work processes, 
human factors and organization models. The objectives for the different interviews 
and observation sessions differed somewhat because they were conducted in 
relation to different projects. In the interviews the respondents were asked to point 
out HSE-related strengths, weaknesses, threats and opportunities in the new 
operating environment, related to the technology or product development they were 
working with. 
The workshops were planned events with invited participants. The topic for the 
workshops was “changes related to IO in the petroleum industry and the impact on 
changed risk”. The participants were selected based on their roles in their 
organizations as well as on their abilities to reflect upon their own and other’s 
views and opinions. This selection procedure was preferred because participants 
were asked to consider the risks of major and system accidents, a task that requires 
participants to see parts of operations in relation to other parts and to the whole 
system surrounding specific operations and organizations. Some of the group 
sessions included representatives from both operating companies and contractors. 
For the discussions, the instruction was to identify generic changes in ways of 
operating and organizing certain described scenarios. Participants were then 
instructed to think of the consequences of these changes on risk. The participants 
were directed to discuss HSE issues and not costs and benefits with IO or other 
related issues unless they were concerned with HSE. The data from the workshops 
were divided into two sets. One set was from the interviews with representatives 
from projects in the industry that had showed the most progress as far as IO was 
concerned. The second set was from the group discussions in the workshop. 
Interviews and group discussions were digitally recorded. The analysis included 
searching for statements that directly and indirectly concerned risks and safety in 
new technological modes of operating. The analysis was challenging because the 
orders and topics of the conversations varied, both within and between different 
settings. This was solved by repeated listening to recordings and reading through of 
notes to reveal insights into risk images.  The statements were then categorized into 
                                                                                                                                                   
7 These are members of a human factor network where they meet and discuss human 
factor issues related to petroleum activities in general as well as concerning the 
development of IO. One of the members participated in a separate interview. 
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groups based on empirical concurrence and their similarities. Four such groups 
materialized, concerning technology, work processes, risk management and human 
and organizational factors. The groups and how different statements relate to these 
are shown in table 3. 
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Table 3: Groups of factors 
 
Fa
ct
or
s  
 
Examples of risk statements 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
 
Information 
technology 
will 
improve 
decisions 
Technology 
will 
improve 
safety 
 
Risks can 
be 
diminished 
if 
technology 
has been 
tested in 
simulators. 
Technology 
is used in 
situations 
that it is 
not 
designed 
for. 
The 
dependencies 
between 
technological 
systems is 
not always 
known 
Older 
installations 
are pushed 
to operate 
longer than 
expected. 
We do not 
really know 
what we 
develop 
W
or
k 
pr
oc
es
se
s 
IO implies a 
busier 
workday. 
The total 
amount of 
work 
(within IO) 
is larger, 
but the 
daily work 
load is the 
same 
Some of 
those in 
the 
onshore 
support 
centre still 
know 
things from 
the 
platform. 
Local 
experts are 
still on call 
Onshore 
centers 
mainly deal 
with 
questions 
that can 
await 
answers until 
the next day. 
Remote 
operation 
by use of 
technology 
is already 
successfully 
used today 
I question 
reduced 
manning in 
critical 
situations. 
How can we 
ensure 
emergency - 
and deviation 
management? 
Ri
sk
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
We rely on 
safety 
system to 
stop any 
escalation 
Any risk 
assessment 
and HF 
method we 
have are 
suitable for 
identifying 
an dealing 
with risks 
that come 
with IO 
 
Traditional 
risk 
assessment 
methods 
are not 
good to 
find 
complex 
risks that 
may come 
with IO 
    
Hu
m
an
 a
nd
 o
rg
. f
ac
to
rs
 Humans 
are 
unreliable 
The feeling 
of” fire 
under your 
feet” 
disappears. 
The 
demand in 
an onshore 
operation 
room was 
so high 
that the 
workers 
cannot sit 
there for 
longer than 
two hrs. 
Cross 
training 
and 
multiple 
work tasks 
may result 
in 
situations 
where one 
person 
needs to 
do two or 
more tasks 
at the 
same time 
Loss of 
control over 
well is 
exposed 
because of 
low manning. 
Always a bad 
scenario. 
Less people 
means less 
problems 
and sources 
of failure 
Less people 
offshore 
means less 
complexity (in 
the work 
processes) 
 
Traditional risk image Technology optimism Reconfigured risk image 
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5 Findings  
In the interviews, seminars and the workshop, the informants could express their 
risk images in comments and as answers to questions from the interviewer or from 
other participants in the group. Expressed images of IO in general varied from 
opportunities based on technology to changes in organizations and competences. 
The definition of IO, and what kinds of technological and organizational changes 
this development comprises was not clear in any of the statements from companies 
or in official reports. Images of IO, therefore, were related to the informants’ 
experiences in their own environments and from what they had read or heard 
outside their own organizations or positions at work. In the following section, the 
statements are meant to illustrate the different risk images that were revealed in the 
analysis of the recordings. The following text explains in more detail what was said 
about the three risk images. 
The data analysis followed a grounded theory approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
The statements were at first coded as "concerned" or "optimistic". The statements 
concerning risk were then reviewed and categorized according to their 
resemblance. However, the analysis showed that the informants’ statements 
revealed such consistent patterns of reasoning on risk images that it came out as 
empirically feasible to group them into distinct categories that could better describe 
the features of the risk images. The categorization "concerned" and "optimistic" 
was thereby left and substituted by three new categories: 
x Technological optimism;  
x Traditional risk images; and 
x Reconfigured risk images. 
 
Labeling was not based on predefined categories from earlier publications and 
thereby the name and content of the category were related to this study only. The 
category "technology optimism" was formed because technology as an enabler for 
safer operations appeared in many of the optimistic statements. Technology 
optimism occurs in the literature as a phenomenon observed among respondents in 
surveys, interviews and focus groups where attitudes towards, and perceptions of, 
technology and the future is the topic. The basic thought is that these characteristics 
vary within groups of people in terms of their attitudes (sceptic, pioneer, paranoid) 
towards technology (Jaafar et al., 2007). In studies of differences between experts 
and lay people, the experts are normally attributed the highest optimism when 
judging risk with new technology, for example (Tichy, 2004). The term technology 
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optimism used in this paper does not necessarily correspond to any of the 
descriptions in these studies. 
After identifying the statements within the technology optimism category, the 
remaining "concerned" and "optimistic" statements were further analyzed and 
divided into traditional risks where the focus was on the way risks are handled 
before IO and new risks or reconfigured images of risks that may emerge from the 
new ways of operating the petroleum production. The categories "traditional risk 
images" and "reconfigured risk images" were formed based on these groups of 
statements. All three risk image categories include the possible identification of 
risk – whether or not new technology, new work processes and changed roles and 
responsibilities imply that any risk is formed, as well as the perception of this risk – 
if it is perceived as something to worry about or that requires action in any way. 
5.1 The technological optimism risk image 
The dominant point of view is that things seem to be in good shape and that there is 
no specific reason why this should not be the same, or better, as progress towards 
more advanced IO is taken further. Among some of those that regard IO as 
something that will improve safety, a strong trust in technology is revealed: 
'Humans are unpredictable. When we leave the identification of criteria, planning 
and decisions to automated processes, we eliminate the unpredictable components 
from the critical decisions.' 
This statement represents an image of a reduced risk level. The main argument is 
that improved ICT and corresponding technologies promote more and better 
representation and sharing of information, and thereby will reduce risk by giving 
enough and correct information to decision makers. Such views are based on a 
strong belief in reliable, automated technology, as seen in the following statement: 
 
'Hands on is important now but in five years not as important. Back in the history 
of aviation – the earlier the pilot felt the wind and temperature and smell – now he 
does not need that, he has other information. We need to think about the new 
generation, they do not have a need for hands on experience.' 
 
A corresponding argument is that automated optimizing tools will contribute 
positively to the risk level by taking some of the burden away from humans by 
automating decisions. Automated decisions are also believed to remove any 
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elements of human unreliability, thereby assuring correct analysis and decision 
making. 
'…but I feel technology can really help us. There is too much information for a 
human to handle, we develop pattern recognition systems to recognize and handle 
the information.' 
5.2 The traditional risk image 
This statement reveals a basic trust in the way the oil and gas production is 
operated: 
'It does not really matter what changes are introduced. If the operation reaches a 
predefined level of uncertainty, the emergency shutdown system will kick in and 
save the situation anyway.' 
According to this and similar statements, IO means business as usual. The 
development of IO is not seen as significantly introducing new kinds of risks or the 
view is that risks in IO can be handled with traditional measures (technological 
barriers, shutdown systems, training, emergency procedures). Control by the use of 
emergency shutdown or strict procedures are common in the offshore petroleum 
industry and represent a traditional view on handling risks. Central to this way of 
reasoning is the belief that if all the different subsystems are reliable and equipped 
with the necessary instrumentation, the overall operation of the total production 
and transportation system is believed to be reliable and safe. Within this view, the 
development and implementation of IO do not imply any specific increase or 
change in risks compared with traditional operations. This does not, however, mean 
that safety and risk are not taken seriously, as seen in the following statement: 
 'Fewer people offshore and on deck reduces the exposure to hazards and thereby 
the risk.' 
Technology that makes it possible to operate installations from onshore facilities is 
seen to have a positive influence on safety, for example by removing people from 
important sources of risk, such as blowouts, fires and explosions. A corresponding 
argument is linked to the fact that fewer people offshore will reduce the need for 
helicopter transportation, which is a high risk activity. 
5.3 The reconfigured risk image 
Acknowledging IO as something that moves the operation of petroleum production 
from a more closed to a more open system may be considered a significant change 
of perspective. It may be that making this acknowledgement is essential for 
constructing risk images related to IO. As a technology expert put it: 
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'When we develop technology that enables operations in difficult reservoirs, the 
management of the companies wants to use the technology in even more marginal 
and difficult reservoirs. These are environments that we haven’t even tested the 
technology for.' 
Technological developments can open new opportunities such as drilling in 
reservoirs that earlier seemed too difficult or risky or accelerating production to a 
greater extent than planned for with optimising tools. Some also fear the increased 
complexity in systems and that the reliability of technology to be introduced into 
existing installations has not been properly tested. 
Furthermore, some informants fear that the installations that have an expanded 
lifespan through IO were not designed for this. This means a possible reduction in 
efficiency and also places a strain on organizations during unforeseen work and 
possible emergency handling. This risk image is prominent both between 
informants who have work experience from the older installations, representatives 
from authorities and some researchers. 
'Today we have a mixture of remotely and locally controlled equipment. The rigs 
are different…and there are old wells as the one we talk about here…when the 
Nintendo generation comes in they do not have the knowledge about relevant 
things from before. Someday the operation will suit the Nintendo generation, but 
not yet.' 
Some informants point to the fact that information overflow from real time data is a 
possible threat towards the human mind’s ability to understand and process 
information. Automating such processes takes away some of the daily burden, but 
also makes systems opaque so that risks can "hide" between automated tasks. 
 
A well-accepted positive effect of including onshore staff in operations in real time 
is that people onshore in an operations centre may have the best overview of the 
operation, and may therefore make the best decisions concerning the prioritization 
of tasks and optimization of operation and safety. The expressed viewpoint is that 
competence is better or wider onshore, where more experts in different fields of 
work are in the proximity of the information and decision processes. Leaving the 
responsibility to people other than your local peer workers is not necessarily seen 
as negative: 
'…If you look at barrier functions today… the control (we have) offshore today is a 
little bit that because you yourself are in control of everything, then it is not 
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required that everything is in perfect shape… if (the task) it is outsourced we need 
to be clearer on the requirements. That is not necessarily a bad thing…'  
Owing to the differences between installations and local technical solutions, the 
way things are controlled and handled has historically been very much up to the 
local management. Although this is not as much the case nowadays as companies 
have standardized many of the procedures and work processes, it may still create 
different atmospheres and cultures between installations. This means that 
knowledge about local technological solutions and work processes is important for 
understanding the system. The growing distribution of roles and authority between 
organizations is also the reason for the forming of a risk image that concerns a lack 
of control, intractable systems and autonomous instead of shared situation 
awareness. One example given in one of the workshops is that of giving suppliers 
access to the safety instrumented systems and how this is seen as a possible threat 
to safety, as they can misinterpret the systems’ behavior in relation to other systems 
offshore. If the suppliers are not integrated well enough into the organization, 
chances are that they may carry out maintenance work or other activities of the 
safety instrumented systems that may be misinterpreted or taken as signals of 
failure within the operation organization. As for all ICT systems, some point to the 
possibility that these systems are hacked or otherwise threatened by outsiders. 
5.4 Distribution of actors on the three risk images 
The second main finding from the analysis concerns the distribution of the three 
types of risk images among different categories of informants. A summary of the 
distribution is shown in  
 
Table 4. The technology optimism risk image is found primarily among 
technologists and researchers. The reconfigured risk images are primarily revealed 
among the researchers, trade union representatives and people working with human 
factors. The concerned, reconfigured view that includes a high degree of a 
perceived increased or changed risk level is also shared by a few of the 
representatives from the operating and contracting companies, although they 
primarily tend to reveal positive images; IO mean solutions to problems they see 
present today. Human factor professionals express statements that are related to 
changed allocation between technology and humans, and between humans in terms 
of geographical distance, with the introduction of possible new risks. The 
traditional risk image is found among representatives of all groups. Many of the 
human factor professionals also reveal a traditional risk image expressed through 
beliefs in standard methodologies for risk assessment. 
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Table 4: Distribution of informants in the three risk image categories 
 
 Risk image Informant group(s) represented 
Traditional Technological professionals in operating and contractor 
companies 
Technological researchers 
Experts in operating and contracting companies 
Human factors professionals 
Managers with economic responsibilities 
Trade union representatives 
Technology 
Optimism 
Technological professionals in operating and contractor 
companies 
Researchers 
Reconfigured Researchers 
Human factor professionals 
Trade union representatives 
 
Managers with economic responsibilities in companies are primarily preoccupied 
with "risk" as an economic risk – i.e. that IO will not have the economic effect that 
was hoped for. When "pushed" towards the risk of accidents and system failure 
they point to new risks, such as the hacking of ICT systems. Another viewpoint is 
that IO opens possibilities for reengineering the organization and introducing new 
management principles. Many of the informants state that only ICT threats are seen 
as new risks in IO, whereas other risk elements are considered unchanged or 
improved. This seems to be linked to the fact that improved ICT is what is 
considered "new" in the operation and that other factors are as before, only 
"helped" by ICT – the risk level is perceived as decreasing with IO.  
 
6 Discussion 
The traditional risk image may be a representation of not identifying any risk at all 
with the change, or just presenting a former and present risk image in the oil and 
gas industry, with relatively few severe system accidents, and, even with some 
disturbances in the past few years, a decreasing number of incidents and accidents 
in total. Most informants in this traditional risk image category state that they rely 
on the existing competences of technical experts and skilled workers in the new, 
high tech environments because they know the nature of operations and know how 
to handle the instruments and equipment. Managers and experts in operating, as 
well as contracting companies trust the transfer of "installation" or "factory" 
competences; a popular expression for the explicit and tacit knowledge developed 
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among those who have worked on an installation for a long time. The expression is 
widely used among the informants in the study. 
The technology optimistic risk image can also be considered partly traditional in 
the sense that the majority of informants representing this view express a strong 
belief that reliable technology and continuous technological improvements are 
what has made operation in the petroleum industry safe up until now. The visual 
representation of IO development reveals a strong technological development 
aspect that will result in better, faster and more efficient work processes.  
The reconfigured risk image includes, to some extent, the notion of something 
unknown in IO. The statements included in this category reveal a feeling of unease. 
IO introduces changes at many levels and in many parts of the socio-technical 
system. The reconfigured risk images take into account the fact that the way of 
operation will change with IO so that the basis of learning (knowing what has 
happened) and monitoring is limited. In such situations, it becomes difficult to 
know what to look for and thereby the anticipating phase becomes limited. 
According to the risk governance framework, it may be argued that there have been 
no early warnings with IO that brings out the need for the reassessment of risk. If 
any earlier accidents included IO-related challenges or causes, it is naturally not 
clearly stated since IO is a new concept. One possibility is that the industry is on 
the verge of entering an incubation period (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997) where 
deviations and events go unnoticed or they are misunderstood because the 
information about a new risk image does not come through. 
Constructing a reconfigured risk image seems to require an understanding of the 
change and that the change requires a way of operating that is significant from the 
former way of operating or organizing. This may be looked upon as a paradigmatic 
change. Boland and Tenkasi (1995) argue that Thomas Kuhn's insights into 
paradigms as a shared sense of the metaphysical nature of the world, the associated 
important problems and what serve as good examples for a domain of concern are 
particularly relevant for understanding how knowledge is produced in a community 
of knowing. The process of paradigmatic change relates to the community of 
knowing, refining and clarifying the perspective of the community. Without a 
strong perspective, Boland and Tenkasi (1995) argue that the 'the community 
cannot tell an anomaly from noise; a challenge to their knowledge from an 
irrelevancy' (p. 354). 
Reflecting upon technological development as an enabler for exploring and 
developing more marginal fields in more vulnerable environments than those that 
the technology was originally developed for, or focusing on how things might be 
handled better from a distance, reflects a risk image formed at a higher level. The 
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risk image combines systems such as the technology and management level in an 
organization or partners in an operating license and touches the societal level in 
terms of environmental risks that may be associated. It seems that the reconfigured 
risk image is present among those that have been, or are attending, many arenas 
and thereby are probably exposed to many different views of IO, or have been part 
of technology developments in industrial settings for a long time. 
Given the outlined change where vendors play a more crucial role in operations 
and where global, virtual organizations operating across traditional organizational 
borders form the basis for operation (OLF, 2005), there is a paradox in the findings 
that little attention is given to risks at the organizational level. The informants, as 
individuals or as communities, do not consider potential misunderstandings, 
coordination challenges or conflicts between vendors and operating companies’ 
policies, HSE practice or safety climates. Nor do most of them see particular limits 
in the existing regulations when it comes to regulating relationships between 
companies that are integrated and operate more as long-term communities of 
practice than those in traditional roles as buyers and vendors. The challenge is that 
some of these possible new risks may be overlooked within the present set of 
experiences and assumptions that form the basis for the collective sense-making 
processes. This is also a situation that may be the start of an incubation period, as 
stated in the manmade disaster model (Turner, 1979). 
The majority of the informants would have been categorized as "experts" on a high 
level in a traditional risk perception study because they are so familiar with the 
technological or organizational developments in the field. "Experts" in risk 
perception studies normally have a lower risk perception compared with others 
(Sjöberg, 1999; Jaafar et al., 2007). The findings in this study do in some ways 
confirm this, since many statements from expert informants relate to "traditional 
risk images" or "technology optimism", which both express a low degree of risk 
perception. The findings are, however, not consistent, as there are also some 
experts among the proponents of reconfigured risk images.  
6.1 Are there possible IO communities? 
There is little evidence of a strong division between actors and their constructed 
risk images based on where they work or to what organizations they belong. The 
social arenas that the informants attend to, however, seem to contribute to the 
formation of what looks to resemble a kind of community of knowing where 
specialized knowledge workers interact in perspective making and perspective 
taking, making possible the emergence of new meaning and knowledge (Boland & 
Tenkasi, 1995). This can also be seen as reflecting the social dimension of 
sensemaking, as expressed by Sackmann (1991) and Weick (1995). These findings 
call for a new way of looking at risk image construction among groups and 
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individuals. The communities of knowing which are formed in connection with the 
development of IO correspond with people’s work practices and environments, but 
they are not confined by organizational borders. Professional background 
contributes to the forming of the communities but does not explain the coherence 
in statements by itself. 
Following Boland and Tenkasi’s (1995) classification, the frequent meetings, 
conferences and workshops that the actors involved in IO development attend 
correspond to at least three of the abovementioned forums: "Forums for narrative 
processes through dialogue and discussion"; "Represented knowledge through 
presentations and reports" and, in some cases, "Interpretive processes". These 
different meeting places seem to function as arenas for the social construction of 
risk images and development of a set of communities of knowing. There are many 
such arenas within the oil and gas industry, such as those provided by oil 
producers’ organizations, authorities, universities and research institutions. These 
arenas provide research, conferences and workshops. The typical pattern is that 
there are a restricted number of actors who participate in, and contribute to, the 
different arenas and associated meetings, workshops and seminars. The arenas with 
the hubs of people stretching across organizational borders and professional 
backgrounds function as "workshops" for social construction processes among 
certain segments of actors, and it is perhaps possible to speak of a limited number 
of "IO families". 
7 Conclusion 
In the work presented here, it has been assumed that risk images are expressed at 
different levels of abstraction and that the words and expressions used to present an 
image will vary. That is why an explorative design was chosen. Based on the 
analysis of statements in the study, three categories of risk images are suggested: 
traditional risk images, technology optimism and reconfigured risk images. These 
three risk images are all present among the informants and seem to be relatively 
equally represented. What risk images an individual presents, seem to be primarily 
connected to participation in distributed communities of knowing, operating on 
different arenas such as research centers, seminars and formal meetings. Neither 
organizational belonging nor academic background seems to play a decisive role. 
Possible risk images that did not come to the surface in this study are connected to 
increased system complexities (technological, organizational, operational), 
operating oil fields through global, distributed organizations, new roles for vendors 
and contractor companies and how cooperation over distance, and across national, 
linguistic and cultural borders as well as new systems for information handling 
may influence risk in operations. These findings illustrate a point often mentioned 
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in the discussion on safety culture, namely that risk images constructed in specific 
communities at the same time may act both to allocate attention to some hazards 
and to divert attention from others (Pidgeon 1998). Illustrating the last point is that 
none of the informants touched upon the question of how emergencies will be 
handled in geographically distributed and heavily technology-dependent operating 
environments. 
The results from this study imply that we need further research on risk images 
among those that take part in risk appraisal and that social science models such as 
social constructionism, sensemaking processes, arena models and knowledge about 
communities of knowing should be included for understanding how risk images are 
constructed and formed in the process of risk appraisal. 
 
Funding 
This work was supported by the Center for Integrated Operations in the Petroleum 
Industry (http://www.ntnu.edu/web/iocenter/home). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21
21  
8 References 
 
Berger, P. L. & T. Luckmann (1967) The social construction of reality a treatise in the 
sociology of knowledge. Harmondsworth, Penguin. 
 
Boland, R. J. & R. V. Tenkasi (1995) Perspective making and perspective taking in 
communities of knowing. Organization Science 6 (4), 350–372. 
 
Clegg, Stewart, Kornberger, Martin & Tyrone Pitsis (2008) Managing & Organizations. 
An Introduction to Theory & Practice. London: Sage 
 
Feldman, Martha S. (1989) Order Without Design. Information Production and Policy 
Making. Stanford: Stanford University Press 
 
Glaser, B. G. & A. L. Strauss (1967) The discovery of grounded theory strategies for 
qualitative research. Chicago, Aldine. 
 
Jaafar, M., A. R. A. Aziz, et al. (2007) Integrating information technology in the 
construction industry: technology readiness assessment of Malaysian contractors. 
International Journal of Project Management 25 (2), 115–120. 
 
Kahneman, D., P. Slovic, et al. (1982) Judgment under uncertainty heuristics and biases. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
 
March, James G. & Johan P. Olsen (1976) Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations. 
Bergen: Universitetsforlaget 
 
Nævestad, T.-O. (2010) Culture, crises and campaigns: examining the role of safety culture 
in the management of hazards in a high risk industry. Centre for Technology, 
Innovation and Culture (TIK), Faculty of Social Sciences. Oslo, University of 
Oslo. PhD. 
 
OLF. (2005) Integrated work processes. Future work processes on the Norwegian 
continental shelf." Retrieved January 1, 2010, from 
http://www.olf.no/rapporter/category229.html. 
 
Pidgeon, N. (1998) Safety culture: key theoretical issues. Work and Stress 12 (3), 202–216. 
 
Sackmann, Sonja A. (1991) Cultural Knowledge in Organizations. Exploring the 
Collective Mind. Newbury Park: Sage 
 
Sjöberg, L. (1999) Risk perception by the public and by experts: a dilemma in risk 
management. Human Ecology Review 6 (2), 1–9. 
 
22
22  
Slovic, P., N. F. Pidgeon, et al. (2003) The social amplification of risk. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Tichy, G. (2004) The over-optimism among experts in assessment and foresight. 
Technological Forecasting & Social Change 71, 341–363. 
 
Turner, B. A. (1979) Man-made disasters. Bristol PA: Taylor & Francis. 
Turner, B. & N. F. Pidgeon (1997) Man-made Disasters. London, Butterworth-Heinemann. 
 
US Congress. (2010) "Letter to BP CEO Tony Hayward." Retrieved November, 2010 from 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100614/Hayward.BP.2010.6.1
4.pdf. 
 
Weick, Karl E. (1979) The Social Psychology of Organizing, Reading: Addison-Wesley 
 
Wenger, E. (2004) Communities of practice and social learning systems. In: Starkey, K., 
Tempest, S. & Kinley, A. M. (eds.) How organizations learn: managing the search 
for knowledge. London, Thomson Learning. pp. 238–257. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
23
23  
 
Paper 2 
Safety perception and comprehension among offshore installation managers on 
the Norwegian Continental Shelf 
 
Jon Espen Skogdalen (corresponding author) 
Department of Industrial Economics, Risk Management and Planning 
University of Stavanger, 4036 Stavanger, Norway 
jon.espen.skogdalen@gmail.com  
Phone/fax: +47 99 02 41 71 
 
Camilla Knudsen Tveiten 
Department of Sociology and Political Science 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Norway 
 
Invited to publication in a special issue based on paper delivered to The 5th 
International Conference Workingonsafety.net. Røros, Norway 2010. Submitted for 
Safety Science, 12 November 2010. Accepted with revisions 24 May 2011. 
Resubmitted 09 August 2011. Still under review. 
Abstract 
The study presented in this article shows that the perceptions and comprehensions 
of safety differ significantly between offshore installation managers (OIMs) and 
the rest of the organization on Norwegian offshore installations. The basis for the 
analysis is a safety climate survey answered by 6850 offshore petroleum 
employees in 2007. OIMs had the most positive perception in all the categories: 
safety prioritization, safety management and involvement, safety versus 
production, individual motivation and system comprehension. These different 
perceptions and comprehensions of safety may be a result of issues of power and 
conflict and may also be based on different knowledge and control. The 
phenomenon of different safety perceptions and comprehensions between these 
groups is important to bear in mind when planning surveys as well as planning and 
implementing safety measures. In particular, the significantly different opinions 
related to safety versus production are of interest because of the earlier distrust 
between unions and management. 
Keywords: Safety climate; safety perception; safety comprehension; offshore 
installation manager;  
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1 Introduction 
The Macondo blowout of 20 April 2010 raised serious concerns about the safety 
culture in the offshore oil and gas (O&G) industry (Graham et al., 2011). 
Deepwater Horizon and its owner suffered serious safety management system 
failures and a poor safety culture manifested in continued maintenance deficiencies 
and training and knowledge gaps (USCG, 2011). The National Commission on the 
BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore (hereafter, the Commission) 
concluded that the errors, mistakes and management failures that caused the 
disaster were not the product of a single rogue company, but instead revealed both 
the failures and inadequate safety procedures of the three key industry players. 
What the men and women who worked on Deepwater Horizon lacked – and what 
every drilling operation requires – was a culture of leadership responsibility (Bartlit 
et al., 2011). According to the Commission, the lessons learned from the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster were not confined to only the US government and 
industry, but were relevant to the rest of the world. The Commission demanded no 
less than a fundamental transformation of the industry’s safety culture (Graham et 
al., 2011). 
The terms ‘‘safety culture” and ‘‘safety climate” have often been used 
interchangeably, although safety culture is considered to be a more complex and 
enduring phenomenon compared with safety climate, reflecting the fundamental 
values, norms, assumptions and expectations (Mearns and Flin, 1999) which, to 
some extent, is assumed to be linked to national and societal culture (Høivik et al., 
2009b). Over time, consensus among industrial psychologists has emerged to 
differentiate safety climate as the surface features of an organization’s safety 
culture, as discerned from the workforce’s comprehensions and perceptions at a 
given point in time, namely a “snapshot of the state of safety” (Cox and Flin, 1998; 
Edkins and Pfister, 2003; Flin et al., 2000). Safety climate is normally measured by 
surveys based on levels of agreement with pre-developed statements. Although 
surveys often form the bases for the measurements of safety culture/safety climate, 
there is more evidence to suggest that these so-called "attitudes" to risk and safety 
are "perceptions" or "descriptive beliefs" rather than "normative beliefs" (Mearns 
and Flin, 1999). The Commission’s findings stress the need for an improved 
understanding of surveys and their relevance as indicators of safety performance. 
The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) states that the Deepwater Horizon 
accident must be seen as a wake-up call to the Norwegian petroleum sector, that it 
must lead to a big improvement in managing major accident risk and that the 
conclusion that the safety culture needs improvements throughout the industry 
must also be considered relevant for Norway’s petroleum activity (PSA, 2011a). 
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There are a number of papers related to the important role of managers in 
developing a strong safety culture (Clarke and Ward, 2006; Kath et al., 2010; 
Lofquist et al., 2011; Martínez-Córcoles et al., 2011; Mearns and Flin, 1995; 
Mearns et al., 2003; Mearns and Yule, 2009; Nielsen et al., 2008; Njå and Fjelltun, 
2010; Vinodkumar and Bhasi, 2010; Wu et al., 2008; Wu et al., 2010). The 
literature suggests that safety climate represents employees' perceptions about 
organizational support, particularly management's commitment to safety in the 
organization (Wills et al., 2006). Høivik et al. (2009a) conducted a qualitative 
study of 31 employees, with and without leadership responsibilities, employed in a 
Norwegian petroleum company and the findings support the importance of 
management’s commitment to safety. 
A culture consists of several sub-cultures including executive culture, engineer 
culture and operator culture. Each sub-culture possesses cultural elements and 
influences the culture emerging from the interactions of the sub-cultures within an 
organization. Different employee groups exhibit different safety attitudes/climate 
structures. For example, Cheyne et al. (2003) investigated two large manufacturing 
organizations and concluded that while managers, supervisors and general 
employees shared the same definition of safety factors, their perceptions of these 
factors and how they interrelated proved to be different. Findley et al. (2007) 
examined group differences in safety climate among job positions in the nuclear 
decommissioning and demolition industry in the United States and observed 
significant differences in mean safety climate scores, factor scores and item scores 
among job positions. 
(Zohar, 2000) offered empirical support for two validation criteria of safety climate 
as a group-level construct in a manufacturing company. Employees develop 
homogeneous perceptions about supervisory safety practices (i.e., within-group 
homogeneity) and these perceptions vary between subunits, resulting in 
significantly different safety climate scores (i.e., between-group variance). Zohar 
and Luria (2005) incorporated a new dispersion model that focused on between-
group climate variability in individual organizations, showing that climate 
variability was negatively related to organization climate strength and procedural 
formalisation.Cox and Cheyne (2000) examined the differences among managers, 
production teams and drilling teams in UK offshore environments. A series of one-
way analyses of variance were performed for each factor in the attitude 
questionnaire. The results were not discussed because the objective of the research 
was to develop and test an assessment technique, which provided a practical tool 
for both the assessment of safety climate and the promotion of a ‘positive’ safety 
culture. 
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The offshore installation manager (OIM) is responsible for all matters of health and 
safety on board an offshore installation. The OIM supervises the day-to-day aspects 
of O&G production including budgets, personnel, production, maintenance and 
logistics. The OIM plays an important role in communicating the safety message 
from senior levels within the onshore organization to the workforce at the sharp 
end. The OIM is supported by a safety adviser. The safety adviser supports in 
matters concerning occupational health and safety management on the offshore 
platform. All installations on the Norwegian Continental Shelf are required to have 
a safety adviser. The safety adviser has different titles depending on the company 
and installation (e.g., offshore safety & environment coordinator, safety leader and 
safety manager). On some installations, the function is shared with the role of 
being a trained nurse. The safety adviser is usually a part of the OIM’s leadership 
team and emergency management team. The safety adviser is usually the contact 
person for the government and has responsibilities related to tracking and reporting 
safety, health and environmental issues. 
1.1 Objective 
The PSA has since 2001 performed the Norwegian offshore risk and safety climate 
inventory (NORSCI) among all offshore workers on the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf. The NORSCI is part of the project Trends in Risk Levels on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf (RNNP). The objective of this paper is to reveal whether the 
perceptions and comprehensions of the safety climate measured in the NORSCI 
differ between the OIMs and the rest of the organization. Moreover, the safety 
advisers’ safety perceptions and comprehensions are analysed because of their 
close co-operation with OIMs and the rest of the management team. This analysis 
is performed using the NORSCI carried out in 2007 (PSA, 2008). The hypothesis is 
that the OIMs have more positive perceptions and comprehensions of the safety 
climate compared with the rest of the organization.  
Working offshore is unlike most working places. The O&G installations on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf are located 40 to 185 miles from the coast. The crews 
are transported by helicopter to these offshore installations and the working period 
is normally 14 continuous days with 12-hour shifts, day or night, followed by a 
four-week off period at home (i.e., the so-called “2-4” schedule; (Høivik, 2010). 
Employees that work regularly on an installation tend to talk about their offshore 
co-workers as their ‘‘second families” (even ‘‘first families”) or of the installation 
as their ‘‘second homes” (Tharaldsen et al., 2010). On the offshore installations, 
managers and employees live together 24 hours a day. This provides a greater 
opportunity for communication during meals and coffee breaks and should make 
communication and confidence building easier (Høivik, 2010).  This may influence 
on the perceptions and comprehensions of safety. 
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Apart from an earlier survey on OIMs (Flin and Slaven, 1993) and two subsequent 
studies (Flin and Slaven, 1994; O'Dea and Flin, 2001), this group has largely been 
ignored by researchers. Understanding the system of beliefs that determines how 
people feel and react to safety issues on an offshore installation is particularly 
relevant for the international O&G industry in which workers may be expected to 
work anywhere in the world at very short notice (Mearns et al., 2004). 
The first part of this article describes the data, theoretical background and central 
concept;, safety perception and comprehension, safety climate and safety culture. 
Furthermore, the RNNP and the NORSCI are briefly explained. The results from 
the data analysis follow. The potential causes and implications of the results are 
then discussed. 
1.2 About the data 
The NORSCI was performed among personnel in the Norwegian offshore industry 
between 7 January and 15 February 2007. This was the fourth time the data had 
been acquired using this questionnaire. The first survey was performed in 
December 2001, the second in December 2003 and the third at the turn of the year 
2005/2006. The survey was developed by health and safety researchers, and it used 
experts from occupational health and safety in the industry and representatives 
from the unions to review, test and examine it. The survey was limited to factors of 
relevance to safety and the working environment, excluding the external 
environment (Tharaldsen et al., 2008). The aim of the survey was to measure 
employees’ perceptions of health, safety and environment (HSE) management in 
the Norwegian offshore industry (PSA, 2008). 
In previous years, there was a response rate of approximately 50%. For the 2007 
survey, a new procedure was implemented for the distribution and collection of the 
questionnaires. As a result, many problems were reported in connection with the 
distribution of forms at the heliport. It is the PSA’s opinion that this led to a lower 
number of responses than that expected. The estimated response rate was 
approximately 30%, which is a low response rate. The number of OIMs responding 
was N=105, whereas safety advisers constituted a larger group (N= 226). 
Nevertheless, the total numbers of responses (N=6850) was sufficiently large to 
perform statistical analyses and to split the data into different categories. The 
distribution of responses among different groups corresponded reasonably well 
with the distribution in previous years’ studies. As in previous years, there was 
again a slight overrepresentation of operator personnel in relation to contractor 
personnel on production installations (PSA, 2008). The RNNP is an important 
fulfilment of sections of the O&G regulations (PSA, 2011b) that focus on the 
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working environment. The companies can get the result the result for their 
company and compare them with the overall result for the industry. 
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Historically, the opinions of safety culture in the Norwegian offshore industry have 
varied. It is therefore of importance to have a historical view to understand the 
background of the NORSCI. After the Piper Alpha tragedy (Cullen, 1990) on the 
British shelf, the whole industry was reminded of the dangers related to the 
offshore O&G industry. The period after the Piper Alpha accident was 
characterised by a strengthening of HSE management by all parties involved in 
which safety was prioritised. Behavioural science became a hot topic within safety 
management. In 1998, a drastic fall in oil prices resulted in belt-tightening, 
reorganizations and downsizing, and management turned its attention to costs and 
efficiency. The trade unions claimed that safety matters were deteriorating and that 
safety was at an all-time low. Their view was confirmed by several research 
communities and fronted by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD). (The 
NPD changed its name to the PSA in 2004). At the same time, several managers 
claimed that safety had never been better. The conflict peaked during the summer 
of 2000 and culminated in a serious accident on 24 December 2000, in which a 
worker was crushed to death under a pile of drilling pipes (Haukelid, 2008). The 
NPD then introduced the RNNP project, which aimed at identifying risk indicators 
that were critical for safety and the working environment. Questionnaires, 
interviews, workshops and fieldwork formed the basis of the analyses in the 
RNNP. The findings stated that important safety matters in the oil industry were 
perceived very differently by the oil companies and the unions, and that there was 
little trust between these parties (NPD, 2002). As a result of these negative 
developments, the NPD/PSA introduced several measures. One unique measure 
was a regulation enforcing a HSE culture. The Framework Regulations, Section 11 
stated: “The party responsible shall encourage and promote a sound health, 
environment and safety culture comprising all activity areas and which contributes 
to achieving that everyone who takes part in petroleum activities takes on 
responsibility in relation to health, environment and safety, including also 
systematic development and improvement of health, environment and safety” (PSA, 
2009).  
 The UK Health and Safety Regulator was also at same time aware that 
organizational factors influenced safety culture. It pointed out that senior 
management commitment, management style, visible management, good 
communication between all levels of employees [management action] and a 
balance of health and safety and production goals [management prioritisation] were 
essential (Health and Safety Executive, 1999). 
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2.1 Safety climate versus safety culture 
Schein (2004) defined the term organizational culture as “observed behavioural 
regularities when people interact (language, customs and traditions, rituals), group 
norms, espoused values, formal philosophy, rules of the game, climate, embedded 
skills, habits of thinking/mental models/linguistic paradigms, shared meanings and 
‘root’ metaphors or integrating symbols”, which shows the complexity of the 
meaning of culture. Reason (1997) emphasised the role of organizational cultural in 
safety management. According to Reason (1997), organizational culture most 
closely captures the essence that shared values (what is important) and beliefs (how 
things work) interact with a company’s people, organizational structures and 
control systems to produce behavioural norms (the way we do things around here). 
Richter and Koch (2004) stated that safety culture is “the shared and learned 
meanings, experiences and interpretations of work and safety – expressed partially 
symbolically – which guide peoples’ actions towards risks, accidents and 
prevention”. Safety culture is shaped by people in the structures and social 
relations within and outside the organization. 
Although there have been reservations from some investigators, safety culture has 
acquired a significant place in the literature, and there is agreement that safety 
culture is a proactive stance towards safety (Guldenmund, 2000). Guldenmund 
(2010) summarised the various definitions of organizational safety culture, one 
being that safety culture is those aspects of the organizational culture that will 
impact on attitudes and behaviour related to increasing or decreasing risk. 
Several studies have found safety management, colleague involvement and 
collaboration to be important dimensions for safety climate (Flin et al., 2000; 
Guldenmund, 2007; Rundmo, 2000). Safety climate is reflected in the workforce’s 
perceptions of the organizational atmosphere. It is more superficial and transient 
than is culture (Guldenmund, 2007). According to Hahn and Murphy (2008) safety 
climate refers to the shared perceptions of employees about the safety of their work 
environments and provides a background against which day-to-day tasks are 
performed. These shared perceptions derive from several factors, including 
management decision-making, organizational safety norms and expectations and 
safety practices, policies and procedures, which together serve to communicate the 
organization’s commitment to safety (Hahn and Murphy, 2008). 
In this analysis, the OIMS and safety advisers are separated from the rest of the 
organization. Their answers form part of the overall safety climate, but it does not 
make sense to describe this as their safety climate. It is therefore called perception 
and comprehension of safety. Each individual has his or her perception and 
comprehension of safety, which were summarised in the overall safety climate. 
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When analyzing a small group, such as OIMs, the analysis includes their safety 
perceptions and comprehensions as part of the overall safety climate. 
2.2 Can safety culture be measured? 
Can safety culture be measured? Anthropologists and psychologists tend to 
disagree on this question. Many psychologists seem to believe that it is possible to 
measure culture – or at least to measure safety climate (Haukelid, 2008). According 
to Hopkins (2006) survey methods are regarded as a well-suited way to study the 
attitudes, values and perceptions of organizational practices. 
There has been continuing debate about the fundamental dimensions of safety 
climate. Flin et al. (2000) examined 18 safety climate instruments used in industry 
and extracted the following dimensions: “Management/Supervision” (especially in 
relation to perceived commitment to safety), “Safety System” (procedures, 
practices and equipment), “Risk” (attitudes to risk-taking), “Work Pressure” (work 
pace; production versus safety) and “Competence” (knowledge, skills, training). 
“Procedures/Rules” was a factor also found in a number of studies. Guldenmund 
(2000) identified similar factors from the 16 articles he reviewed. In both reviews, 
management was the dominant variable. This included first-line supervisors, site 
managers and senior managers. The level of management is not always well 
specified. Some researchers, such as Zohar and Luria (2003), have argued that the 
essential dimension is management’s commitment to safety and that this suffices as 
a measure of safety climate (Yule et al., 2007). 
All but one of the seven empirical articles in Safety Science’s special issue on 
safety culture used survey methods to measure safety culture/climate (see Safety 
Science volume 34, 2000). For survey methods to be considered useful as safety 
assessments, their results should provide some basis for making judgements about 
how safe or unsafe an organization is as well as some sort of prediction as to 
whether the organization is prone to having accidents (Antonsen, 2009b). One way 
of answering the question is to analyse the relationship between safety climate 
surveys and occupational accidents. This is done in several studies e.g. (Høivik, 
2010). The management of occupational accidents is different from that of major 
hazard risk management. Two recent studies have analysed safety climate surveys 
and precursor incidents with the potential to cause major accidents. Hydrocarbon 
leaks are important precursor incident in the O&G industry as they may rapidly 
escalate to major accidents. An extensive study using the NORSCI concluded that 
there were significant correlations between the number of hydrocarbon leaks and 
safety climate indicators (Vinnem et al., 2010). A second study explored the extent 
to which a safety climate indicator from a survey on working conditions 
undertaken in an O&G company (n = 2188) could be used as a safety indicator in 
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relation to hydrocarbon leaks on 28 offshore installations. It was found that more 
negative safety climate scores were associated with increasing numbers of 
hydrocarbon leaks over a 12-month period following the survey. The safety climate 
indicator explained more of the variance in hydrocarbon leaks than did the 
technical indicators (Kongsvik et al., 2011).  
The knowledge of the relationship between safety climate surveys and safety 
results is still rather limited, but the promising results should be followed up by 
more knowledge about surveys as tools for measuring safety climate.  
3 RESULTS 
The survey consisted of 124 questions or statements divided into the six main parts 
relevant to health and safety. In addition to demographic and other background 
data, the survey included 43 statements about daily HSE prioritisation and risk 
communication, own and others’ safety skills and behaviour connected to role 
clarity, safety training, competence and workplace conditions influencing health 
and safety such as management and prioritisation and individual motivation and 
following up systems and procedures. In the present study, the results for these 43 
statements were analysed. In the analysis, all items were graded from “1” (“totally 
agree”) to “5” (“totally disagree”). To counteract response style bias, 28 of the 
statements were formulated positively (e.g., ‘‘my colleagues are very preoccupied 
with HSE”), while the remaining 15 statements were formulated negatively (e.g., 
‘‘I sometimes violate safety rules to get the job done”). The questionnaire has been 
continually developed and new questions have been introduced. A basic set of 
questions has been retained in order to monitor trends over time. 
The following table shows the different questions categorized into six categories. 
The categories are similar to those used by Høivik et al. (2009b) which also used 
the NORSCI. For the purpose of our analysis, the categorization is purely a matter 
of order and not an object of the analysis. The mean of score of each individual 
statement was calculated for the three variables: (a) OIMs, (b) safety advisers and 
(c) the rest of the offshore organization. The standard deviation (95% confidence 
interval) is listed for the three groups. The differences between the three variables 
were then calculated. 
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 One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) is a technique used to compare the means 
of two or more samples. The one-way ANOVA technique analyses variance for a 
quantitative dependent variable using a single factor (independent) variable and is 
used to test the hypothesis that several means are equal. This technique is an 
extension of the two-sample t test (Field, 2009).  One-way ANOVA is a relatively 
robust procedure with respect to violations of the normality assumption. The 
questions were are all significant within the limit of ≥0.01, except for four 
questions: The regulatory requirements on HSE are not good enough (Sign: 
0.077); I stop working if I think it can be dangerous for me or other to continue 
(sign: 0.043); The safety deputies are doing a good job (sign: 0.093); and Different 
procedures and routines on different installations may threaten the safety (sign: 
0.197). The response rate was above 98% for all the questions.  
The purpose of the present study is to reveal whether the understanding of central 
elements related to safety climate (safety perception and comprehension) is shared 
by the different levels of the offshore organization. As seen, there is a significant 
difference in almost all the questions, and further categorization was thus not 
carried out.  
4 Discussion 
Managing an organization’s safety requires a long-term approach focused on the 
key determinants of the safety culture. One of the prime factors is the degree of 
management commitment to safety at all levels, from the first-line supervisors to 
the managing director. Managers must check whether their safety commitment is 
being transmitted to others. This can be achieved by the use of safety climate 
surveys (Flin et al., 2002). As shown in the table and the one-way ANOVA 
calculation, there are significant differences in the scores between the OIMs and 
the rest of the organization. In particular, within the categories of safety 
prioritisation and safety versus production, the differences between OIMs and the 
rest of the organization were considerable. 
Hale (2000) listed a number of elements for a good safety culture: importance of 
safety; involvement of workers at all levels; role of safety staff; caring trust (that all 
parties have a watchful eye and helping hand to cope with inevitable slips and 
blunders); openness in communication; belief in safety improvements; and 
integration of safety into the organization. The OIMs and the rest of the 
organization have different opinions about the questions: I find it uncomfortable to 
call attention to violations of safety rules and Reports on accidents or dangerous 
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situations are often ‘‘smartened up”. These are important questions related to the 
elements listed by Hale (2000). A good organizational safety culture typically 
relies on good safety leadership (Conchie and Donald, 2006). A study in the UK 
showed that OIMs report difficulties in motivating and controlling crucial safety 
aspects of workforce behaviour even though they are aware of the importance of 
such leadership (O'Dea and Flin, 2001). 
Transocean conducted surveys and interviews with hundreds of employees onshore 
and on four rigs, including Deepwater Horizon, which was surveyed from March 
12 to March 16, 2010. The surveys and interviews focused on elements of the 
safety climate. The reviewers found Deepwater Horizon “relatively strong in many 
of the core aspects of safety management. However, there were also weaknesses. 
Almost half (46%) of the crew members surveyed felt that some of the workforce 
feared reprisals for reporting unsafe situations, and 15% felt that there were not 
always enough people available to carry out work safely. Some Transocean crews 
complained that the safety manual was “unstructured”, “hard to navigate” and “not 
written with the end user in mind”, and that there was a “poor distinction between 
what is required and how this should be achieved” (Graham et al., 2011). It was not 
the goal to draw any parallels between the findings in the NORSCI and the 
research conducted among Transocean’s crew. However, it is interesting to see that 
the differences between the OIMs and the rest of the organization are large for 
questions 2 and 10: “When it comes to one’s career it is a disadvantage to be too 
concerned with HSE” and “The manning is sufficient to ensure that health, 
environment and safety is well taken care off”. Indeed, what the Transocean crew 
members found problematic is the similar to the questions where OIMs and and the 
rest of organization have had the most different comprehensions.  
A number of investigations into the safety climates on offshore petroleum 
installations have identified the importance of management, although in rather 
general terms. Alexander et al. (1995) reported that for UK offshore workers 
“management commitment to safety” was the dominant factor in their safety 
climate questionnaire. Rundmo (1994) analysed the association between 
organizational factors and safety in the Norwegian offshore environment and found 
that employees’ perceptions of greater management commitment to safety and the 
priority of safety over production goals were important predictors of employee 
satisfaction. This finding was replicated in a subsequent survey in the UK using a 
similar set of measures (Flin et al., 1996). As seen in the results, the difference 
between the OIMs and the rest of the organization was considerable (1.52) for the 
question: In practice, the concern for production precedes the concern for HSE. 
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4.1 Response bias 
Differences in survey responses can be related to the respondent’s role in an 
organization. Psychologists have identified a phenomenon called socially desirable 
responding, which is the tendency to answer in a way that makes the respondent 
look good (Paulhus, 1991). What is socially desirable depends on the situation and 
the individual’s perception. For a group to answer homogeneously in a socially 
desirable way the group must be largely uniform and the surroundings must be 
comparable for the different individuals of the group. Response biases are 
controlled by using rational techniques such as forced choice or by using factor 
analysis or covariate techniques when analysing the data. A common way to 
bypass situational pressure for desirable responding is anonymity. Although 
anonymity is assured in the NORSCI, there is no indication that socially desirable 
responding is controlled for in the survey. 
4.2 Safety as an arena for conflicting interests 
The management of an offshore installation plant involves the task of finding a 
balance between a large number of sometimes conflicting requirements. These can 
be thought of as generic dilemmas of management, which have to be understood, 
resolved and integrated into organizational activities. One example is the balance 
between safety and efficiency, which has to be approached in a way so as not to 
allow one compromise the other. Management’s need to express a positive view of 
the way safety is managed in the company may thus be strongly enforced, 
especially when scoring a safety survey from the safety authority. 
As described earlier, there are still different opinions on safety levels between 
unions and operator companies. Issues of power and conflict in organizations are 
rarely addressed in safety culture research. Much safety culture research thus rests 
on a harmony model of organizational life. Antonsen, (2009a) argued that this is a 
fundamental shortcoming of the existing research. The most obvious but 
nonetheless most important lesson for safety culture research is that organizations 
are arenas for conflicting interests. Safety issues, like other organizational issues, 
are subject to discussion and disagreement. Hovden et al. (2008) found that safety 
advisers report more problematic relations to their managers than vice versa. This 
is expressed in terms of loyalty conflicts, priority of cost versus safety, manager’s 
intolerance of safety advisers’ use of time and resources and managers 
unwillingness to listen. 
4.3 The role of trust 
The role of trust and distrust has been argued to play an increasingly important role 
in modern, global, complex and ambivalent risk societies (Conchie and Donald, 
2006; Tharaldsen et al., 2010). Low-trust relations between key stakeholders are 
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assumed to have a negative impact on safety culture by reinforcing blame and 
fostering the non-reporting of safety-relevant information (Conchie and Donald, 
2006; Cox et al., 2006; Schöbel, 2009). Trust can improve safety attitudes and 
performance (Cox et al., 2004) and trust is a significant predictor of perceived risk 
(Viklund, 2003). 
In summary, studies on safety leadership suggest that trust within leader–worker 
relationships is necessary to develop and sustain good safety cultures within 
organizations (Conchie and Donald, 2006). Large differences in safety perceptions 
and comprehensions may lead to less trust. Different safety perceptions are 
especially evident when it comes to questions related to safety versus production. 
Both the PSA and the Health and Safety Executive UK have emphasised the 
importance of a balance between safety and production to ensure safe operations. 
Safety versus production issues are often seen as the cause of major accidents and 
the main conflict between unions and management. As organizational functioning 
relies on cooperation between different group members, trust may show varying 
degrees of importance depending on the tasks and associated interactions. 
A study by Luria (2010) tested the contribution of trust to safety between leaders 
and subordinates and found that leaders that created a relationship of trust with 
their subordinates were more likely to create a safe working environment and 
achieve higher and stronger safety climate perceptions among their subordinates. 
The results reinforced the assumption that safety is related to social relationships, 
such as trust in a leader. It thus seems that trust is related to the effective 
communication of the importance of safety (i.e., strong safety climate), and trust 
relationships are also related to the perceived importance of safety to unit leaders 
(safety climate level), which ultimately contributes to fewer injuries. It also seems 
that safety management is linked to a broad spectrum of social relationships 
between leaders and subordinates. (Høivik, 2010) found that all HSE climate 
factors were negatively associated with recordable injuries, but only the factor 
“Confidence in management” was significantly negatively associated with 
recordable injuries. Thus, organizational surveys might be used as indicators of the 
risk of injuries. Management style and trust in the manager were also important 
factors for personnel injuries. This study did not conclude that there is mistrust, but 
drawing the historical lines related to trust and still observing that safety versus 
production is the category where OIMs differ most from their organizations is 
interesting and this could be followed up by more extensive studies. Indeed, there 
were different opinions about the safety level that triggered the RNNP in the first 
place. 
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4.4 Shared perceptions of safety as a basis for developing a 
safety culture  
As culture is socially constructed in groups, it is unlikely that these processes will 
generate the same culture in different parts and at different levels of an 
organization (Antonsen, 2009a). This line of thought is rather marginal and poorly 
developed in the safety culture literature, which generally presupposes that safety 
cultures are shared by all members of organizations. The safety culture literature 
lacks a conceptualisation of how changes in shared frames of reference occur 
(Nævestad, 2010). Our study supports the hypothesis that managers in general have 
more positive perceptions and comprehensions of safety onboard. It also supports 
the notion that culture is socially constructed in groups. The results supported the 
hypothesis, but the overall low standard deviation and the distinctive differences 
for almost all questions is surprising. Major hazards always pose a threat to the 
whole crew from the OIMs to the roughnecks. In many industries, occupational 
accidents are the main hazard. Managers are not exposed to these hazards in the 
same way as are the rest of the blue-collar workers. Thus, the perceptions and 
comprehensions about the safety climate might therefore not necessarily differ 
between OIMs and the rest of the crew in the same way as in other industries. 
5 Concluding remarks 
Risk and safety perceptions offshore have been found to be framed by the 
installation you work on and whether you belong to a client or a contractor 
company (Høivik, 2009; Høivik et al., 2009a; Høivik et al., 2009b; Tharaldsen et 
al., 2010). This study adds that the risk and safety perception is framed by the 
executive position of OIMs and safety advisers for offshore workers on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf. 
Our findings support earlier research in that the managers of organizations that are 
closer to the planning and strategy of the operation express a more positive view of 
the safety level. Working offshore is special in the sense that all levels of the 
organization work, eat, have time off and sleep in a limited space far away from 
family. Thus, they interact differently than most other workplaces. Offshore 
workers often refer to the organization as “one big family” and state that there is a 
low level of hierarchy. It is thus of interest to see how this close interaction 
influences the perception and comprehension of safety and whether similar 
differences between managers and workers in their understanding of safety exist in 
such a “family setting”. The study presented in this article shows that safety 
perceptions and comprehensions differ significantly among OIMs, safety advisers 
and the rest of the organization on offshore installations. OIMs have the most 
positive perceptions and comprehensions of both personal and organizational 
safety. Safety advisers’ responses are between OIMs and the rest of the 
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organization. These different safety perceptions and comprehensions may be 
influenced by group identity, different knowledge and control and issues of power 
and conflict. As OIMs and safety advisers have important roles in safety 
management and risk treatment on offshore installations, the difference is of 
significance for the communication and management of risks on offshore 
installations. These different safety perceptions and comprehensions are important 
to bear in mind when planning surveys as well as planning and implementing 
safety measures. Knowledge about the perception and comprehension might also 
give managers an appreciation of how other employees perceive the relationships 
between the elements of safety climate. Further research is needed to explain the 
differences. The significantly different opinions related to safety versus production 
are of special interest because of the earlier distrust between unions and 
management. 
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Paper 3 
Resilient Planning of 
Modification Projects in High 
Risk Systems: The Implications 
of Using FRAM for Risk 
Assessments 
 
Camilla Knudsen Tveiten 
Chapter in book:  Eirik Albrechtsen and Besnard, Denis (eds) (2013) Oil and Gas, 
Technology and Humans.  Assessing the Human Factors of Technological Change. 
Ashgate. 
Recent research into accidents, safety and risk assessment has implemented a 
resilience engineering framework for managing emergent risks and latent failures. 
The resilience engineering approach emphasizes the need to study the normal 
operation of a sociotechnical system to identify performance variability that may 
lead to unwanted consequences should interactions result in instability. The study 
discussed in this chapter implemented the Functional Resonance Analysis Method 
(FRAM) to identify potential performance variability in the planning of 
modifications to a mature offshore oil installation. In addition to identifying 
variability that may lead to unwanted outcomes in the planning phase of 
modifications, the study suggests that FRAM may be useful as a risk assessment 
method at the organizational level.  
1 Introduction 
Recent research has focused on understanding accidents, safety and risk assessment 
from a resilience engineering perspective (Hollnagel, Woods and Leveson 2006; 
Hollnagel, Nemeth and Dekker, 2008; Nemeth, Hollnagel and Dekker, 2009; 
Hollnagel et al., 2011).  Earlier work by James Reason focused on the need to 
identify latent failures and highlighted latent errors as a hazard and a source of risk 
in maintenance activities (Reason, 1990; Reason and Hobbs, 2003). In the same 
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vein, this chapter demonstrates the application of the resilience engineering 
approach as framework for managing emergent risks and latent failures. 
A particular feature of the resilience engineering approach is that the study of 
normal operations can provide information about performance variability in the 
sociotechnical system. Performance variability can lead to unwanted consequences 
when the variability of individual system functions combines in a way that 
destabilizes the system. The study described here aimed to identify performance 
variability that might be the source of risk during the planning of modifications on 
an offshore petroleum installation. 
The planning of modifications to offshore oil and gas platforms is almost a daily 
activity in the industry, especially as installations mature. The planning phase in 
itself is not considered a high-risk activity, but modifications to operational 
installations can imply potentially radical changes to high-risk systems that may 
have a significant impact on safety. Complex production processes and 
sophisticated operating systems can make it difficult to identify risks. This 
particularly applies to older installations, as the older the installation is, the greater 
the likelihood that modifications will require the introduction of completely new 
technology. The consequence of modifications may be an intractable system that 
emerges either simply as a result of the modifications themselves, or in 
combination with other changes such as working practices or the organization of 
human resources.     
The FRAM method has traditionally been used in accident investigations to model 
and analyze accidents in order to identify ways of reducing future risk. However, it 
has been argued that one of the strengths of the method, like other system-based 
accident models such as the Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes 
(STAMP), is that it can also be used for risk assessment (Hollnagel, 2004; Leveson 
et al., 2006). FRAM has already been used as a risk assessment method in analyses 
at the operational level that aim to identify emergent risks due to the variability of 
normal performance (Macchi, Hollnagel and Leonhardt, 2009; Macchi, 2010). 
Similarly, the study described in this chapter investigates whether the FRAM 
method is useful for risk assessment in the planning phase of operations to identify 
potential performance variability; in this case, in the planning of modifications to a 
mature offshore oil installation.  
2 The FRAM method 
The FRAM method was first presented in the book ‘Barriers and Accident 
Prevention’ (Hollnagel, 2004) and other comprehensive descriptions can be found 
in Macchi (2010) and Woltjer and Hollnagel (2007). 
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The basic element of the FRAM method is the function and its six descriptors 
(Input, Time, Control, Output, Resource and Precondition) as shown in Figure 1. A 
function is an action performed by a part of the system in order to fulfill the goals 
of the system. Functions can consist of both human activities and technological 
operations. 
 
 
Figure 5: A FRAM function (Hollnagel, 2008) 
The FRAM model initially provides a simple visual representation of a system’s 
individual functions. At this stage the connections between the functions of the 
model are potential rather than actual (i.e. there is no attempt to evaluate function 
descriptors). It is only when the FRAM model is instantiated that function 
descriptors are evaluated and the actual couplings between functions are 
established. Whether the FRAM method is used for accident or risk analysis, 
features of the operational environment can be added to the instantiation, which 
then provides a representation of the system’s functions in a given time frame, 
conditions or scenario chosen for the purpose of the analysis.  
2.1 A FRAM Analysis 
Whether it is used for accident investigation or for risk assessment a FRAM event 
analysis in general consists of the following five steps: 
1. Define the purpose of the analysis. The FRAM method can be used for safety 
assessment (analysis of future events) or for accident investigation (analysis of 
past events). 
2. Identify and describe the relevant system functions. A function, in FRAM 
terms, is an activity or task which has important or necessary consequences for 
the state or properties of another activity. In the FRAM method, functions are 
identified based on ‘work as done’ rather than ‘work as planned’ (e.g. 
Activity/
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procedures or work descriptions).  Each function is characterized by six 
descriptors: Input (I, what the function uses or transforms), Output (O, what 
the function produces), Preconditions (P, conditions that must be fulfilled), 
Resources (R, what the function needs or consumes), Time (T, the time 
available), and Control (C, what supervises or adjusts the function).  
3. Assess the potential performance variability of each function. The potential 
performance variability of a function is characterized qualitatively.  Variability 
may originate in human intervention, the organization or technology, i.e., the 
sociotechnical system. The FRAM method distinguishes foreground and 
background functions, which may both be affected by variability. Foreground 
functions indicate what is being analysed or assessed, i.e., the focus of the 
investigation and can vary significantly depending on the  scenario, while 
background functions constitute the context or working environment and vary 
more slowly. The variability of both foreground and background factors 
should be assessed as far as possible using either information provided by 
accident databases or on the basis of issues that are known to influence the 
behaviour of the system. 
4. Identify where functional resonance may emerge. Functional resonance occurs 
when the normal variability of the system’s functions interacts in unintended 
ways. Each function in the system exists in an environment composed of the 
other functions and every function has a normal variability. In certain 
circumstances, the variability of one function may act in such a way as to 
reinforce the variability of another (i.e. resonate) and thereby cause variability 
to exceed normal limits. This phenomenon can be described as the resonance 
of the normal variability of functions, hence as functional resonance.  
5. The fifth and last step is the development of effective countermeasures. These 
usually aim to dampen performance variability in order to maintain the system 
in a safe state, but they can also be used to sustain or amplify functional 
resonance that leads to desired or improved outcomes. Countermeasures are 
not discussed in detail here, but some measures to dampen variability are 
proposed. 
2.2 The Evaluation of Performance Variability 
The general purpose of a risk assessment is to identify how and where risks may 
arise. In the FRAM method, risk identification is based on an evaluation of the 
variability of normal performance. A review of case studies where a FRAM 
analysis has been applied shows that there are different ways of characterizing this 
variability. One approach was proposed by Hollnagel in the original description of 
the FRAM method (Hollnagel, 2004). Here, variability is evaluated by first 
identifying unexpected connections between system functions (e.g. control loops or 
checks that may fail) and then evaluating how failure may occur (e.g. the activity is 
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not completed in time, lack of competence). The variability of each function and of 
the system as a whole is evaluated in the same way.  
Another approach is to use common performance conditions (CPCs) to characterize 
the potential variability of a function. In this case, functions are evaluated as 
adequate, inadequate or unpredictable. CPCs were first introduced in the context of 
the Cognitive Reliability Error Analysis Method (CREAM) method (Hollnagel 
1998/2007); they consist of eleven common conditions related to human 
performance. In more recent studies that have implemented the FRAM method, 
performance conditions are considered to be the outcome of other (typically 
organizational) functions (Herrera, Macchi and Hollnagel, 2010).  
Another approach was proposed by Macchi, Hollnagel and Leonhardt (2009) who 
suggested that system functions could be categorized into three types: 
x Human functions are usually variable as people adjust their performance to 
current working conditions (resources and demands) (Hollnagel, 2009). 
Human performance can vary on a short-term basis, but may also have a 
dampening effect. 
x Technological functions depend on the technology implemented in the 
system. These are less subject to variability as they are designed to be 
stable, reliable, and predictable. Technical functions are not normally able 
to dampen performance variability (unless there are barriers in place in the 
system). 
x Organizational functions are related to human functions but subject to a 
different kind of variability. Organizational functions are less variable than 
human functions – or rather their variability has a delayed effect on human 
functions. A typical example would be the production and updating of 
procedures.  
The study then assessed the performance variability of the output of human 
functions using a three-by-three matrix that evaluated the temporal and precision 
characteristics of the function’s inputs. Temporal characteristics were described as, 
‘too early, on-time and too late’ and precision characteristics as, ‘precise, 
acceptable and imprecise’. The result of this evaluation was an overall 
characterisation of the function where the quality of the output was represented by 
the median of the quality of the input characteristics.  
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3 The Case Study 
Oil and gas productions installations on the Norwegian continental shelf are owned 
by a licenced group of companies. One of the companies in the group holds the role 
of operating company. For maintenance and modification activities, work is often 
managed through an integrated service contract that is established between the 
operating company and an offshore construction company (the vendor company), 
which has the role of contractor and which may in turn contract other vendors. 
Integrated service contracts are long-term and imply a broad concept of service that 
may require the contractor to undertake planning and administration 
responsibilities, provide cost estimates, etc.   
Modifications to offshore oil installations can change the functionality of both a 
piece of equipment and the wider system. Updates to technology or the 
replacement of parts can make the system look and function differently. At the 
same time, drawings and manuals need to be updated. The goal is usually to 
improve the system or to adjust it to new requirements. Minor modifications can be 
carried out by the company’s own staff or external contractors, and integrated into 
normal work processes. In this case decisions are taken locally within budgetary 
limitations. Major modifications however, involve the wider organization, 
including both the operating company and the contractor and may even require a 
temporary project team to be established.  
At the installation in question, an integrated service contract had been in place 
since 2005. Modification projects followed procedures defined in manuals 
developed by the operating company and the construction contractor. Initially, each 
company had its own manual which was merged into a combined project plan 
detailing the roles and responsibilities of each of the two companies in different 
phases of the project. The planning phase consisted of: the identification of a 
problem or an opportunity; finding (a) potential solution(s); developing a 
modification procedure; preparing cost estimates; conducting a risk assessment; 
and pre-engineering activities. During this period the two parties communicated by 
telephone and email, and held formal meetings as prescribed by the project plan – 
typically when important decisions needed to be taken, or more generally to 
discuss and clarify ongoing work. 
In this case planning activities involved the modification of an oil well. The 
problem was that production had fallen due to low well pressure. The proposed 
solution was to install a gas lift with subsea and topside components to increase 
well pressure. A gas lift involves injecting gas through a tubing-casing annulus. 
The injected gas aerates the fluid and reduces its density; the formation pressure is 
then able to lift the oil column and force the fluid out of the wellbore. This 
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modification is one of several ways to increase oil well pressure and it is common 
in older wells. Nevertheless, the risk of a hydrocarbon leak during the installation 
and operation of the gas lift requires that a risk assessment be carried out. When the 
study began, the contractor had prepared a preliminary design for the topside 
construction of the lift. The modification was expected to be implemented during a 
planned maintenance period at the installation two months later. However, the 
work was postponed several times and still had not been carried out by the time the 
study ended.  
3.1 Data Gathering 
Data for the FRAM analysis was gathered in two parallel phases. One phase 
consisted of an examination of both companies’ manuals for the planning of 
modification projects. These manuals contain detailed descriptions of all the issues 
that must be taken into account during the planning phase, and procedures are 
described thoroughly and in detail as they must be generally applicable to all of the 
company’s installations. Because of this level of generality, the functions that 
constituted the planning phase were clarified in discussions with project staff in 
both companies. The combined project plan that merged the two companies’ work 
processes was also studied. The essential functions of the planning phase were 
extracted from these documents and recorded in a spreadsheet, together with a 
description of each function.  
However, it is often the case that the detailed procedures prescribed in manuals 
describe the way work should be done; this frequently translates into a more 
manageable ‘procedure’ for day-to-day activities. This day-to-day ‘procedure’ is 
not described in any manual, but can be seen in the tasks, meetings and 
documentation that occur when modifications are planned. Therefore, the second 
data gathering phase consisted of observations of meetings between the operating 
company and the contractor, interviews with personnel in both companies and 
email exchanges with staff. The purpose of these observations and interviews was 
to validate that the analysis was based on the way planning activities were actually 
executed.  It also provided the scenario that formed the basis for the instantiation of 
the FRAM model (the actual risk analysis). Field notes were taken of the 
observations and interviews for later use in the analysis. Particular care was taken 
to include variability in the way functions were executed. 
3.2 Identification of System Functions 
Based on the information gathered from written procedures, interviews and 
observations, the functions of ‘work as done’ were identified. These functions are 
essential for completing the task when things go right in planning a modification 
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project. Table 1 shows the functions that were identified, together with a 
description of their purpose and general characteristics. 
Table 5: Planning phase functions for modification projects  
 Function Description 
1 Identify a 
problem or an 
opportunity 
The need for a modification starts with either the 
identification of a problem or a proposal for improvement. 
A member of staff identifies a problem or an opportunity in 
the system that needs to be dealt with. This may include a 
suggestion for how to solve the problem or take advantage 
of the opportunity.  
Human function performed by the operating company. 
2 Validate the 
proposal 
The proposal is validated by a supervisor or manager before 
being entered into the database as authorised for further 
processing.  
Human function performed by the operating company. 
3 Identify 
solution 
Potential solutions for the problem or opportunity are 
investigated and one solution is chosen. Pre-estimates of 
cost and risk may be made.  
Human function performed by the operating company and 
the contractor.  
4 Refine solution Details such as the available resources, budget and 
criticality of the chosen solution are determined.  
Human function performed by the operating company and 
the contractor.   
5 Define concept The concept for carrying out the modification is described 
in detail. Any requirements and the impact on ongoing 
system operations are also described. The final decision on 
whether to make the investment is taken.  
Human function performed by the operating company and 
the contractor.   
6 Estimate cost Detailed costs estimates are prepared based on the 
description of the chosen solution and its impact on 
ongoing operations. This function applies to all phases of 
the modification project, with differences in the precision 
and level of detail.  
Human function performed by the engineering and finance 
departments using information provided by the contractor. 
7 Assess risk The risk assessment (economic, process-related and safety) 
is based on the description of the chosen solution and its 
55
 
55  
impact on ongoing operations. Particular note is taken of 
the criticality of the work. This function applies to all 
planning phases. 
Human function performed by the operating company and 
the contractor.   
8 Decision to 
proceed to pre-
engineering 
A kick-off meeting is arranged. The solution is opened for 
pre-engineering.  
Human function performed by the operating company. 
 
These eight functions were described in terms of the six FRAM descriptors (input, 
output, preconditions, resources, time and control). For example, for the function 
‘define concept’ the following descriptions were prepared (table 6): 
Table 6: The function ‘define concept’ with descriptors 
Descriptor Function: Define concept 
Input (I) Defined solution selected 
Suggestion with criticality and possible solution registered in 
database 
Output (O) Concept study 
Preconditions (P) Solution selected 
Budget allocated 
Resources (R) Contractor personnel  
Engineering and maintenance personnel 
Expert technical personnel within the company 
Time (T) Possible solution available 
Criticality 
Control (C) Modification procedure 
 
After describing all the functions according to their characteristics, a consistency 
check was performed. The consistency check aims to ensure that each descriptor is 
produced (and used) by at least one function in the model. The consistency check 
enabled the background functions to be identified. Background functions are 
essential for work to be carried out and include for example, the provision of 
resources, competence, budget planning, etc. The exact nature of background 
functions depends on the system being analyzed. In this case, the background 
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functions were identified through observations, interviews and procedures and are 
described in table 7 
Table 7: Background functions 
 Function Description 
1 Provide resources 
(operating company)  
Organizational function: provide and manage sufficient 
human resources for adequate system functioning in the 
operating company 
2 Provide resources 
(contractor company 
) 
Organizational function: provide and manage sufficient 
human resources for adequate system functioning in the 
contractor company (depends on contract). 
3 Manage budget Organizational function: provide and manage sufficient 
financial resources for adequate system functioning. 
4 Manage 
modification 
procedure 
Organizational function: design and update procedures 
to support activities. 
5 Evaluate criticality Operational system function: label the problem or 
opportunity with an attribute. For example, if the 
modification is assessed as critical for production 
continuity or safety, it is labelled as such based on pre-
established criteria. 
 
These background functions resemble the organizational functions identified in the 
study by Macchi, Hollnagel and Leonhardt (2009) who combined CPCs with 
research on the evaluation of safety-critical issues by Reiman and Oedewald 
(2009). However, in this case the organizational functions identified in the Macchi 
study were not appropriate to the analysis. For example, the authors identified a 
‘manage resources’ function. In the current analysis this was divided into ‘provide 
operating company resources’ and ‘provide contractor company resources’ to 
account for the fact that resources had various origins, together with a ‘manage 
budget’ function to account for financial resources. In addition, the operational 
system function ‘evaluate criticality’ was added, as the criticality of a modification 
(in terms of safety and production issues) is an important part of the decision-
making process that is not necessarily found in risk analyses. 
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3.3 The FRAM model 
The foreground and background functions are shown in a FRAM model (Figure 6). 
Foreground functions are shown in grey and background functions in black.  
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Figure 6: The FRAM model for the planning phase of modifications 
This initial FRAM model shows all the potential couplings between functions, but 
not any actual couplings, which are the subject of the subsequent analysis. 
3.4 Analysis of the Normal Scenario 
The key to success for any modification project is that it is carried out on time and 
that cost and risk estimates are accurate. In addition, modification planning must 
take into account any other ongoing work on the installation, for example routine 
maintenance, other planned modifications, and normal production and operation 
activities. Modification projects form part of an overall work plan for the 
installation, which includes factors such as the availability of accommodation and 
transport (for personnel and equipment etc.).  
The relationships between functions were based on the information provided by the 
function descriptors. The output of any function can be an input to another 
function. Taking the ‘define concept’ function as an example, inputs were ‘defined 
solution selected’ and ‘suggestion with criticality and possible solution registered 
in database’. These in turn are outputs of the functions ‘find solution’ and ‘identify 
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problem or opportunity’.  The fact that a solution exists (output from the ‘find 
solution’ function) is a precondition for the ‘define concept’ function. 
3.5 Assessment of Potential Variability  
Information about the potential variability of functions was gathered through 
observations of meetings and interviews. The description of potential variability is 
qualitative. In the analysis, potential variability in the output of each function was 
characterized as adequate, inadequate/inappropriate or unpredictable/missing. 
Where there was little performance variability and only small potential for 
interference from background functions, the output was characterized as 
‘adequate’. ‘Inadequate’ indicated that there was a greater potential for 
performance variability and interference from background functions, and when 
there was  a lack of information on how the function was actually carried out, or 
the description of variability was unclear, the output was characterized as 
‘unpredictable’. The performance variability characteristics for the ‘define concept’ 
function are shown in Table 8. Similar tables were developed for all the functions 
in tables 3 and 5. 
Table 8: Characterization of variability for the ‘define concept’ 
function 
Descriptor Function: Define concept Characterization 
Input (I) Defined solution selected 
Suggestion with criticality and 
possible solution registered in 
database 
Adequate  
Output (O) Concept study Inadequate  
Preconditions (P) Solution selected 
Budget allocated 
Unpredictable  
Resources (R) Contractor personnel  
Engineering and maintenance 
personnel 
Expert technical personnel within 
the company 
Adequate/inadequate  
Time (T) Possible solution available 
Criticality 
Unpredictable  
Control (C) Modification procedure Adequate  
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If any of the function descriptors I, P, C, R or T was rated as unpredictable or 
inadequate, the output (O) of the function was also assessed as unpredictable or 
inadequate, as unwanted variability in one function could transfer to any other 
function linked to it. 
3.6 Identification of Functional Resonance 
The fourth step of the FRAM analysis aims to identify where functional resonance 
may emerge. This involves identifying the ways in which the variability in one or 
several functions may spread through the system. Particular combinations of 
variability may lead to situations where the system is unable to safety manage 
events. 
The initial scenario instantiated in the FRAM model and described here illustrates 
how the FRAM method can be applied to a safety assessment of the planning 
phase; it could be followed by a further set of instantiations to represent the 
subsequent installation phase. Other instantiations could introduce features of the 
operational environment such as staff shortages, a lack of other resources or 
unforeseen problems with the well or production system.  
In order to identify potential emergent risks in the planning scenario, two 
environmental features were introduced into the FRAM model: 1) multiple 
concurrent modification proposals and 2) an ageing installation (which normally 
increases the number of modification proposals). The analysis of the entire FRAM 
model is too complex to be described here. Instead, the selected extract (figure 3) 
illustrates how the analysis is carried out and what the result may look like.  
At the heart of Figure 3 are the two foreground functions ‘define solution’ and 
‘define concept’ (shown in grey) and the relationships between them. In both 
foreground functions, the contractor is deeply involved in the preparation of 
proposals, preliminary concept descriptions and meetings and communication with 
the operating company. These functions also include preliminary risk assessments. 
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Figure 7: Instantiation of the functions ‘refine solution’ and ‘define concept’ 
in the scenario of an ageing installation with multiple concurrent modification 
projects 
Figure 3 also shows background functions (in black) and the two environmental 
issues introduced to refine the instantiation (white clouds). Thick solid lines 
indicate the relationship between the output of one function and the input of 
another. Lines that are not connected to anything indicate an input or output to 
another function in the overall FRAM model (figure 2) that is not shown here. Thin 
solid lines show relationships that are the result of the two environmental issues 
introduced for the purposes of the analysis. Dashed lines show the relationships 
between foreground functions and background functions. Red zigzags indicate 
either variability in the function itself or the influence of variability from the input 
of another function.  
The assessment of performance variability is based on the example shown in Table 
8 and reveals several interesting results. Unwanted variability can be seen in both 
foreground functions. This problem relates to hidden or inaccessible information 
about the installation in question. Variability is strongly influenced by background 
functions that provide resources such as input from the contractor about similar 
modifications and information about the installation. In addition, both functions are 
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influenced by the high number of modification proposals due to the age of the 
installation. Older installations that have undergone many modifications are 
typically underspecified and poorly documented. What documentation is available 
tends to be on paper and contained in drawings that have not been digitalized. 
Unwanted variability may also arise from the fact that the planning process follows 
detailed procedures that are remote from daily activities. ‘Normal’ work practices 
become habits that bear little relation to the specified procedures, and differing 
mental models of ‘how’ and ‘how thoroughly’ work needs to be done may develop 
in the organization. Another issue is that uncontrollable pressure in a gas lift in one 
well may impact other wells and the topside production system.  This means that 
the entire production system needs to be taken into account in the risk assessment. 
Finally, other problems are created by the introduction of new employees who do 
not know the history of the installation. The combination of these factors can result 
in variability that may lead to unwanted outcomes in the planning phase. It is also 
likely to lead to delays which can put into question the decision to move into the 
pre-engineering phase.  
It is important to note that the FRAM analysis helps to highlight both general 
variability in the process being modeled and where it is necessary to adjust to a 
specific situation. It is also important to focus not only on variability that may 
cause delays, adjustments, increased costs, etc. but also on variability that has an 
impact on safety. Moreover, it is important to ensure that the dampening of 
variability does not impede wanted variability and flexibility. 
Figure 3 shows the instantiation of one part of the planning phase. In order to 
conduct a full risk assessment it is important to be able to zoom in and out of the 
overall model. In other words it should be possible to zoom in on a function and 
elaborate on the conditions that must be fulfilled in order to make it operable. It is 
also essential to be able to see the effects of functions on the whole system by 
zooming out of the model. This phase of the FRAM analysis depends on the 
description of functions in the model and (Herrera, Macchi and Hollnagel, 2010) 
emphasise the importance of ensuring that each function has been described in 
sufficient detail. This point is essential in order to arrive at an accurate risk 
assessment, to know where to dampen variability and to establish the relevant 
indicators necessary for monitoring. 
3.7 Countermeasures to Dampen Variability 
In general, improvements to safety and efficiency in modification planning result 
from an examination of ‘work as done’ rather than ‘work as planned’. Ideally, it 
should be possible to identify the functions that are necessary for the safe and 
efficient planning of modifications, and to use them as the basis for a discussion 
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about improvements. In this respect, the development of the FRAM model may be 
a helpful countermeasure, as it highlights the fact that each function exists in the 
system, and all aspects of a function can be related to other aspects of other 
functions.  
Another effective countermeasure may be to make information about the system 
and the installation (models, drawings, historical data, etc.) visible and accessible 
to all personnel, and to encourage everyone involved in the planning and execution 
of modifications to work as a team, rather than two separate organizations. This is 
an issue that was addressed early on in the introduction of integrated operations in 
the petroleum industry (OLF, 2003) and should continue to be kept in mind. 
Modification planning would benefit from the sharing of updated and real-time 
information about the installation and its systems. In order for this to happen, 
barriers found in information and communication technology (ICT) systems must 
be removed while at the same time ensuring safety.   
An important concern is to dampen variability arising from the number of other 
modification projects and the fact that modifications may be carried out 
concurrently. It may be useful to develop a FRAM model specifically focused on 
this scenario. It may also be useful to group modifications on the installation (or to 
specific systems of the installation) into a single project or modification program to 
provide a better overview and coordination of the situation. 
4 Discussion 
In order to use FRAM for risk assessment it must be possible to capture 
information about the human, technological and organizational functions of the 
system. A FRAM risk assessment requires that working practices are both planned 
and executed in real time and that information is available through observations 
and interviews. These factors suggest that FRAM is a promising risk assessment 
method for analyzing the planning of high-risk modifications in an operational 
system. 
As it is unusual to carry out a risk analysis of planning or other non-operational 
work processes it is difficult to evaluate whether the FRAM method provides a 
better insight into risks than other methods, as there is little comparable data. 
Nevertheless, accident investigations have demonstrated that the planning phase of 
a project is important in ensuring safe operations. As an example, in 2004 several 
deficiencies in the planning phase of a well operation at the oil production 
installation Snorre A resulted in one of the most serious near-accidents on the 
Norwegian continental shelf (Brattbakk et al., 2004; Schiefloe et al., 2005). 
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Subsequent to the incident, the FRAM method was applied as a risk assessment 
method to the planning phase of the well operation (Phung, 2010).  
Traditional risk assessment methods such as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) 
characterize risks according to the magnitude (severity) of the possible adverse 
consequence(s), and the likelihood (probability) of occurrence of each 
consequence. As these methods rely on quantifiable issues and do not take account 
of issues that are not probable and/or have little impact, it is less likely that latent 
failures resulting from unwanted performance variability in the planning phase will 
be taken into consideration. These latent failures often combine with other issues 
and performance variability in the operational phase of the planned process, and 
eventually emerge as risks and hazardous situations. Major accidents can be the 
result of the combination of factors and behaviors that individually may have been 
regarded as quite normal and efficient if the result had been a success (Hollnagel, 
2004; Hollnagel, Woods and Leveson, 2006; Hollnagel, 2009).  
The FRAM risk assessment may reveal dependencies between functions or tasks 
that are normally missed. In addition to providing recommendations for measures 
that may dampen variance (these measures reduce the chance of a negative 
outcome of an interaction or action in a system and may also be termed human, 
organizational or functional barriers) the FRAM method aims to provide 
recommendations for monitoring performance and variability, and detecting 
undesired variability. As a result of the implementation of the method, performance 
indicators can be developed for every function and every link between functions.  
Although FRAM as a risk assessment method (and an accident investigation 
method) is still under development it has been suggested that it may be a promising 
way to identify safety indicators (Herrera, Macchi and Hollnagel, 2010). As an 
accident investigation method, FRAM has already been applied to accidents and 
incidents in aviation (Woltjer and Hollnagel, 2007) and other settings. Experience 
has shown that FRAM is well-suited to the investigation of system accidents and 
that it provides a better understanding of events than traditional multi-linear 
methods (Herrera and Woltjer, 2009). 
5 Conclusion 
The study described here suggests that the FRAM method is well-suited to the 
investigation of complex sociotechnical operations and work phases in the oil and 
gas industry. This conclusion is based on the fact that traditional risk assessments 
rarely assess risk in normal working conditions (such as planning), although 
accident investigations have demonstrated that sociotechnical factors are very often 
found to be contributing factors to incidents.  
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This study also demonstrates that further work is needed if the FRAM method is to 
become a practical tool for risk assessment in the offshore oil and gas industry. 
This point particularly applies to the evaluation of potential variability and how this 
should be assessed. It is also important that the method is made accessible to risk 
analysts and safety personnel in companies; although it will probably be necessary 
to provide research support for the analyses while the method is under 
development.   
In addition, efforts should be made not only to dampen unwanted variability in the 
system, but also to support desirable performance variability. In the study in 
question, this could take the form of making historical information about the 
installation available to everyone, and facilitating the exchange of real-time data 
between the operator and the contractor company.   Organizational barriers should 
be lowered in order to provide support for the integration of employees who share 
the same goal; safe and efficient modifications. Although further development of 
the FRAM method is needed in order to become of practical use in a dynamic 
operating company, the method shows promise as a tool for the identification of 
latent failures and potential variability in the planning phase of high-risk 
operations. 
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ABSTRACT 
Emergency management faces a changed reality in terms of possibilities and 
threats with use of new technology. Due to the ongoing changes in the operation of 
oil and gas production, different constellations of actors in a distributed system are 
built. This introduces opportunities for planning and operation. At the same time as 
new technology offers opportunities, the technology-enabled distributed network of 
actors generate challenges for emergency handling. The purpose of the study 
presented has been to look for possibilities for making emergency management 
more resilient by becoming a part of continuous risk and hazard management. The 
suggested three main elements that are important to consider in the development of 
future emergency management are 1) proactive emergency management through 
early risk anticipation; and emergency management’s adaptation to new and future 
work practices such as 2) distributed actors and 3) new technology. Based on these 
results we suggest broadening the scope of emergency management to 
systematically include monitoring, anticipation, responding and learning. 
 
Keywords: emergency management, intelligent operations, petroleum 
industry 
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Abbreviations: 
 
DSHA Defined situations of hazard and accidents 
HRO High reliability organizations 
IO Integrated operations 
NCS Norwegian continental shelf 
NOFO Norwegian oil protection association for operating 
companies 
NORSOK Norwegian standards for the petroleum industry  
NTC Norwegian Technology Center 
RE Resilience engineering 
1 Introduction 
Emergency management, as well as many other areas in society faces a changed 
reality in terms of possibilities and threats with the introduction of new technology 
and related changes in work forms as wells as organizational forms. In this paper 
we study how new technology and new work processes influence emergency 
management in the Norwegian oil and gas industry. Emergency management has to 
adapt to this development, which will offer both opportunities and challenges for 
improved handling of emergencies. This paper studies how emergency 
management can adapt to these new technologies and ways of working in the 
Norwegian oil and gas industry, in order to improve detection of and handling of 
emergencies. This purpose has been approached by an explorative study where 
early anticipation of risks; interaction between different actors; and information 
and communication through new technology' has been in focus. 
We define emergency management as the total of activities (both administrative 
routines and informal processes) conducted in a more or less coordinated way to 
control emergencies before, during and after an event. This includes analysis; 
planning; training; handling; learning; anticipation; and monitoring. Our definition 
of emergency management represents a wider definition than what is found on 
emergency preparedness assessment in the NORSOK standard Z-013 ‘Risk and 
emergency preparedness analysis’ (NTC, 2001:6), which is the mainstream best 
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practice for planning of emergency management used at the Norwegian continental 
shelf.  
The theoretical basis of the study is taken from the field of Resilience Engineering 
(RE) and High Reliability Organizations (HRO). Both perspectives are relevant for 
handling emergencies as well as representing a proactive approach to emergency 
management. RE looks for ways to enhance the ability of systems to succeed under 
varying conditions (Hollnagel 2009). This includes  the ability to respond 
effectively to both expected and unexpected conditions; to monitor both threats and 
opportunities; to anticipate future developments that may affect the system’s ability 
to achieve its goals; and to learn from past events, to understand correctly both 
what happened and why. The HRO literature gives input on how organizations 
develop a capacity to handle unexpected events and detect risk. The theory is 
grounded in studies of organizations that have demonstrated an outstanding 
capacity to handle fairly complex technologies without generating major accidents 
(LaPorte and Consolini 1991; Rochlin 1997). Important aspects from this research 
tradition are organizational redundancy and the capacity of organizations to adapt 
to peak demands and crisis (Weick 2001; Weick and Sutcliffe 2001; Weick and 
Sutcliffe 2007). In HRO theory, mindfulness points to a constant awareness and an 
ability in an organization to search for evolving practices and mechanisms to 
handle the unexpected through the principles of anticipation and containment.  
The starting point of this study was the findings in a study by Skjerve et al. 
(Skjerve, Albrechtsen et al. 2008). This study showed that new technology and new 
work processes generate new causes of accidents and new relationships between 
causes in an Integrated Operations (IO) setting. The report stated that this impacts 
emergency handling, which implies that training scenarios should be revised when 
IO is introduced. Defined Situations of Hazard and Accident (DSHAs) for example 
gas leakage or falling objects, are used by petroleum companies operating on the 
Norwegian continental shelf to specify a selection of hazardous and accidental 
events, which are important input to emergency preparedness analysis (EPA) 
processes (NORSOK Z-013: (NTC, 2001). The study indicates that the content of 
existing DSHAs is not changed in a significant way by the new IT-based 
development. The study also reveals that new opportunities and challenges arise 
regarding emergency handling. One of the interviewees in the study illustrated this 
neatly by the following statement: “New work processes and technology or not – 
the crises are the same8. ... The crises are the same, but the emergency handling is 
different in IO” 
                                                          
8 By ‘crises’ the interviewee refers to top events or defined situations of hazards and 
accidents (DSHAs) 
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A review of 16 investigation reports from the petroleum authority in Norway in the 
period 2007-2009, show that eight of them are related to possible or real major 
accidents and eight to possible or real fatal occupational accidents. We looked for 
findings concerning anticipation of risks and risk assessment, learning from earlier 
incidents or accidents with similar attributions, monitoring (ability to detect risk) 
and response of the hazard. These categories are in line with the cornerstones of 
resilience engineering (Hollnagel 2009). Deficiencies in risk anticipation and –
assessment were found in 11 of the 16 reports (eight out of eight occupational 
accidents and three out of eight major accidents). Deficiencies in learning were 
found in five of the reports (all major accidents); deficiencies in monitoring were 
found in four of the reports (all major accidents). Emergency response (evacuation 
of personnel, rescue etc.) was described as sufficient in seven of the 16 reports 
(four occupational accidents and three major accidents) and insufficient in one 
report.  
In the next section we present the background for the study related to the changes 
in work forms in the petroleum industry. We then describe the approach of the 
explorative study (observation studies of emergency training sessions and a 
workshop with industrial experts). The next section presents the results of the 
explorative study related to early risk anticipation, interaction between different 
actors, and communication during distributed emergency handling. This is 
followed by a discussion of the results, emphasizing how emergency management 
can become more proactive and how it can adapt to new technology. In the 
concluding remarks we argue for a more resilient emergency management by 
suggesting improvements in monitoring of normal operation and for anticipation of 
possible deviations from normal operations.  
2 New work practices in the Norwegian petroleum 
industry  
The need to optimize offshore oil and gas production, maximize overall recovery, 
while safeguarding cost, safety and environmental aspects is met by a change in 
work practice by actors on the Norwegian continental shelf. The change in work 
processes is enabled by digital infrastructure and information technology. The 
benefits of the development are several: better use of available resources, increased 
production, lower operating costs, longer field lifetimes and increased recovery of 
oil and gas (OLF 2006). The Norwegian government (whitepaper nr. 12 2005-2006 
(Regjeringen 2002)) underlines that technological challenges are not the only issue 
within the industry. The focus is on new work processes; integration of 
information; and HSE challenges related to safety.  The ambition is to make the 
work processes faster, safer and better, additionally to create enhanced value and 
safer operations through better dialogue across specialist disciplines and closer 
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cooperation between employees onshore and offshore. The result is expected to be 
improved decision making through new ways of working utilizing real time 
information to collaborate across social, professional, organizational and 
geographical boundaries. ‘Integrated operations (IO)’ is the most common term 
used to describe this development. 
Ringstad and Andersen (2006) describe general trends for new work processes in 
IO. One of the new trends is moving away from individual experts working alone 
in a sequential hand – over characterized work process towards real time 
simultaneous cooperation. In addition, the work can frequently be performed 
independent on where the operator is situated if the worker has access to the 
necessary real time data. The distributed as well as the co-located work is 
supported by advanced information and communication technology in its work 
processes as well as industry specific technology such as sensor technology that 
provide possibilities for distribution of real time data.  
3 Approach  
Within the theoretical framework of RE and HRO the research design of this study 
has had an open-ended approach and exploratory character often found in 
ethnographic studies (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007).  Thus the sampling 
strategies were worked out and refined as the research progressed. In order to 
gather data; observations as well as a workshop setting have been used. Dingwall 
(Miller and Dingwall, 1997) points to the importance of using observation as a 
method in social research as it enables us to document behavior in natural settings. 
Workplace studies by Suchman (1996; 2007) have shown that one of the strengths 
of observations “in situ” is that many incidents are not unremarkable for the 
participants, making them quickly forgotten and thus difficult to describe verbally 
to the researcher. 
We observed two emergency handling training sessions in two different 
companies. The first training session included a) loss of control of a well and a b) 
following oil spill. Three researchers, partly at different locations, observed the 
identification of the event in a morning meeting between the onshore operation 
support center and the offshore installation. The next step was the establishment of 
the 2nd line emergency organization and the following actions in the emergency 
handling center and in the well support center. 3rd line emergency handling was 
also partly present in the areas that we observed. In the second training session two 
researchers followed a training session for handling a) loss of control of a well with 
b) following oil spill and c) personal injuries. The 2nd line emergency handling 
onshore (the emergency handling room/central) and 3rd line handling at the 
company’s head office was observed. The results from the observations of the two 
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training sessions were recorded in field notes in the sessions The field notes 
followed an observation guide that included the role of actors and groups, 
interfaces between actors, communication between co –located actors, formal and 
informal information sharing, use of ICT, as well as observation made on the 
transition from normal to an emergency situation.  
The observations uncovered a need to discuss future challenges in emergency 
management across different organizations and professions. A workshop setting 
was considered as an appropriate method to get more information about emergency 
management from several of the actors in the Norwegian oil & gas industry. Farner 
(2008) describes the workshop as an efficient tool to collect data and get opinions 
from several stakeholders as well as an arena for coordination and interdisciplinary 
problem-solving. In order to jointly reach a new understanding in this setting he 
underlines the importance of making the participants active contributors and not 
merely passive listeners. To achieve this, the researchers took the role as 
facilitators. The role of facilitator for the researchers introduced the difficulties 
with reflexivity of the researcher in the results (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). 
This means that the facilitator’s attributes such as opinions, attitudes and social 
aspects will influence the group processes and thus the result just as any other 
participant’s attitudes will have an influence on the other participants. The role of 
the researchers as facilitators in our observations was at all times overt, just as it 
was in the observations of the emergency handling training sessions in order to 
diminish the effects of our presence in the results. Emphasis for the facilitators in 
the workshop was put on opening up for discussions and dialogue between the 
participants by asking questions and summarizing the discussions, thus our 
involvement mostly influence the scope of what was discussed and focus on the 
future rather than the present situation for emergency management.  
The overall question asked to the group at the beginning of the workshop was 
‘Which opportunities and challenges do you foresee related to emergency handling 
in the future?’ The participants in the workshop were representatives from three 
operating companies, a contractor and consultants within the emergency handling 
field. The meeting lasted for six hours with informal discussions.  The group of 19 
participants was divided into two smaller groups during the day to make it easier 
for everyone to contribute to the discussions. The results were recorded by the 
researchers taking notes during both discussions and presentations 
  
4 Results  
Results from the two observation studies and the workshop indicate that there are 
possibilities for more efficient and earlier handling of possible hazardous 
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deviations in the transition stage between normal operation and emergency 
handling. This acknowledgement is supported by the introduction of new 
technology, work processes and more integrated information. The main results are 
presented below in relation to early risk anticipation, interaction between different 
actors, and communication during distributed emergency handling. The results are 
relevant for opportunities that should be incorporated into the future of emergency 
management, as well as representing challenges that follows the introduction of IO. 
4.1  Proactive emergency management through early risk 
anticipation  
As the emergency situations that we observed were training sessions, the 
possibility to observe the transition from normal operation to emergency handling, 
as well as how deviances are handled in normal operation, was limited. The results 
presented in this paragraph on early risk anticipation stem mostly from the 
workshop though one observation was made during one of the training sessions. As 
part of the training scenario, which included a well operation that developed into an 
unsteady state, the onshore engineers were warned about a possible situation the 
night before, but the emergency was called off. In the following morning meeting, 
information about the development into a less steady state for the well was listed in 
the log that was shown on the screen during the meeting. As a part of the training 
session, it was an uncertain element whether this would be addressed in the 
meeting before the training situation was announced – in fact, the group seemed 
not to notice the disturbances. The emergency scenario was announced in the 
morning meeting and by this the training session begun. For this as well as the 
second observed emergency scenario, the co-located teams had an increase in 
collaboration as time passed.  
 
The workshop participants stated that there was a need for more focus on detecting 
and responding to deviant situations at an earlier stage. The role of the recently 
established operation centers that (continuously) support the operations offshore 
was discussed; how these could be involved at an early stage and how training for 
better collaboration between these and the emergency preparedness room was an 
issue. Where to draw the line between ‘normal operation’ and emergency was also 
discussed. It seems as the industry generally has only the two states; normal 
operation and emergency; though some workshop participants also spoke of the 
transitional state between normal operation and emergency (i.e. a deviation state 
where normal operation was left but where the operation group would handle the 
situation, not the emergency team).  
In the workshop it became clear that there are differences between operating teams 
and emergency preparedness teams according to the how risks are assessed.  The 
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‘worst case scenario’ is normally not considered in normal operation, but it is the 
shared image of the situation for an emergency handling team. In addition it was 
argued that the handling of crises seem still to be either ‘on’ or ‘off’; the 
emergency handling organization is established by call in case of emergency, 
usually late in the problem solving process. How to train operation teams in risk 
consideration and assessment was discussed as a way of improving the risk 
assessment. It was even said that in the transition from normal operation to 
emergency, work was done ad hoc as there are no procedures for this. It was 
argued that offshore on site teams are more preoccupied with looking ahead and 
being prepared for the worst and that this behavior could be transferred to onshore 
as onshore groups become more involved in the daily operation. 
4.2 Interaction between different actors 
Risk anticipation between different actors was raised as an issue in the workshop, 
following the open question on what opportunities and challenges emergency 
management would face in the future. The challenges regarding interaction 
between actors are related to the increased number and complex map of actors 
involved in emergency handling in the industry due to changes brought on by IO. 
These actors are different in terms of responsibilities, interests, proximity to hazard 
and resources and thereby there is a need to focus on new forms of cooperation, 
coordination and awareness when planning and handling emergencies. 
Furthermore, it was identified that involvement of some of these actors at an earlier 
stage in normal operation and developing new ways of including these actors in 
emergency management could be a step in the right direction in detecting 
deficiencies or a drift from normal operation to incidents or accident situations. 
Figure 1 shows mappings of relations and sharing of information from the 
observation of one of the emergency management training sessions. A line 
indicates a relation, a one way arrow indicates the direction of information flow 
and a two way arrow indicates two- way information sharing. 
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Figure 8: An actor map from an emergency handling situation9 (Tveiten, Albrechtsen 
et al. 2010). 
 
The actor map shows rather complex inter-relations between actors. In the 
evaluation after the emergency management training situations and also in the 
following workshop, it became evident that actors in emergency handling are not 
necessarily aware of this complexity or even of all the actors involved. It was 
further found that mapping of distributed actors was particularly important for the 
planning stage of emergency management as this creates an awareness of who 
should be involved and consulted in an emergency handling situation. The different 
actors should further be specified for each DSHA as well as a general map of 
actors for any unspecified emergency situation. This was also related to being able 
to clarify the different roles and responsibilities in a situation where there are many 
different internal and external actors involved. The DSHA study (see Skjerve et al., 
2008 and Tveiten & Albrechtsen, 2010) suggested that the scenarios used for 
emergency training need to reflect this new environment of IO.  
There are many interfaces between distributed actors to consider when looking at 
the operators' emergency handling, both within and across organizational 
                                                          
9 The presence of each actor will depend on which situation of hazard or accident that is 
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boundaries. In the workshop it was said  that there is a need to "draw the map all 
over again" due to the changes that have happened in the industry and get an 
overview of the different distributed actors involved in emergency management. 
The changes that need to be included in the mapping of the actors are both the 
internal actors in operation and emergency management. This includes internal 
company support teams and other resources available as well as external agents 
such as contractors, the Norwegian oil protection association for operating 
companies (NOFO) and other important actors.  
In situations of emergency some actors may have different functions than within 
normal operation. Partly as a consequence of IO, there may be several expert teams 
present onshore in the office locations. In one of the observed emergency exercises, 
the Operational Drilling Center turned into a support team (drilling team) for the 
emergency organization. This team is occupied by solving the problem, e.g. to kill 
the flow from the well. 
In the route of identifying the actors involved, the participants in the workshop put 
their emphasis on the recent increase in use of support centers onshore which 
consists of experts with competence in different areas of the production process. 
These support teams and -centers possess crucial information for emergency 
management, and it was suggested that their role in the emergency management 
organization should be assessed. This also includes the contractors support team(s) 
and what their role should be. 
4.3 Communication and information during distributed 
emergency handling 
Communication challenges in existing emergency management seem to be related 
to the increased number of actors and the large amount of available information. 
Sharing of information in real time plays an even more crucial part than before in 
coordination of activities at different vertical and horizontal levels in emergency 
handling. From the observations it was found that both poorer and richer forms of 
communication could be used, but that these have both strengths and weaknesses in 
emergency handling that needs to be considered further. Additionally, the 
reliability and integrity of the information shared and received in an emergency 
situation should be considered as important factors when reviewing the data, 
channels and tools used.  
From the observations and the workshop it became clear that the log system is 
considered as an important tool for coordination as well as to gain awareness of the 
actions and how the emergency situation is developing. However, it was found in 
the observation studies that this log was not accessible for all actors, and there is a 
need to assess who should have access to different types of information and 
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systems. Another important element is that there may be a need to protect some of 
the actors involved e.g., 1st and 2nd line emergency personnel from too much 
information and request for information from other actors. However, this needs to 
be balanced in terms of how much information the other actors need in order to be 
able to handle the emergency situation at hand.  
When discussing issues regarding introducing new technology in the emergency 
organization it was found that the tools introduced has to be familiar and user-
friendly to the personnel involved in the emergency situation. It was argued in the 
workshop that emergency management should not be technology driven but that 
the technology and tools used has to support the work processes in emergency 
situations.  
5 Discussion 
The main result from our study is that new work processes enable a more proactive 
approach to emergency management. Making emergency management more 
resilient increases the possibility to deal with deficiencies in risk anticipation, 
dealing with unanticipated events and emergency management’s adaptation to new 
and future work practices. The discussion is further sectioned into three parts; 
proactivity in emergency management and deficiencies in risk anticipation; 
emergency management’s adaptation to new and future work practices such as 
distributed actors and new technology. 
5.1 Towards a proactive emergency management 
The petroleum safety authority refers to the NORSOK Standard Z-013 as 
requirements for handling risks in the oil and gas sector at the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf (NCS) (NTC 2001). The requirements are according to 
traditional risk assessment procedures and follow the as-low-as-reasonable- 
possible (ALARP) principles. Defined situations of hazard and accident (DSHA) 
form the basis for the planning, and execution of the risk- and emergency 
preparedness analysis. The emergency preparedness plan is established in an 
installation’s design and building phase and is executed e.g. for training and 
manning purposes throughout operation. The oil and gas companies rely on the 
NORSOK standard and the work carried out based on this standard for establishing 
their emergency management and for training.  
Based on the discussion of the empirical results it becomes evident that the 
emergency organization should expand their operational time frame. Today, the 
onset of the emergency team is when the event has occurred. Indications of 
possibilities of such an event may exist but are handled as part of normal operation. 
The system recovery phase is handled by outside the emergency management team. 
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We suggest broadening the scope of emergency management in both directions as 
shown in figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 9: Phases in an emergency situation. The position of the traditional 
emergency management organization is shown by a dotted line in the figure and 
the possible new onset of parts of an emergency organization is shown by the 
arrow. 
 
In figure 2, the dotted lined square shows the quite late onset of a traditional 
emergency response. The onset of emergency response comes after there have been 
attempts to respond to the actual situation. The perspectives for the emergency 
management team thus remains to rescue and evacuation of those exposed and to 
bringing the production systems etc. to a safe state. The square with arrows 
indicates that new actors and technology may contribute to an earlier onset of 
response and handling of the situation at hand and thus improve situation 
awareness for the emergency management team. Broadening the scope of 
emergency management implies to expand the set point and total time frame by 
emphasizing anticipation and monitoring. New technology such as real time 
monitoring and visualization enables this expansion. Also, the new work forms 
with use of support teams etc. support such an expansion. When support teams and 
centers are included in the emergency handling they ensure learning throughout the 
organization. It is likely that such an expansion will deal with the deficiencies in 
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early risk anticipation, deal with unanticipated scenarios, and help adapting to new 
technology in work processes. 
5.1.1 Deficiencies in risk anticipation 
The read-through of the investigation reports referred to in the introduction in this 
article was that risk anticipation (mostly referred to as (operational) risk assessment 
in the reports) was insufficient in the majority of the cases. Several major system 
accidents in the recent years have revealed deficiencies in risk assessment and – 
anticipation (e.g. the BP Texas accident (Baker, Erwin et al. 2007) and the 
Challenger accident (Vaughan 1996)). 
Adaptation is an important element in the RE perspective. The capacity to adjust 
and adapt comprises knowledge in terms of Anticipation (what to expect), 
Attention (what to look for), and Response (what to do). These three elements are 
not positioned such that anticipation precedes competence, which in turn precedes 
response. Rather, all three should be continuously be applied and kept active. 
Adaptation is a necessary means to face and cope with change and unexpected 
events (Størseth, Albrechtsen et al. 2010). The continuous process of adaptation 
implies that the level of vigilance in operation needs to stay high in all phases. In 
IO, the use of onshore support teams in normal operation has enabled a turn into a 
dynamic problem solving work process rather than an ‘expert-on-call in case of 
problems’ way of working. The handling of crises seem still to be either ‘on’ or 
‘off’; the emergency handling organization is established by call in case of 
emergency, usually late in the problem solving process. In order to become more 
adaptive and resilient in the handling of operational problems, emergency 
management need to include the transition period from normal operation to the 
actual emergency handling by use of available resources such as the different 
support centers in a more coordinated manner. There is a need for a more proactive 
focus in emergency handling; to focus more on handling deviant situations and 
worst case scenarios at an earlier stage and involving experts, thus handling the 
situation before it escalates to a severe accident.  
Following French & Niculae (2005) it may be argued that there is overconfidence 
in emergency preparedness modeling. They claim models are poorly calibrated for 
major accidents since they are by nature infrequent, thus insufficient pasts data to 
test the models.  The involved persons are drawn from other “day jobs” and have 
little experience of working in a crisis situation (with and assessing the import of 
the advice from their experts).This is true also in the oil and gas industry - the 
personnel that man the emergency centers are drawn from different parts of the 
organization.  
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5.1.2 Emergency management of unanticipated scenarios  
Most emergency management models are based on a belief that the system is 
known or knowable, i.e. that cause and effect are understood and predictable or can 
be determined with sufficient data (French and Niculae 2005). Handling of major 
accident events are mainly characterized by systems or situations that are either 
complex (i.e. cause and effect may be explained after the event) or chaotic (i.e. 
cause and effect not discernible). Social, political and economic issues arise in 
these situations; this is partly due to several stakeholders involved with different 
perceptions of the situation.  In these situations it is difficult to predict what is 
going on and what will happen (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001; 2007). 
An emergency management plan will not be able to consider all aspects of a 
possible future danger or accident situation mainly because it is difficult to 
anticipate how a given danger or accident situation will develop. This means that 
the personnel involved in handling a situation has to have the skills, knowledge and 
creativity to somewhat improvise in a given situation. There may be different 
approaches to designing resilience into a system: (1) Resilience based on detailed 
predictions of hazard scenarios or causal chains, (2) resilience based on specific 
predictions of hazardous effect and states and (3) resilience based on dealing with a 
totally unanticipated scenario (Smith, Spencer et al. 2009). Smith et al. argue for a 
hybrid combination of the three approaches (the fourth approach) which means that 
an organization should be aim at identifying potential contingencies in order to 
ensure effective, customized response to such situations (first layer of defense), but 
that it is not possible to accomplish this for all contingencies. A second layer of 
response should be to identify contingencies at a less complete level of detail and 
to develop generic responses to these. For complex systems, it is argued, that a 
third level of defense is needed, one that makes it possible to detect and respond to 
novel and yet unanticipated scenarios. On the NCS it is usually not possible to 
detect even a second layer of defense in the written procedures and manuals for 
emergency management, though many accident and incident investigation reports, 
especially those that are carried out for major accidents, describe the accident 
scenario as partly or totally novel and not identified in detail in any risk analysis or 
DSHA. Investigation reports of successful handling of major accident scenarios 
often include a description of how the people at the sharp end apply a combination 
of layers of defense, that is; not only relying on detailed or more generic predefined 
handling of the situation (Brattbakk, Østvold et al. 2004; Schiefloe, Vikland et al. 
2005; 2006) 
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5.2 Distributed actors 
Integration of disciplines; technology and across organizational and geographical 
borders is one of the main changes in work practises in the industry (OLF 2005). 
The different actors involved have different responsibilities, rationalities, resources 
and proximity to hazard, which makes the map complex. Which actors who are 
involved in emergency management will vary according to the situation and the 
organization handling it. This makes collaboration and communication between 
different actors a challenge. This challenge of complexity is not only relevant for 
emergencies but is also relevant for maintaining safety in normal operations 
(Grøtan, Størseth et al. 2009). 
On one side, new work processes by distributed actors in the petroleum industry is 
a challenge for emergency management regarding coordination, planning, analysis 
and training. On the other hand, it also represents a possibility for improved 
anticipation. More actors, including contractors, with different ways of interpreting 
situations imply that problems might be detected at an early stage (Weick and 
Sutcliffe 2001; 2007) as well as different understandings of phenomena enrich 
understandings of deviations and causes (Hale and Hovden. 1998; Bolman and 
Deal 2008). This can for example be onshore operational drilling centers that 
monitor drilling performance (Andersen, Sjøwall et al. 2009) and onshore drilling 
support centers that support several rigs with multidisciplinary expert knowledge 
(Wahl, Johnsen et al. 2009). Such centers also strengthen the principle of 
anticipation ‘reluctance to simplify interpretations’ (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001; 
2007) since they have access to as well as dedicated time to study detailed real-
time information about ongoing offshore activities. Most of the operators as well as 
contractors at the NCS today are using or plan to implement onshore operation 
and/or support centers, which will strengthen the ability to anticipate and monitor if 
used in a proper manner in emergency management.  
According to a study by Skjerve et al. (2008) no changes in DSHAs as a 
consequence of new technology and work processes at the shelf have been 
identified, but new factors influence the build-up of; consequences of; and handling 
of events. As a result of integration of actors involved in emergency management 
and how they interact, emergency management planning face two challenges. First, 
all involved actors for different types of events must be identified. It must also be 
mapped out what the roles of the actors are and how they interact with other actors. 
The second challenge is related to risk analysis as an important input to emergency 
preparedness analysis – do adequate risk analytical approaches exist to express risk 
for complex systems? It is outside the scope of this paper to discuss the second 
challenge, which has been addressed by e.g. Grøtan et al. (2009) and Vatn (2010).  
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5.3 New information- and communication technology 
As we stated in the last paragraph the sharing of information between actors within 
a distributed team is important and normally a challenge. Information technology 
can cope with some of the challenges in emergency management. Explicit 
knowledge (databases, models, information surfaces) can be used to make more 
detailed model based analysis and for complex and chaotic spaces where more 
judgment is needed. ICT can support this by collaboration technology (French and 
Niculae 2005). But there is a downside to the increased use of ICT, it leads to more 
complex and tighter coupled organizations (Perrow 1984; Perrow 1999) adding to 
the challenge in emergency management.  
De Bruijne (2007) claims that the environment of many HROs in modern, western 
countries has undergone dramatic changes in the last decades, changing reliability 
organization into high reliability networks (HRNs). HRNs are distinguished from 
traditional HRO by an increased use of ICT, increased real time management and 
an increased interactive complexity.  De Brunijne (ibid) stresses the importance of 
informal, rich interaction between operators across organizational boundaries in 
order to maintain the reliability in HRNs. This statement points to the essence of 
the challenges in future emergency management in the oil and gas industry. The 
concept of Integrated Operations is based on an increased use of ICT giving room 
for faster decisions in real time in an increasingly more complex system. When 
these decisions are made within complex systems with many actors from different 
organizations as shown in figure 1 , it is important that the information that is 
shared is easy to interpret and understand as well as that it is suited for the receiver. 
Richer information such as real images instead of text helps this by demanding less 
interpretation effort from the cognitive human system.   
Increased bandwidth and new information and communication technology (ICT) is 
the main enabler for new work processes in the industry (OLF 2003; 2005; 2009). 
Our observation studies showed that collection and sharing of information among 
different actors have a central role in coordination of activities at different vertical 
and horizontal levels in the emergency handling situation. Workshop participants 
working at the sharp end emphasized that the demand of information must be 
balanced with the actual handling of the emergency situation. It must be avoided 
that request for information disturb the actual handling of the event. Furthermore, 
our observation studies indicate that use of rich communication channels and other 
ways of sharing information than the log system was absent. Paradoxically, the 
industry claims that richer communication and effective visualization of real-time 
information is one of the main new technology-based work processes (ibid). The 
reason for this technological underdevelopment in emergency management is 
probably related to a conservative mind-set in this field. Trust in technology is 
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emphasized and emergency handling it is not an area where one explore new 
technology and work processes. However, in the future it must be assumed that 
emergency management must adapt and implement new technology. In a long-term 
perspective, use of rich communication channels and collecting and visualization 
of real-time information, becomes an established way of working in the other areas 
of operation. In such a situation it will be more efficient for emergency handling to 
stick with the technological solutions that are being used in normal operation. 
To deal with this the challenge of trust in new technology in emergency situations, 
training should emphasize use of the same tools for co-located and distributed 
teams in training so that they are familiar with the tools that will be used in an 
emergency handling situation. Additionally it is important that all actors are able to 
view and observe the same information because this will lead to better 
communication and understanding of the situation. 
Information and communication technology (ICT) must be carefully introduced 
into emergency preparedness training. This is showed by Woltjer, Lindgren et al. 
(2006) and Iannella and Henricksen (2007).  There should not be a mismatch 
between the ICT tools used in training and those used in the actual work 
environment as this may lead to that the domain-specific skills do not transfer to 
real situations. They further go on to say that the skills may transfer but that that 
the skills are inappropriate and a source of confusion and ineffectiveness (Woltjer, 
Lindgren et al. 2006). Emergency management systems that are not used on a 
regular basis are unlikely to be of use in actual emergencies. Our findings support 
that the technology must be familiar to the user(s) and that the user must trust it 
which normally also include that the technology needs to be highly reliable.  
6 Conclusion 
We have presented the results from our study of future challenges and possibilities 
in emergency management in intelligent operation of petroleum production. The 
main result from our study is that there is a need to be more proactive in emergency 
management, a possibility that is enabled by IO concepts. In the discussion of the 
results we suggested three main elements that are important to consider in the 
development of future emergency management; 1) proactive emergency 
management through early risk anticipation; and emergency management’s 
adaptation to new and future work practices such as 2) distributed actors and 3) 
new technology. It is possible to look at emergency management as a process that 
includes several phases – from early signs of something that may develop into an 
accident, to the direct handling of situations and consequences and the process of 
returning to a normal state. To cope with the challenges of new work processes and 
new technology, managing unexpected events and poor risk anticipation we 
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suggest the following principles of resilient emergency management in integrated 
operations: 
- The first principle is monitoring. This is part of normal operation, but it 
may turn into the first phase of emergency handling. Real time data and 
monitoring during normal operation improves the ability to monitor the 
emergence of unwanted development 
- The second principle is anticipation which involves handling the early 
warning deviation and to foresee that this may turn into an unsafe state of 
the system if not handled. This principle influences the emergency 
preparedness planning and implies that risk assessment is an ongoing 
process rather than a static measure. Risk assessment needs to include new 
input such as mapping out distributed actors. 
- The third principle involves responding. This principal is similar to the 
traditional emergency handling. However a proactive focus makes it 
possible to react to deviations before they develop into accidents. As a 
result it makes it possible to return to normal state before the emergency 
situation develops. If this is not possible a different phase of emergency 
management will start that resemble more traditional crisis management.  
- The fourth principle is learning. As the system is back safe state there is 
a need to learn from the process and update the risk image of the system. 
Equally important is to learn from successful handling of events. 
 
These principals are equally important in all phases of emergency management. In 
order to fulfill these principals the emergency organization in the petroleum 
industry need to consider changes in their structure, roles, use of technology and 
work processes.  
Onshore teams that monitor and work with real time data introduce more people 
seeing more of the same things within the operation. Expert knowledge is often 
used in onshore teams. Their knowledge and expertise may imply reluctance to 
simplify and more sensitivity to the operations. This may move the focus of 
handling crises from just handling the top events. The implications of the changes 
will be changed scenarios for and roles within emergency management training 
sessions. In order to prevent distrust in new tools and unfamiliarity with new work 
forms and new actors, the use of collaboration tools and technology for information 
sharing must be especially considered in training sessions. 
Other sectors such as energy supply, the financial system and transport systems 
face the same challenges with new technology and distributed organizations. The 
challenges with emergency management in other industries and especially at the 
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societal level have been exposed to disasters and accidents in the last years, and 
seem to resemble the challenges that we see in our study. The results in this article 
may be equally important for emergency management outside the oil and gas 
industry.  
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